Money is also talked about in other (less central) ways by middle-income participants. For example, most participants are also ambivalent or express tensions about personal money in some manner. This occurs in two ways. First, more than half of the participants talk about money in terms of the „tensions‟ that personal money may create. In each case, participants reflect on times in which they have personally experienced some kind of financial stress or worry, or in particular, have had to do with very little or even no money. The experiences are without exception described in negative terms. Some of the descriptive terms include the following: „awful‟, socially „cut-off‟, „stressful‟, „a loose canon‟, the „rug pulled from under my feet‟, „rough‟ and „tough‟, „ashamed‟, „scroungy kind of existence‟, „anxiety‟, „a sad, sad tale‟, „really depressing‟, „panic‟, „difficult‟, and a „source of unhappiness‟. For middle-income participants, there are no silver linings around these kinds of money experiences.
Accordingly, as well as orienting themselves towards money as „central‟ to a good life, many in the middle-income group are also clear that financial difficulty is a state to be actively avoided. That is, they not only indicate an orientation towards personal money as „good‟ and worthwhile pursing, but also that the converse – having little money or difficulties related to money acquisition – is a circumstance they are oriented away from. For middle-income participants, choosing financial difficulty is not legitimated in the context of a „good life‟, and not at all conceivable as a possible alternative money meaning.
Second, almost half of participants feel uneasy about the relation of personal money to wellbeing or, in particular, „happiness‟. For example, they commonly reflect, albeit briefly, on variations of the old adage that „money won‟t bring you happiness‟. At the same time however, it is a theme often continued by participants with a
118 „I think it was Zsa Zsa Gabor who said “money can‟t buy you happiness, but at least you can dress well while you‟re sad”. I thought yeah, that‟s exactly right. It won‟t solve all your problems, but it‟ll buy you some nice
distractions‟. (Damien, 27, Administrator)
„So, when you think of the good life, being able to go out and have a few drinks with friends, go out for a meal or go out to the theatre. You can‟t really do that unless you‟ve got a bit of cash. And then there are a lot of things that you can do that make you very happy that don‟t involve money. But it‟s always nicer to have the choice!‟ (Ruth, 25, Government Employee) These participants show constraint in their orientation towards money as central to a „good life‟. However, there are also common themes within this restraint. First, participants are not ambivalent towards the relation of personal money to a range of outcomes (such as too much wealth or consumption) but rather specifically to one outcome: happiness. Second, they do not articulate why this is the case. The idea is described as if it is a „self-evident‟ statement amongst these participants, without any rationale necessary. Third, the comment is invariably followed by the qualification that doing without money is also not an option. Sally provides another example of these points:
„I‟ve lived in situations where our family was really wealthy, like we had yachts and everything, and then - totally bankrupt. And the best times we had were when we had no money… I mean it‟s good to have money. Like I would say to [partner] that I don‟t want to be like my parents where, if something breaks down you never have the money to fix it. I want to have enough [money] away so that, if I need a vacuum cleaner I can just go out
and buy one.‟ (Sally, 35, Administrator)
It is clear in these instances that the ambivalences expressed are not only found in the felt disjuncture between money and happiness, but more particularly in the difficulty participants have in reconciling what this ambivalence means in relation to their orientations towards money. In other words, these participants are articulating the „ideal‟ that there is a moral inconsistency between wealth accumulation and personal happiness. However, they find it difficult to articulate the possibility that
119 understanding money as „good‟ could be a moral dilemma. This is because by all other accounts their idea of „happiness‟ also sits within an orientation that treats personal money not as a dilemma but as a dominant, ongoing life-goal and „good‟. As such, participants struggle to resolve the disjuncture, resulting in ambivalence towards what actually constitutes „happiness‟. The effect of this is that it becomes a comment that participants have nowhere to „go‟ with, for example in no case amongst the middle-income group is there any sustained discussion about this theme. In comparison, downshifters (see chapter nine) also use the term „happiness‟ in relation to money but tend to clearly articulate strong justifications for what they mean in relation to these two „goods‟.
A similar dilemma is noted in at least five instances where middle-income
participants contradict themselves about their views on money. For example, George, in reflection about the relation of money to needs and desires, states that he doesn‟t need to have luxuries, such as expensive cars. However later in the interview he highlights the possibility of owning a Porsche „at 40‟. Thus, while George admits on the one hand he has no need of a luxury car, it is nevertheless built into his
perceptions and hopes of who he will be in the future. Another example is Mark, who begins his interview with an explanation of a shift in his thinking over time about money, from in his youth desiring to be very wealthy to more recently placing far greater value on relationships without which money „won‟t mean anything‟. Towards the end of the interview, Mark comes to the conclusion that in a good life, „everyone wants to be a millionaire‟, and that his goals are directed towards being debt free, owning property and working hard for a „happy life‟. It seems no matter how much other values – like relational ones - exist in the „good life‟, money continually resurfaces in importance alongside them and even (as in Mark‟s case) given ultimate importance.
On the one hand, these contradictions flag a genuine desire for some kind of self- restraint against the simple pursuit of personal money. However, the self-restraint itself is ambivalent, and playful concessions result in the almost-burying of these self- restraints under the inevitability of the pursuit of money as a central moral orientation in the „good life‟. In other words, these middle-income participants have difficulty
120 acknowledging the „good‟ of self-restraint because that privilege is given to personal money understood as „good‟ money.