In instances of protracted violent relationships, as highlighted between Iraq and the United States in chapters 1 and 2, scholars hypothesize that individuals or collectives subjected to comparable experiences are increasingly probable to construct negative opinions of their adversary who is frequently deemed responsible for the wrongdoing, harms or humiliation endured (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354; Rosoux, 2009: 550). Paraphrasing Galtung’s (2007: 16) assessment of deconstructive relational patterns, he suggests “where there is conflict there may be frustration,” frustration leads to polarization, polarization can produce existential worldviews, existential perceptions can manifest in violent behavior and violent interaction produces trauma and aspirations for revenge. As the processes articulated in the quote evolve, deconstructive perceptions and behavior proliferate, protracting or escalating conflict, creating further animosity, trauma and destruction (Galtung, 2007: 16; Steele, 2008: 1-7).
Contextualizing these tendencies, chapter 2 qualified and quantified the effects of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq war at the micro and macro level, verifying the existence of a conflict relationship that negatively impacts on public opinion of the “other” (Hypothesis 1). The combination of experience and sentiment associated with them is problematic for the quality of future bilateral relations between these two entities. As Vasquez (2009: 171) emphasizes: “The history of prior interactions, particularly since the last major war, establishes a set of expectations and a reservoir of psychological hostility or friendship.” In the case of U.S.-Iraq
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relations, the quote is validated through the demonstration of animosity and blame rooted in more than twenty years of deconstructive interaction that is likely to persist unless addressed.
Conflict perpetuation, in such instances, is likely to occur for multiple reasons. Providing one explanation, Martin Shaw (2003: 120) posits: “In every active conflict, states, parties and movements construct and disseminate their own, highly partisan version of history.” Shaw here illustrates that perceptions are formulated and then dispersed through the collection, interpretation and dissemination of what occurred in the past, which may include real or perceived injustices (Boulding, 1978: 49; Parent, 2012: 30-31; Wilmer, 1998: 106-108). As negative perceptions are continuously (re-) processed and disseminated through stories, books, rituals, media and so forth, conflicts become entrenched and are subject to escalation (Parent, 2012: 30-31; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 34-35; Worthington, 2006: 262). Over time, events impact and become part of the identity of those involved (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 34-35). Through such processes, a conflict perpetuates itself, rooting in the psyche and behavior of those engaged, which makes resolving the conflict increasingly more difficult.
Deconstructive perceptions and behavior are often produced by distrust and fear of an adversary (Parent, 2012: 31-35). Fear and distrust are natural byproducts of (prolonged) exposure to conflict, and their perpetuation deepens and solidifies negative perceptions of the
“other” (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354; Parent, 2012: 30-31; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 34). Fear and distrust thereby taint referents’ interpretation of existing conflict circumstances, including the perceived value of a given relationship and an opponent’s intentions (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354;
Parent, 2012: 30-36; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 34). Consequently, referents often overlook or misinterpret their adversary’s positive qualities or actions, instead magnifying negative attributes (R. Fisher, 2001b: 32-33; Lederach, 1995: 17-18; Parent, 2012: 34; Worthington, 2006: 127-128). Daniel Bar-Tal (2000: 352-353) hypothesizes that these distorted tendencies are a result of referents selectively processing (conflict-related) inputs in an effort to simplify complex relationships for the sake of minimizing uncertainty and increasing their perceived understanding of existing circumstances. Despite the counter-intuitive nature of selective processing, referents believe they have the capacity to understand a complex situation and predict the future, albeit subjectively, when they simplify inputs (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-353). In short, referents are under the impression that they are objectively rationalizing, although their judgment is clouded by fear, fixation on past experiences, anger and incorrect or incomplete observations or beliefs.
Providing supplementary insight into the narrow and subjective cognitive processing common in such deconstructive relations, Ronald Fisher (2001b) interjects:
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Among the most pervasive cognitive errors that individuals, and thereby groups, involved in destructive conflict make are misattributions about the characteristics and motives of the other side. Attribution is the process by which we infer causation about the behavior of another actor, and these judgments are critical, because they tend to guide both our immediate reaction and our future behavior toward that actor (R. Fisher, 2001b: 32).
