(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1974). 78
Richard Crossman,
The Diaries of A Cabinet Minister
s 3 vols. 1:2 (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathon Cape, 1975 and 1976 resp.);revealed the disquieting shallowness of the Labour Government's 79
appreciation of the Northern Ireland problem — in particular a pervasive British failure to develop policies which accurately reflected strongly-held perceptions, or to implement fully those
80
policies which were developed.
It may also have been Callaghan's misfortune that
A House Divided
was published when he was in Opposition, enjoying a widely-held but undeserved reputation as a 'success' in Northern Ireland, and not
81
concerned with even 'shadowing' that portfolio. Thus the 'greening' 82 of the future Prime Minister — i.e. his hope for eventual Irish unity — must have been an embarrassment to him upon assuming the leadership of a party whose tenure of the treasury benches was in large part dependent upon a small minority who were unalterably opposed to this prospect. (Nor could Harold Wilson's comfortable advocacy of Irish
83
unity, in Opposition, have been a legacy Callaghan received with any great gratitude).
His Northern Ireland Secretary was, therefore, obliged to engage in some peculiar conceptual inconsistencies. The first principle on which Rees argued was contained in the July 1974 White Paper, which stated
2 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977). 79
Oddly, the Irish Government regarded some of the leading officials who served these politicians in very good light. According to Mr Sean Donlon, an assistant Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the reports submitted to London by seconded F.C.O. diplomats Oliver Wright and Howard Smith, were 'first class', (Interview, Dublin, 7 June 1978). According to one report, a similar respect was voiced for a later F.C.O. appointment at the NIO, Frank Cooper, (Whale and Ryder, 'Decade of
Despair1, p. 15). 80
The same shallowness imputed to the Labour Minister named above is also found in the memoirs of a former Conservative Home Secretary. See Reginald Maudling,
Memoirs
(London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978), p. 28; p. 157; and pp. 178-88.81
Harold Wilson took over this role in December 1971. 82
Callaghan,
A House Divided
, pp. 182-7. See Chapter 1, p. 72.Any pattern of government must be acceptable to the people of the United Kingdom as a whole and to
Parliament at Westminister. Citizenship confers not only rights and privileges but also obi igations.84-
Second, the House of Commons was the supreme legislative body of the United Kingdom, it was up to that body 'to reach final decisions'.
'That', said Rees, 'is what being part of the United Kingdom is all about'.^
Both, however, were aspirations rather than operating principles. Insofar as the first was concerned, there was not in 1974, nor has there been since, any suggestion that the British Government would refer
Northern Ireland matters
to the United Kingdom electorate.
And with some justification. In every major survey conducted in Britain since86
1974 a majority opinion has been expressed in favour of withdrawal. As Sir John Peck, the British Ambassador to Ireland (1970-1973) remarked of an earlier similar claim to that of Rees's
87 this [was] an elegant charade which fooled nobody.
Nevertheless, with regard to the second Rees was somewhat more able to demonstrate the operability of the principle. On 3 February 1976 the Constitutional Convention was ordered to reconvene because the United Kingdom Government did not view its Report as 'commanding
88
sufficiently widespread acceptance throughout the community'. It was required, thereupon, to further deliberate and, hopefully, agree on a system of government which 'provided for a form of partnership and
The Northern Ireland Constitution
, p. 16, and cited by Rees, House of Commons,Official Report
, vol. 903, 12 January 1976, col. 54.^ ibid., c o l . 54.
