Consequently for both Bauman and Taylor, morality is central to their description of being human. By virtue of the fact that humans ask questions about and grapple with issues of what is right or wrong or good or bad, they are „moral‟. This description of the moral individual does differ from Durkheim‟s „moral fact‟. For Durkheim (1972), „society‟ is the overarching consciousness from which normatively understood moral authority is derived. Accordingly, because morality is a social „fact‟, morality is understood as a product of the social. In other words for Durkheim, moral cohesion – through individuation, or „organic‟ solidarity - is a „function‟ of the social. The normative moral standard of individualism is thus considered ideal (for the best function of society) and any alternative moral beliefs are viewed as pathological. Consequently, Durkheim‟s perception of morality as a functional „product‟ of the social differs from Bauman and Taylor‟s conceptualisation of the intrinsically moral individual.
Consequently, the first point to make about the sociology of morality for the purpose of this thesis is that moral orientations are theorised in a number of ways. On the one hand, morality can be understood as both a function of needs arising from human sociality (or a „social morality‟), as in Durkheim‟s understanding. On the other hand, morality is also theorised as central to the „self‟, and as Bauman has noted, even possible outside sociality. Findings in the following chapters raise the central question about how these different understandings of morality apply to one another.
92 As such, the relationship between Durkheim‟s form of social morality and the moral self will be discussed more extensively in the thesis discussion (chapter eleven). Differences aside, Durkheim nevertheless insisted that if morality is social in any way, then sociology should be concerned with understanding process. Taylor and Bauman also similarly contend that the moral subject is implicated in historical and social process. The following section will outline their theories in contrast to alternative claims that suggest morality is predominantly an individual phenomenon.
4.2.4.
Historical and social processes of the moral self
It is suggested by some theorists that morality in contemporary society can only be understood in the context of individual agency. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre (1981: 35-66) claims that morality has been reduced to an individualised phenomenon. He argues that moral judgement has lost evaluative meaning, or meaning beyond itself. This, he notes, is because the traditional values that morality was once embedded in no longer find a home in the rationalist principles that have come to dominate social life. According to MacIntyre, the „moral self‟ is therefore a sovereign agent with no orienting frameworks or shared basis for rationale. Any language surrounding moral judgement is but a „linguistic survival from the practices of classical theism‟ (MacIntyre 1981: 57). The continued use of the language of moral judgement without the theistic context in which they originally made sense means that a great chasm exists between such uses of the term „morality‟ and their meanings. For MacIntyre, the ideal society would be one in which the virtues (drawn from Homeric / Aristotelian philosophy) were oriented around practice, narrative order, and a moral tradition.23 Accordingly, MacIntyre explains moral meaning in modernity as reduced to the sphere of individual moral choice.
23
While MacIntyre contends that when it comes to morality, modern society has left the individual as sovereign agent with few meaningful orienting anchors, his „ideal‟ society would be a return to a society tied to social principles and ends oriented around an Aristotelian notion similar to the polis.
93 Both Taylor and Bauman take a different perspective to morality than MacIntyre. Both argue that historical and social processes are a key to understanding the contemporary phenomenon of morality. Taylor, for example, argues that understanding the social history of moral change is integral to conceptualising morality. Bauman argues that what makes humans into individuals is society, and consequently the notion of „individual‟ is not some natural, innate feature of being24
. The following is an exploration of Taylor‟s ideas, and through them a return to critique MacIntyre‟s account of morality. Subsequent to this I outline Bauman‟s theory, which offers a concrete link into sociological processes in shifting social formations through modernity and post-modernity.
Taylor‟s historical sources
The heart of Taylor‟s account lies in his historical exploration of the moral self, in which he signposts the continuity and adaptation of moral sources as they weave through shifting understandings of the self over time. His historical account rests on a view of the nature of changing thought in the way transitions in moral sources and self-identities occur. Taylor suggests that historically people do not reject one moral framework (such as theism) for another (like scientific rationality) simply because the former is proven incorrect. Taylor‟s „best account‟ principle can help to explain this idea. The „best account principle‟ is that the human world involves descriptions and explanations that best account for the meanings that thought and actions embody, including „hypergoods‟. On this basis, Taylor suggests that shifts in moral sources
That is, embedded in teleological notions of goals directed toward (collective) human ends, morality would flourish through virtues established in practice, through a narrative order, and a moral tradition (1981: 170-4.). In other words, although MacIntyre conceptualises modernity as morally atomised (and even individual morality as having little meaning in relation to others), his „solution‟ is a far more Durkheimian model of morality embedded in social cohesion through a shared project.