Fisher’s quote identifies the conflict-perpetuating cognitive reductionist processing as
“attribution” while correspondingly emphasizing its deconstructive nature.
When attribution evolves, in-group identity strengthens as a means of coping with the (perceived) outside threat that the “other” represents, a processes which inevitably impacts relational quality (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354). Since conflict continuation leads to entrenchment, referents cognitively prepare to protect their interest and endure the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000:
352-354). Within this environment, corresponding inputs are continuously processed and re-processed, stored and disseminated at the individual and collective levels, further reinforcing status quo relational patterns which are probable to generate a relational impasse (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354; Wilmer, 1998: 106-108). At its extreme, referents comparatively define themselves as the direct opposite of their adversary, perceiving the “other” as evil or untrustworthy (Funk and Said, 2004: 8; Galtung, 2007: 19-20), or de-humanizing them and identifying them as an existential threat (Boulding, 1978: 53-54; Galtung, 2007: 19-20;
Kelman, 2004: 120-121; Long and Brecke, 2003: 30; Parent, 2012: 37; Staub, 2003: 8-12).
When the maxim is obtained, deployment of violence is likely. Herbert Kelman (2004:
121) explains the increased propensity for violence occurs because “it becomes easier for each party to minimize guilt feelings for acts of violence and oppression against the other and to avoid seeing itself in the role of victimizer, rather than only the role of victim.” Clearly stated, the quote explains that attribution, at its extreme, makes the perpetration of violence justified and increasingly likely to be deployed by those engaged in a conflict. Due to these pervasive tendencies, alteration of the quality of the relationship is hypothesized essential to improve the long-term quality of a given relationship and circumvent violence (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 64;
Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 13; Bar-Tal, 2000: 356-357; Lederach, 1995: 17-19). The interplay and depth of the highlighted processes in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations can be observed in human research studies, as introduced in chapter 2.
To contextualize the existence of conflict between the United States and Iraq, we first address the issue of cognitive framing and its tendency of perpetuating deconstructive behavior. Research conducted by Wohl and Branscombe (2009) examines in-group forgiveness, where members of the same collective are asked to extend forgiveness to their
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fellow members for the wrongdoing they have committed against an out-group member, the latter of whom is perceived to be an existential threat. Their research centered on U.S. citizens and their perceptions of U.S. soldiers’ activity in Iraq. The study found that U.S. respondents are more likely to forgive their compatriots for wrongdoing committed against Iraqis when exposed to references of 9/11 prior to completing the survey (Wohl and Branscombe, 2009:
209-211). Wohl and Branscombe’s (2009: 211-213) findings demonstrate that in-group forgiveness has the propensity to increase popular endorsement of or justification for violence perpetrated, as demonstrated in the in-group acceptance or legitimization of wrongdoing against the out-group due to the (perceived) threat the out-group posed. Such perceptions affirm that individuals are apt to dismiss or justify wrongdoing committed by the in-group when the “other” is perceived in a negative context.
In light of this basic understanding of how conflict influences individuals and societies, we simultaneously wish to emphasize that the end of combat operations and the removal of military forces does not constitute a transformation of a conflictual relationship, nor does it guarantee the construction of peaceful relations (Lambourne, 2004: 2). While these measures are indicative of the end of occupation and a termination of direct physical violence, conflict is not synonymous with armed confrontation, violence or war, as outlined below (Wilmer, 1998: 105). Consequently, two issues should be considered when thinking about violent conflict and its impact on societal perceptions in the context of Iraq and U.S. relations.
Firstly, the United States government should appreciate that most of its activities during the occupation were narrowly focused and largely imposed, and thereby constitutes structural violence, as illustrated in chapter one (Bowen, 2013: 11; Stover and others, 2005: 831-857).