86
According to a study published in 1978, from June 1974 to February 1977, 'British opinion has been consistent and clear: in each of seven surveys a majority, averaging 57 per cent, has favoured a phased with drawal of troops' (Richard Rose, Ian McAllister, and Peter Mair, Is
There A Concurring Majority About Northern Ireland
3 Studies in Public Policy, No. 22 (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy,University of Strathclyde, 1978), p. 27. 87
John Peck,
Dublin from Downing Street
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1978), p. 135.participation'. Yet the limits within which this prerogative would be exercised were abundantly clear. The collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive was eloquent testimony to the contingent rather than the absolute primacy of Westminster which the Loyalists operate under, and which the Labour Government passively encouraged by its lack of effective action against the UWC. In appreciating, but in no way justifying, the ferae majeure of their position Rees concluded that
a united Ireland [was] not in the gift of this Pariiament.90
To this point it may reasonably be assumed that the Irish
Government extended its understanding of the factors which determined the diminishing efforts by the British Government to break the stalemate in Northern Ireland. Thereafter, for the clearest of reasons, this could not be assumed. At issue was a measure — on increase in the Province's representation at Westminster — which if introduced or encouraged by the British Government, could only be interpreted as
antithetical to Irish unity. In this it was obvious that the imperatives of maintaining government office were foremost, although the full extent of what v/as involved did not become apparent in the period now under review.91
But it was apparent that the Labour Government, in the latter half of 1976, had found it necessary to reverse its position on the representative question. On 18 March 1976, the Northern Ireland Secretary came under strong pressure from the Conservative Opposition during Question Time in the House of Commons to increase the number of Northern Ireland seats. Rees in reply insisted that, 'even to talk about extra representation is to fly in the face of history' and, therefore,
92 that such a change would not be feasible.
89
House of Commons,
Official Report
, vol. 906, 5 March 1976, col. 1716. 90House of Commons,
Official Report,
vol. 903, 12 January 1976, col. 51. See Chapter 4, pp. 204-10.92
House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 907, 18 March 1976, cols. 1518-19.
Throughout the remainder of 1976 the Labour Government remained non-committal on increased representation until the approach of a devolution debate. At that point, Mr Michael Foot, the leader of the House of Commons, proposed that
progress should be made on the question of representation from Northern Ireland.
Furthermore he repeated to the House part of a speech made by the 93
Northern Ireland Secretary, Mr Roy Mason, the previous week, in which he said that a constitutional settlement would open the way for
94 the change in the 'present under-representation'.
95 His denial that this was in the nature of a 'commitment' did not allay fears in Dublin that the British Government was fundamentally uncertain of its own intentions. Thus the Irish Foreign Minister
noted later
the ... private discussions between Unionist/Loyalist M.P.s at Westminster ... and some members of the present, British Government ... may have helped to delude Unionist opinion as to the attitude of the present British
Government.96 and
a prolonged failure to give full attention to the problem, leading to a feeling amongst both sections of the
community in Northern Ireland that the buck is being
passed exclusively to them, despite the obvious difficulty that they face in arriving at a solution unaided, and without any clear concept of the intentions of the sovereign power.97
The National Coalition of which Fitzgerald was a Minister passed
93 94
Mason succeeded Rees as Northern Ireland Secretary in September 1976, House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 921, 30 November 1976,
col. 825.
95 ibid., col. 826 96
P. 97
Fitzgerald, 'Statement on Northern Ireland, 12 October 1977', p. 20.
from office in June 1977 without the sought-after clarification of British intentions — indeed they were no clearer nearly two years beyond then when the British Labour Government was defeated — but not before a re-emerging concern with security matters was restored to its former prominence, and with it, the fourth unsettling influence upon Anglo-Irish relations.
As with the previous factor, there appeared little good reason for security considerations to provide such a substantial cause for misunderstanding and tension. Certainly the irritation caused by the methods and practice of Border road closures continued to be an
98
irritant, as did the steadily mounting toll of cross-Border incursions 99
by the British Army, but of these only a small number constituted what Fitzgerald described as 'of a particular serious character
involving assaults on members of our security forces or threats against them'. ^
Yet it is deserving of comment that these infringements, whether unintentional or (deliberate, failed to prompt a 'troops out' demand by the Irish Government. On the contrary it appeared to be an almost whole-hearted supporter of the British Army's presence in the North.