24
In fact, Bauman (1993) states that the term „morality‟ itself is a specifically modern one, because the distinction between moralities has only in the modern era become a distinct sphere of thought, action and sentiment, alongside the notion of „individual‟ entities, capable of making evaluative self choice.
94 (or hypergoods) are grounded within the existing intuitions and moral experience available (by best account) to individuals at the time. In other words, people are only convinced to shift from one moral source to another if what is already morally available to them is superseded by a higher moral awareness or consciousness. Taylor (1989: 72) names this shift an „epistemic gain‟.
To clarify this idea, Taylor suggests that conflict exists within any moral experience or recognition of „goods‟. By their very nature, „goods‟ frequently and inherently embody dilemmas, such as being in conflict with other „goods‟. A „good‟ such as „universal human rights‟ for example, holds internal dilemmas not least because its ideal continually remains unrealized. It may also conflict with other social „goods‟ such as those embodied in the individual pursuit of happiness. Taylor reasons that these dilemmas form a motivation for moral transitions because only in seeking their resolution are new moral sources named. In other words, the criteria for the
invocation of new „goods‟ (or the elevation of existing ones to a higher status) is the perceived epistemological gain or superior experience thought to be achievable through them (Taylor 1989: 62-75).
Historically, Taylor suggests that these moral re-articulations (or epistemic gains) have taken diverse paths. His account highlights the major shifts as: the development of the Inward Turn, the Affirmation of the Ordinary, and The Voice of Nature. Following is a brief outline of crucial elements within each historical transition. Taylor (1989: 111) acknowledges that the notion of „individual‟ that is taken for granted today was by no means available to 16th and 17th century societies. However, moral transitions toward „inwardness‟ at the time now underlie the modern self as commonly understood today. In the context of a largely theistic order/cosmos, Taylor traces transitions in thinking through major philosophies of the time: Plato‟s self mastery, Augustine‟s radical reflexivity, Descartes‟ disengaged reason, Locke‟s punctual self, and others. From them, some fundamental shifts in self-understanding took place. First is an incremental disconnection from the wider, cosmic and
meaningful order, with individual paradigm direction set subjectively, from within. Coupled with growing notions of disengaged reason, self reflexivity, self exploration and self-control were increasingly endorsed through a growing value placed upon
95 self-responsible independence and human dignity. Another inward turn took place through a recognition and privileging of the particular. Subjective identities, often in uneasy tension with disengaged reason, thus formed another facet of the modern „self‟. Yet another inward turn involves the ethic of personal commitment driven by Reformational Puritanism, shifting the basis of consensus from communal to
contractual relations. This ethic radicalised the first two aspects and extended their reach further into shifting spiritual thinking and forming secularisms (Taylor 1989: 111-198).
Taylor (1989: 211-33) describes the other two major shifts similarly: as incremental moral transitions in thinking through the increasing valuing and privileging of some ideas and behaviours over others. In the second shift (the „affirmation of the
ordinary‟), the destabilisation of „higher‟ activities as constituted through traditional hierarchies resulted in a turn to the „ordinary‟. The restoration of the „everyday‟ was incrementally given higher moral ground, as it was seen as part of God‟s redeeming plan for creation. Taylor‟s work is here is reminiscent of Max Weber‟s Protestant Ethic (Weber 1930)25. For example, Taylor highlights the Protestant sense of calling
25
As an important aside, further to an outline of the protestant reformation as a process important to historical modernity, Taylor and Weber‟s work share another likeness. As another of sociology‟s classical trilogy, Weber did not omit morality in his social theory. Unlike Durkheim, who located morality in social fact, Weber located the sources of social change in moral ideas. In this respect, Taylor similarly is drawing primarily on shifting philosophical ideas as underlying the sources of morality throughout modernity. Weber shows that the moral sources drawn upon today (e.g. capitalism and economic rationalism) are not necessarily born of the rejection of moral belief (e.g. religion), rather in some cases because of their shifting manifestations. Social processes (or Durkheim‟s „facts‟) can tell
us what social forms have shifted, however Weber‟s ideas can embody the „why‟, or the motive for that
shift. In this sense, Weber‟s preceding theory strengthens Taylor‟s claim that moral sources shift because they represent an „epistemic gain‟ or „error-reducing move‟. The primary difference between Weber and Taylor at this juncture is that while Taylor‟s focus is on historic shifts in moral thinking, Weber‟s account of shifting moral ideas is accounted for through reference to social outcomes rather than philosophical ones, for example, rationalist conduct and capitalism.
