The coalition prioritized the enhancement of regional cooperation to reduce cross-border interference and infiltration by foreign state and non-state entities (Brandon, 2006a: 1-3;
2006b: 128-133; Perito, 2005: 8; United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 2). Regional cooperation was advanced for two broad reasons. On the one hand, there were mutual security concerns among neighboring countries since (non-) state actors moved across Iraq’s borders to conduct (counter)attacks and/or find sanctuary (Brandon, 2006a: 1; 2006b: 128-133). More specifically, freelance warriors were infiltrating Iraq’s borders to fight the United States and instigate sectarian violence, as denoted in section 1.3.2.2. At the same time, Iran and Turkey reported armed incursions by Kurd organizations, notably the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) or the Party for Freedom and Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) that were allegedly operating from inside Iraq’s frontiers (Brandon, 2006a: 1-3;
2006b: 2-3; Katzman, 2014: 32). In response to the Kurd attacks, Turkey and Iran made several military incursions into Iraq’s territory to undermine Kurdish operations launched from the Mount Qandil area (Brandon, 2006a: 2-3; Cordesman, 2010: 8-9; United Nations, 2012: 4)34. Accordingly, it was essential to establish regional dialogue to discuss border security to protect the interests of all stakeholders involved.
32 For example, on January 15, 2011 a recruit-in-training smuggled live ammunition onto a firing range in Mosul and killed two of his U.S. trainers (CNN News, 2011).
33 An August 17, 2010 attack on a recruitment center in Baghdad serves as a case in point when a suicide bomber killed 51 recruits and injured more than one hundred others (Sly and Salman, 2010). However, the population did not support such attacks. For instance, a May 2004 survey found that an overwhelming majority (91%) of Iraqis perceived attacks on Iraq’s police forces unjustifiable (Burkholder, 2004d).
34 For instance, Turkey’s military attacked Kurdish forces based inside Iraq in mid-October 2011 following violent clashes between Kurdish “rebels” and Turkey’s military (Katzman, 2014: 32), operations which continued into 2012 (United Nations, 2012: 4).
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On the other hand, and stated above, neighboring countries, such as Iran, were intervening in Iraq (assisting Shi‘a groups) to influence social-political developments during the occupation (Cordesman, 2010: 62-64; Katzman, 2014: 30). Iran’s overt and covert activities, in particular, raised considerable concern among U.S. politicians, coalition military officials, and Iraq’s Sunni population alike (Cordesman, 2010: 62-64). For these reasons, and others, it was determined that the development of regional security cooperation was essential to stabilizing Iraq and reducing tensions throughout the region (United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 1). To this end, various efforts were implemented at the interstate level.
For example, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) sponsored and hosted a “non-official dialogue” in 2007 (United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 1). At the conference, six regional neighbors, including Iran and Syria, negotiated a framework to enhance Iraq’s security and that of the wider region (United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 2-4). The dialogue ended with the signing of the Marmara Declaration for regional cooperation and security (United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 2-4). The declaration emphasizes that participants should not incite (ethnic-sectarian) violence within their neighbors’ borders and underscores the mutual value of promoting political and social stability in Iraq (United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 2). Correspondingly, the United Nations continues to function as a third party to promote regional peace and security through continued bilateral dialogue between Iraq and its neighbors (United Nations, 2012: 5).
The relative utility of regional dialogue, however, appears to be marginal. On the one hand, Iran continues to intervene in Iraq. It most recently has been supplying weapons and intelligence to Shi‘a militias engaged in civil unrest during 2013 and 2014 (Katzman, 2014:
30). On the other hand, Iraq’s Shi‘a have been supporting anti-government fighters in Syria to undermine Syria’s government (Ali, 2014: 18-19). Both examples challenge national sovereignty and manufactures bilateral friction between these countries.
1.3.3.3 (Re) Construction
In addition to kinetic operations and the promotion of regional cooperation, the coalition engaged in reconstruction of Iraq’s governing institutions and infrastructure to restore the functioning of the state and to address social needs and grievances. Stuart Bowen (2009: 259) defines reconstruction in Iraq as: “the restor[ation of] the core capacities of government—its
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strategic and policy-planning ability, as well as its financial, information, and human resources management.” Reconstruction, according to the quote, thus broadly refers to institution building (governing bodies) and infrastructural development (construction of roads and the provision of utilities), in conjunction with assistance (financing) to achieve these objectives (Bowen, 2009: 187-192; Iraq Study Group, 2006: 25-26). The United States, its coalition allies and other international actors (the UN and other NGOs) have been involved in the reconstruction effort (Bowen, 2009: 187-192; Iraq Study Group, 2006: 25-26). Their operations continued throughout the duration of the occupation and persisted following the departure of U.S. military forces.
Reconstruction was implemented at multiple levels by numerous actors (Power, 2014:
347-348). These actors utilized both a top-down and bottom-up approach, rebuilding central government capacity, in addition to the structural capacities at the local level (Bowen, 2009:
10-23). Activities include the reconstruction of power plants, water treatment facilities, the refurbishment and supplying of schools and the establishment and training of local and national governing institutions and members (Bowen, 2013). Such measures were foremost believed to enhance internal stability and bring a measure of GOI legitimacy through the provision of representation, public goods and services (Bowen, 2013: 10; Brennan and others, 2013: 15; Iraq Study Group, 2006: 25; Levi and others, 2009: 356). Efforts were likewise designed to improve the humanitarian/living conditions inside Iraq by (re)building social and governing structures and their capacities (the provision of basic services) (Bowen, 2009: 23).