In the Northern Ireland debate of 26 June 1974 the Taoiseach was adamant that its presence was essential in the province to ensure the protection of the Catholic community:
y
o'
*
See for example, Dail Eireann,
Official Report
, vol. 274, 9 July 1974, cols. 513-14; vol. 275, 30 October 1974, cols. 547-8; ibid., 7 November 1974, col. 1312; vol. 279, 10 April 1975, cols. 1497-8; vol. 280, 6 May 1975, cols. 1127-8; and vol. 285, 6 November 1975, cols. 1093-4.99
In the period 1 January 1973 to 12 May 1976, 304 incursions by the British Army were registered by the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs. 261 of these incidents were taken up with the British, who expressed regret for 144; 19 (on 13 May 1976) were still under discussion, and on 117 there was disagreement as to the facts. By Irish Government estimates there were 22 Irish Army incursions into Northern Ireland in the same period. Dail Eireann,
Official Report
, vol. 290, 13 May 1976, cols. 1323-3.Dail Eireann,
Official Report
, vol. 275, 5 November 1974, cols. 929-30. For a brief account of three such incidents see Dail Eireann,Official Report
, vol. 271, 14 March 1974, cols. 272-5; andSome people say that the British Government should be asked now to make a declaration of their intent to withdraw at some time in the future to be determined by parties in Ireland, or to withdraw their troops to barracks as a first step in a phased withdrawal.
Suggestions of this kind ignore reality — for example, the reality of the exposed position of the minority in many parts of the North and the absence of any Northern
Ireland security force acceptable to the whole community there.101
On this at least there grew to be a close agreement — if there was not
102
one already. After the failure of the first phases of the
Constitutional Convention, Rees, in Janaury 1976, denounced withdrawal as a 'short-sighted ... but above all ... an irresponsible policy' for the havoc its implementation would wreck, not only in Northern
103 Ireland but also the Republic and mainland Britain.
In any event the Republic's endorsement of a British military presence was a natural consequence of its 'low profile' on Northern Ireland, which was further amplified by the Minister for Defence. On the occasion of an interview in September 1975, Mr Patrick Donegan disclaimed any foreseeable situation, specifically the 'doomsday' scenario, in which the Irish Army would receive orders to cross the Border in aid of the minority community. In Donegan's reckoning the
104 Army was 'here to see that our citizens go to bed and sleep safely'.
In a positive sense also the Irish Republic's response on security matters during the period of office of the National Coalition
reflected a general Anglo-Irish accord. Although many of the measures undertaken by the Irish Government fell short of the joint British
105
Army/Irish Army patrols sought by Roy Mason in July 1974, there were,
101
Dail Eireann,
Official Report
, vol. 273, 26 June 1974, cols. 1579-80.102
i.e. Depending on the substance to the allegations of withdrawal previously referred to.
10?
House of Commons,
Official Report,
vol. 903, 12 January 1976, col.51. 104Irish Press, 11 September 1975, p. 1.
1 OS
House of Commons,
Official Report
, vol. 876, 2 July 1974, col. 195 (Mr Mason was then Secretary of State for Defence.)nevertheless, substantial efforts made in relation to the overall resources of the Republic. In the space of the five years since the
'troubles' had begun in earnest (i.e. between 1969 and 1974), the Defence Budget was tripled — to over £ 40 million. Recruitment to the Army and Garda Siochana (Police) were also substantially increased: in the former from 8,252 in 1969 to 11,602 in 1 9 7 4 , and in the
latter from approximately 6,400 in 1969 to approximately 8,300 in 1974. After explosions in Dublin and Monaghan on 17 May 1974 had claimed 28 lives the Irish Government recalled the more than 300 troops it had serving with the United Nations force in Cyprus and supplemented this
/ /
measure with a limited call-up of the Forsai Cosanta Aitula — the Irish 109
Army Local Defence Forces. In the Dail the Taoiseach made a plea to school-leavers to 'consider the desirability of a period of service in the Army' so that the security forces might be well provided with
manpower to combat the terrorist threat to the country.**^ The strength of the Army was then (June 1974) at its highest peace-time level since the Civil War half a century earlier, while that of the Garda
111
Siochana was at its highest level since the foundation of the State. Of a combined military-police strength of 19,000,nearly 3,000 were on
112
security duties in the Border areas. Measured simply in financial terms, the violence in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1974 was estimated to have cost the Republic £40 million in financing the
106
Comparison was made between the respective Appropriation Accounts of the Defence Vote for 1969-70 and 1974. Photo-copies of same were supplied by the Department of Defence, Dublin, but not with any full title reference, ^ Letter to the writer from the Department of Defence, Dublin,
16 October 1980. 108
Conor Brady, 'The Changing of the Gardai',
Irish Times
, 24 September 1979, p. 10. Unfortunately no reply was received by the writer to his written inquiry of 25 July 1980, addressed to the Commissioner, Garda Siochana, regarding yearly increases in man-power levels and Appropriation Account. The police figures are, therefore, the result of interpolating figures as of 1973 and 1977 used by Brady. .109
London Sunday Times
, 19 May 1974.