96 and refusal to demarcate sacred from secular because all of life came to be understood as belonging to God. The Protestant ethic was encapsulated in commitment to
rationalised, disciplined work and devoted family life.
The third major theme draws directly on the previous two. The „inward turn‟ and the „affirmation of the ordinary‟ life had shifted notions of the „good‟ and opened up traditional theistic moral sources to increasing critique. Taylor asserts of this transition,
The crucial change is that people no longer felt that the spiritual dimension of their lives was incomprehensible if one supposed there was no God.
(Taylor 1989: 310)
According to Taylor, redefining moral sources minus the inclusion of God took two broad directions, defined in terms of the „radical enlightenment‟ and „romanticism‟ (Taylor 1989: 315-9). The primary form taken by „radical enlightenment‟ thinkers was the utilitarian step of elevating the pursuit of pleasure over pain as the central goal of humanity. Rejecting the theistic or providential constitutive moral source, utilitarians nevertheless remained committed to the „lifegoods‟ they espoused such as individual freedom, affirmation of the ordinary and universal (and objective)
benevolence. To utilitarians, human nature represented a neutral domain – neither inherently good nor bad – to be moulded and shaped toward (or against) human happiness through unshackled reason (Taylor 1989: 321-3).
Taylor notes that reason was also understood through alternative moral sources, the main form being „romanticism‟(Taylor 1989: 355-367). Romanticism was founded in Rousseau‟s concept of the natural inner voice as the source of good and representing harmony, virtue and freedom. This notion of „inner nature‟ as the ultimate source of „good‟ flowered in Romanticism and increasingly without overarching ideas of cosmic or interlocking natural order. Rather than disengaging from self, romanticists longed for connection with the impulse of nature through recovering sentiment, sensuality, articulation, and means to express that nature. Access to a moral stance in Romanticism is therefore understood to be gained through the inner voice of the individual and the wholeness and originality springing from it - a predominant
97 example of this was found through art. Taylor (1989: 36-7) also notes that in many cases, nature is also closely linked with reason.
Taylor emphasises that historical watershed transformations identified in these three major transitions have bought about changes that still underlie our western sense of moral orientation. These include the notion that humans deserve dignity, justice and universal benevolence, as well as the continuing affirmation of the „ordinary‟ life. These transformations broadly have their source in any one of these roots: in Judeo- Christian charity; various enlightenment notions of the equal, rational and civilized individual as free to benefit mankind; or the Romanticist notion of sympathy flowing from an undistorted natural desire to assist humankind and provide justice. Some of these „goods‟ will be later identified in the accounts of participants central to this study.
Taylor‟s outline so far gives adequate context to support further consideration of MacIntyre‟s thesis of the virtues. Through Taylor‟s historical outline it is possible to argue that MacIntyre‟s account is limited because morality is defined in static terms. Morality has no meaning, argues MacIntyre, because the „context‟ (read theistic, Aristotelian, or in any case teleological context) is absent. That is, there is no moral „context‟ in contemporary society, or „ends‟ around which to practice virtue
(MacIntyre 1981: 35-66). Contrastingly, Taylor claims that the content of morality shifts over time and is therefore historically situated. Morality is not static, but ephemeral and in constant shuffle. Taylor‟s notion of „epistemic gain‟ demonstrates that moral sources not only shift, but that the justifications for their transition are themselves morally motivated.