Reconstruction was, nonetheless, fraught with multiple problems. The first notable challenge was post-war violence (Bowen, 2013: 14-85). For example, targeted attacks complicated the rehabilitation of Iraq’s dilapidated or damaged infrastructure, hindering the production and distribution of basic services, such as water and electricity (Bowen, 2013: 14;
Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256; Hashim, 2006: 34; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 40). Insurgents’
purposeful targeting of Iraq’s infrastructure, including oil and electrical facilities, had noteworthy consequences (Bowen, 2013: 75; Kepel, 2004: 222; Tripp, 2007: 289). The targeting of oil production throughout Iraq, for instance, problematized delivery of petroleum at the local level creating fuel shortages, while simultaneously reducing GOI revenue by limiting the amount of petroleum available for sale on the international market (Allawi, 2007:
175; Bowen, 2013: 84; Hafez, 2007: 97). Moreover, the quality and quantity of attacks forced the coalition to reallocate fiscal appropriations from one sector to another because essential infrastructure was continuously damaged or destroyed and thereby required additional funding for repairs (Bowen, 2009: 170). The volume and persistence of the violent and devastating
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cycle reached a point where finances, previously earmarked for reconstruction projects, had to be re-appropriated to the security sector to protect functioning installations and undermine the cycle of destruction (Bowen, 2009: 170). In this manner, some reconstruction projects were shelved so that security at functioning sites could be funded.
Setbacks were also experienced as a result of insurgents’ targeting of foreign and domestic contractors (Bowen, 2009: 75, 179; 2013: 75; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256). Such attacks were designed to undermine the reconstruction effort by striking at contractors’ ability to operate safely while compromising staff morale. Similarly, insurgents attacked essential indigenous human resources, including translators, police, and public officials, to discourage cooperation with the coalition (Allawi, 2007: 373; Burkholder, 2004d; Kepel, 2004: 238). The insurgent strategy was successful. The hazards manufactured problematized reconstruction, resulting in work stoppages and difficulties in recruiting staff (Bowen, 2009: 75, 179; 2013: 75).
Combined, insurgent operations complicated reconstruction, while underscoring the fallibility of the coalition and Iraq’s governing bodies. Persistent violence demonstrated that the coalition and Iraq’s government were ineffective, and unable to provide security or basic utilities (Bowen, 2013: 40-41; Garfield, 2007; Gunarantna, 2007: 197). Nevertheless, ineffectiveness against violence was not the only means of demonstrating coalition and GOI ineffectiveness, as much of the reconstruction program was beleaguered with problems manufactured by those charged with reconstruction.
Figure 2 ABC News and others (2009) Post-war Living Conditions
Figure 2 cites ABC News and others (2009: 13), which trends the provision of services during the occupation.
The graph depicts the absence of basic services, including potable water and electricity, while the insurgency intensified, which demonstrates that targeted violence had an impact on reconstruction between November 2005 and February 2008.
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In particular, scholars characterize U.S. planning and implementation of reconstruction as
“poorly conceived, overambitious, and often at cross-purposes” (Bowen, 2009: 327), an assertion endorsed by others (Benjamin and Simon, 2005: 187; Flavin, 2013: 178;
Gunarantna, 2007: 197; Hoffman, 2004: 109). Poor design was partly the result of a U.S.
failure “to consult sufficiently with Iraqis to understand what they really wanted from the reconstruction program” (Bowen, 2009: 327). These failures emphasized in Bowen’s quotes resulted in instances of infrastructural projects that consumed millions of dollars in revenue that were unwanted by the population or never completed (Bowen, 2013: 4). It likewise alludes to the lack of oversight of the overall reconstruction program. Consequently, there are numerous instances of U.S. mismanagement of Iraq’s oil revenue and corrupt behavior by U.S. contractors and decision-makers, some of who have been found guilty of criminal behavior (Bowen, 2009: 154-327). The systematic relegation of local ownership, the inability to properly plan, implement and oversee reconstruction, as well as the misappropriation of resources, increased local suspicion and exacerbated negative popular sentiment (Bowen, 2009: 327; Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1061; Stover and others, 2005: 834-835).
Combined, the challenges denoted profoundly hindered reconstruction, since only slight progress was recorded despite several years of efforts (Bowen, 2009: 232; O’Hanlon and Livingston, 2010). Delays in turn had a social impact. In 2005, for example, 39% of Iraqis perceived reconstruction as ineffective (Oxford Research International, 2005: 10). Three years later, ABC News and others (2008: 2) found that 88% of respondents still lacked electricity in their homes, and oil production remained markedly below pre-war production levels (ABC News and others, 2009: 5, 13; O’Hanlon and Campbell, 2008). Figure 2 trends the availability of basic goods and services between 2004 and 2009, which is graphed by ABC News and others (2009: 13). It also demonstrates a decline in services as the insurgency strengthened and repeatedly targeted reconstruction efforts, events that exacerbated poor planning.
Despite modest improvement, the reconstruction of Iraq remained lethargic throughout the occupation. As late as mid-2010, sixty-six percent of Iraqis felt that the provision of basic services continued to be the greatest challenge facing the country (International Republican Institute, 2010: 15, 30, 32). That same year, another survey found that respondents lacked sufficient personal funds to purchase food (18%) and 13% alleged they still did not have water in their neighborhoods (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 65). Hence, reconstruction in Iraq was hindered by numerous challenges and the impediments created social deprivations.
Prevalent conditions affected popular sentiment toward occupying forces, and later Iraq’s
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governing institutions. Consequently, some scholars emphasize that the inability to reconstruct Iraq constitutes structural violence (Tripp, 2007: 292-293).