Dail Eireann,
Official Report,
vol. 273, 26 June 1974, col. 1580. *** Speech by the Minister for Justice, Mr Cooney, ibid., col. 1604.112
It was a response which was well received in London, as was indicated by the Prime Minister in the course of a Northern Ireland security debate in 1976, by which time the levels referred to in the foregoing had all maintained their steady increase.
I pay tribute to the co-operation we are receiving from the Government of the Republic of Ireland ... There is no doubt that the Government of the Republic are as determined as are this Government to stamp out cross-border banditry and murder. There is now close and valuable co-operation between the RUC and the Irish p o l i c e . ! ^
By exclusion it was clear that the British Government was still not appreciably closer to its objective of Army-to-Army co-operation,
115
a point which Wilson admitted later in the debate. However, it was not this shortcoming in Anglo-Irish relations which caused them to be further strained in 1976/1977, although both of the two causes of this process may be partly attributed to the frustration which a lack of bilateral military co-operation engendered.
The first concerned the consequences of incursions into the Republic of Ireland by two units of the British Army Special Air Service (SAS) on 5/6 May 1976. Depsite a request from the British Under-Secretary for the Army, Mr Robert Brown, that the Irish
1 1
Government take a 'constructive view' of the incident, the eight men concerned were tried in the Special Criminal Court in Dublin (which normally saw alleged IRA defendants before it) in March 1977. The charges they faced were:, possessing arms and ammunition without a
113 expansion of the security forces alone.
ibid., col. 1574. In 1974 the Irish budget was approximately £ 1,500 mi 11 ion.
114
House of Commons, Official Report, vol.903, 12 January 1976, col.29.' 115
ibid., col. 33. See also House of Commons, Official Reports vol.903, 22 January 1976, cols. 1515-18, for confirmation by Rees that cross- Border police co-operation v/as 'close', and in some areas 'excellent', but that bilateral Army co-operation was unlikely.
i i
r
licence, and possessing weapons with intent to endanger life — the latter of which carried a twenty-year maximum prison sentence.* 7 Perhaps fortunately for the whole spectrum of Anglo-Irish relations, the SAS personnel were acquitted of this second charge, but found
U p
guilty and fined £100 each on the other.
In the context of the hundreds of incursions by British Army units into the Republic from Northern Ireland, the question arises as to why these particular instances were subject to the full force of Irish law. And, incidentally, why it was that two British patrols which crossed into the Republic only the following day (7 May) were escorted back to the Border without further action being taken by
119 the Irish authorities.
The answer is to be found, generally, in the context of what the Minister for Foreign Affairs described as
the firmest assurances [from the British Government! that their activities would be confined to the other side of the Border and that their method of operation would be in accordance with the law in Northern
Ireland.120
and the conflicting fact that, by the date of this statement, over
121
300 incursions had been reported. It is also to be found in the
122
suspicion with which the SAS are regarded in Ireland, which arose 123 from its justified reputation as an elite and unorthodox regiment.
**
Sunday Times
3 6 March 1977. 118Guardian
, 9 March 1977. 119Irish Times
3 8 May 1976, p. 1.120
Dail Eireann,
Official Report
, vol. 290, 13 May 1976, col. 1328. 121 ibid., cols. 1325-6.122
See for example, Dail Eireann,
Official Report
, vol. 271, 27 March 1973, cols. 903-07; and vol. 287, 21 January 1976, col. 3.123
The SAS's unorthodoxy was testified to at the Dublin trial by Major Brian Baty who was commander of the SAS in South Armagh at the time the incursions occurred. He admitted that although his men operated under the same rules and instructions as other army units, they used 'slightly different methods'.
Guardian
, 9 March 1977.official circles in Dublin that the SAS had deliberately infringed 124 the Republic's territory with an intent to operate therein.
The effect of this particular incident upon Anglo-Irish relations is difficult to assess. While it was Fizgerald's opinon during the early controversy that it caused, that it would not significantly affect
125
Anglo-Irish relations or co-operation against terrorism, the long delay between the incursion and the trial must surely have compounded