This motivation includes reducing conflicts experienced within particular moral stances by moving towards a so-called „better‟ (or error-reducing) morality.
Therefore to insist that the „best‟ version of moral virtues is located in one particular historic time or place, as MacIntyre does, is to dismiss these shifting sources of morality. Moreover dismissing them precludes insight into the moral forms that do manifest (albeit in vastly different ways than centuries ago) in contemporary society. MacIntyre is therefore unable to account for the meaning that is given particular moral stances by individuals today, or the possible social processes that underlie
98 those choices. For example, In Part II of this thesis, I identify the specifically moral dimensions of money meanings amongst participants in this study. They may not be identified in terms of moral virtues MacIntyre idealises, nevertheless they constitute moral orientations – or a disposition towards what is „good‟ – that is shared in this contemporary culture.
I have outlined a sketch of Taylor‟s morally oriented, historically situated, and specifically modern, self. However, while Taylor‟s outline of a historical articulation is significant to this project, his moral sources of the self are outlined primarily through philosophical ideas.26 What a sociological project emphasises is the central fact that the „self‟ is of course also social. The „self‟ is constructed in social space, and constitutive of social relations. I return to the work of Zygmunt Bauman to assist in developing a clearer understanding of these social relations.
Bauman‟s social ethics
Bauman contends that central to individual moral choices are social processes. It is social process that lends some choice alternatives greater legitimacy over others. Bauman names these social processes as „ethical‟ ones. In other words, social order and culture are ethical in that they situate moral choices in relation to them. For Bauman therefore, sociology is the study of the ways in which (social) ethical rules are made, endured, and maintained, and the ways in which humans interact with choices guided by such ethics (Bauman 1993: 44-5).27
26
In general terms, philosophy (including moral philosophy, for example see Vajda (1999) and Baier (1997)) conceptualises morality in terms of internal, rather than social, mechanisms. A similar argument is mounted of „moral psychology‟. Work such as Kohlberg (1975), Hoffman (1980) and Shelton and McAdams (1990) have concerned themselves with developmental measures for
ascertaining moral awareness. The latter, for example, locates „morality‟ as an empathetic response to other‟s needs, and gives little indication of the historical, social or contextual phenomenon of morality.
27
99 In Post-Modern Ethics Bauman (1993) describes the ethic of post-modernity as primarily articulated through the social processes contained within the modern project and the reasons why they failed. For that reason, the following is an outline of the modern „project‟ according to Bauman, followed up with the concluding comments Bauman makes in relation to the „experiential context‟ of post-modernity.
Modernity, states Bauman, has been built upon the premise of „mistrust‟ (Bauman 1993: 67). Modern emancipation of „self‟ from natural (or divine) order did not translate to a freedom from all external constraints. The new-found freedom from an overarching „natural‟ order was interpreted into widespread mistrust of natural impulse (previously Bauman‟s argument noted that such „impulse‟ is primarily the individual‟s moral impulse). For example: emotions had no place in principled reasoning (e.g. Kant); all criteria for morality shifted strongly toward proceduralism and the displacement of morality to the rational decision-maker; „doing good‟ was replaced with „discipline‟; and „freedom‟ came to be equated with choice to abide by the rules. For these reasons, claims Bauman, what begins in scepticism of
autonomous moral capacity results in a modern social ethic that denies the self any agency in moral judgement (Bauman 1993: 65-9).
Further to being mistrusted in modernity, moral capacity is also undermined by modern social processes. Society, argues Bauman, may be defined as the addition of the „third‟ (the „judge‟ or „umpire‟) to the „moral party of two‟. The moral party of two is the sphere in which responsibility for the Other can take place, through face to face relations. „Society‟ is the realm of social order - those individuals, categories, contractual obligations and accountabilities that enter as the third party to arbitrate between the moral party of two (Bauman 1993: 110). Central to Bauman‟s
description of modern forms of society are the elements that constitute the social, for example „socialisation‟ and „sociality‟ (Bauman 1993: 116-37) or „cognitive‟ or „aesthetic‟ spaces (Bauman 1993: 145-8). Bauman explains the ways in which each of these forms of the social diminish moral space, for example: through structured