TIEMPO FUERA!

power-sharing be affirmed as an operating principle, while the British Government obliged by its pronouncements but effectively did

34 little else to promote it.

Power-sharing, or rather, a lack of confidence in British intentions regarding power-sharing was, however, only one of four

factors which undermined Anglo-Irish relations throughout the remaining period of office of the National Coalition. Primarily, the doubts

concerning this principle may be viewed as extending from the overriding Irish uncertainty concerning the British policies in Northern Ireland. As Keith Kyle later commented

... the worst shock for the Irish Government was the revelation of what they interpreted as British

irresolution in the face of a fundamental challenge to

Patrick Keatinge,

A Place Among the Nations: Issues of Irish

Foreign Policy

(Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1978), p. 122, (hereafter cited as Keatinge,

Issues of Irish Foreign Policy).

ip

Fisk,

The Point of No Return

3 p. 230. 33

Fitzgerald, 'Statement on Northern Ireland', p. 21. 34

See also pp. 204-10 concerning the alleged Unionist-Labour Party 'pact'and its bearing on power-sharing.

Britain's authority, particularly in the vital first days [of the UWC strike]. From then on they felt

themselves out of touch with British motives, consulted in a formal way but not taken into confidence.35

Moreover Anglo-Irish relations in this third period confirmed Harold Wilson's April 1974 prophecy that if the Executive failed then 'there would be little hope that we could once again reconstruct a fresh

36

political initiative1. Thus, drift served to compound uncertainty throughout the following three years — through the succession of James Callaghan as Prime Minister, to the return of Fianna Fail as Government in the Republic.

The remaining three factors — a readiness on the part of the British Government to negotiate with the Provisional IRA, the susceptibi1ity of the Labour Government (after 1976) to Unionist

pressure at Westminster, and disputes concerning transnational security matters may be regarded as issues with more limited implications than the first. Indeed, it is suggested that these factors achieved the prominence they did, directly as a result of the absence in Anglo-Irish relations of imaginative measures such as had characterised the

preceding period.

It is emphasised that the above four classifications are not 37

exhaustive: others, such as internment, the use of CR gas by

38 39 40

security forces in the North, sectarian murders, and espionage,

35

Keith Kyle, 'Sunningdale and after: Britain, Ireland, and Ulster',

The World Today,

31 (November 1975): 448.

or

Press conference, Belfast, 18 April 1974, Times, 14 April 1974, p .1, 37

Dail Eireann,

Official Report,

vol. 275, 7 November 1974,

cols. 1315-18; vol. 277, 5 February 1975, cols. 1711-15; and vol. 281, 5 June 1975, cols. 1841-3.

38

Dail Eireann,

Official Report

, vol. 277, 8 February 1975, cols. 1699-1701.

39

Dail Eireann,

Official R e p o r t

vol. 283, 9 July 1975, cols. 1124-7. 40

Dail Eireann, Official Report, vol. 275, 7 November 1974, cols. 1315-16; and vol. 285, 19 November 1975, cols. 1554-6.

all contributed to the deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations between mid-1974 and mid-1977, but by no means to the same extent as those which are given a more detailed consideration.

As on previous occasions, the British Government's decision to meet with the Provisional IRA coincided with efforts in both Britain and Ireland to create conditions inimical to the latter's support.

In both countries the respective governments accepted the recommendations of the Law Enforcement Commission and proceeded with legislation to

41

establish extra-territorial courts. In the case of Britain contact with the Provisional IRA also followed closely upon virtuous

denunciations by the Northern Ireland Secretary of the political morality of acceding to such a course of action. On 3 June 1974 Merlyn Rees had explained to the House of Commons

This group [the UWC] is a non-elected body of men that sought to subvert the expressed wish and

authority to this Parliament through unconstitutional and undemocratic means involving widespread

intimidation ...

In the same way as I refused to be bombed to the conference table by the Provisionals, so I have been adamant that a sectarian strike by so-called Loyalists and backed by para-military forces would not force me to such a conference table.42

Nevertheless, in December 1974, with the foreknowledge and

something more than the tacit approval of the Northern Ireland Office 43

(NIO), a group of Protestant clergymen met with Provisional IRA 44

leaders at Smyth's Village Hotel, Feakle, Co. Clare. This resulted

41

The Legislation came into effect on 1 June 1976. 42

House of Commons,

Official Report

, vol. 874, 3 June 1974. col. 880. 43

McAllister,

SDLP

, pp. 148-9, claimed that it was 'with at least the tacit approval of the NIO', and a report subsequent to the publication of this work indicates that the 'men of God had the Government's confidence' — John Whale and Chris Ryder, 'Ulster 1968-1978: A Decade of Despair',

Sunday Times,

18 June 1978, p. 17, (hereafter cited as Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of Despair').

44

Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of Despair', p. 17; and Conor O'Clery, 'Provisionals got a commitment to withdraw',

Irish Times

, 9 June 1978. (O'Clery's article is an interview with the Rev. William Arlow, the man responsible for arranging this and a later meeting between British

Officials and Provisional Sinn Fein; hereafter the article will be cited as O'Clery, Arlow interview,

Irish Times

, 9 June 1978).

in a ceasefire by the Provisionals which lasted from 22 December 1974 to 16 January 1975. Within a few weeks of this meeting, on 19 January 1975, representatives of Provisional Sinn Fein — only notionally

distinct from the Provisional IRA — met with British Government representatives including James Allan, a Foreign and Commonwealth

45

Office diplomat seconded to the NIO. Once again the outcome was a ceasefire, which began on 10 February.

Rees's reversal of his previous policy on this matter owed much to his hope for a stable environment in which the forthcoming

Constitutional Convention could operate. By his account he ... sought to get away from the daily catalogue of violence and open the door to a new situation in which discussions and political activity could take place in a constructive and peaceful atmosphere.46

He was, therefore, disposed to respond to reductions in the level of violence by the IRA. As he admitted in the Commons

the actions of the security forces ... would be related to the level of any activity which might occur.47

Furthermore he promised that, in the event of 'a genuine and sustained 43 cessation of violence', he would 'gradually release all detainees'.

Rees, it might be noted, eschewed the term 'ceasefire'. Last year there was a ceasefire. I did not

describe it as a ceasefire. ,Jhose were the words used by the Provisional I R A .49

45

Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of Despair', p.15; and O'Clery, Arlow interview,

Irish Times

, 9 June 1978.

46

House of Commons,

Official Report

, vol.885, 5 February 1975, col.1384, 47

House of Commons,

Official Report

, vol.884, 14 February, cols.201-02, as cited as McAllister,

SDLP

, p.149.

48

House of Commons,

Official Report,

vol.885, 5 February 1975, col.1384, 49

House of Commons,

Official Report

, vol.913, 14 June 1976, col.48. In fact they were words used by more than the Provisional IRA: in May 1975, a British Government agency, the Central Office of Information, described the cessation of violence that occurred as a 'ceasefire'

[Northern Ireland

, (London: Central Office of Information, 1975), p.6], while in 1979, Sir Harold Wilson went so far as to term it a 'definitive

Moreover he went so far as to deny that the meetings with Provisional Sinn Fein were negotiations.

There have never been negotiations with anyone, but, ... it is valuable to explain Government policy, and my advisers believe that benefit is to be gained from doing so.ou

Rees's attempt to evade the use of expressions alluded to by semantic juxtaposition is to be understood in terms of the opprobrium which contacts with the Provisionals had earned William Whitelaw in

1972. But such an understanding in no way serves to authenticate his claim that the meetings, in early 1975 anyway, were called so that the IRA might become better acquainted with the British policies. On the contrary, there are grounds for concluding that, at these meetings which were 'never ... negotiations', it was the

IRA

that convinced the British representatives of

its

intentions to conduct a massive

terrorist campaign on the mainland, and obtained in return for not doing so, several advantages which included a promise by the British to

withdraw from Northern Ireland.

If this was the case, then obviously the Northern Ireland

Secretary allowed himself somewhat elastic limits, beyond the release of detainees, in which to respond to the IRA's 'sustained cessation of violence'. It is useful, therefore, to consider the evidence relating to the outcomes of these meetings, and in some instance, the

reliability of those who provided it. In particular, considerable reliability must be placed on the veracity of the Rev. William Arlow,

51

a Church of Ireland clergyman, and then Assistant Secretary to the

In document Proceso y diagnósticos de enfermería (página 132-134)