For instance, the U.S. applied pressure during the drafting of Iraq’s constitution, encouraged the establishment of a liberal democracy, and hastened the conduct of democratic elections, to name a few examples (Allawi, 2007: 9; Haass, 2009: 262-278; Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 9).
Such activities connote the marginalization of Iraqi needs and desires in exchange for promoting U.S. interests (establishing a new government and stabilizing Iraq to hasten U.S.
military withdraw). Iraqis, as articulated elsewhere, view such policies as an imposition, hence violent and subjected to rejection or resistance (be it violent or passive). This suggests that not only was direct physical violence perpetrated, but also structural violence, which equally influences popular sentiment. Secondly, chapter two demonstrates that long-standing negative sentiment exists across these groups, and is likely to endure, given the trajectory of U.S. relations with Iraq and other countries in the Middle East (Funk and Said, 2004: 1-3). For these reasons, we argue that conflict resolution should be pursued.
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, altering the quality of a relationship and social perceptions requires the U.S. embark on a complex campaign of sustained and palpable modification of behavior and perceptions aimed at changing years of mistrust and animosity between both societies (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 249). This suggests, on the one hand, that policy changes are necessary. In particular, the combination of occupation, U.S. maltreatment of Arab/Muslims in places like Guantánamo Bay or Abu Ghraib, and the continual projection of military force and political influence in the Middle East understandably give the impression that the U.S. is at war with Islam and Arabs (Sageman, 2008: 73-175). However, U.S. leaders repeatedly discount the latter claim while pursuing policies, which contradict their rhetoric (Obama, 2009c; 2010b). Therefore, policy must be addressed.
On the other hand, there are equally identity-based influencers of conflict in this instance.
For example, we demonstrated above that there are cultural and religious elements, which influence the quality of bilateral relationships. These components must likewise be addressed, since they similarly influence the trajectory of a given relationship.
Consolidated, conflict relationships incorporate cognitive, behavioral and affective components (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-359; Parent, 2012: 30-37). We wish to quickly acknowledge the existence of these components in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. Concerning the cognitive component, negative sentiment exists on both sides of the relationship, as qualified in chapter 2. On the one hand, anti-American/occupation sentiment was high in Iraq prior to and throughout the duration of the occupation (ABC News and others, 2009: 3-20;
Burkholder, 2004e; Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004:
36; Oxford Research International, 2004: 3; 2005: 3-21; Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006: 6). This sentiment included a high degree of distrust of the United States and its agents during the occupation (Abdallah, 2003: 65-66; Bowen, 2009: 73; DeYoung, 2007;
Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 41; International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 30-41; Kull, 2007: 5;
University of Michigan and Eastern Michigan University, 2006; Zogby, 2008). On the other hand, U.S. soldiers were generally suspicious of all Iraqis, classifying them as either insurgents or collaborators (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). Among the general U.S. public, there has been prolonged and rampant negative opinion of Iraq trended by open source surveys over the past two decades (Gallup, 2014).
In behavioral terms, the United States physically occupied Iraq, and Iraq’s population countered their presence with techniques ranging from street protests to physical resistance in the armed insurgency (Allawi, 2007: 158-243; Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-62; Fattah and
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Caso, 2009: 256; Fontan, 2006: 227-235; Hashim, 2006: 92-97; Ucko, 2008: 344-345).
Hence, both groups employed violence to achieve their objectives vis-à-vis the other (Alvord and others, 2003; Amnesty International, 2003: 5; Burkholder, 2004e; Calhoun, 2005: 94;
Fontan, 2006: 220-227; Hicks and others, 2011: 12; Human Rights Watch, 2003: 5-60; Roth, 2005: 10; Tripp, 2007: 292-293). On the one hand, Iraqis viewed violence appropriate to hasten the end of the U.S.-led occupation and their influence (ABC News and others, 2007:
2). On the other hand, U.S. citizens judged the military invasion and occupation of Iraq essential to increase U.S. national security (Tripp, 2007: 272-273).
Finally, concerning the affective component, disagreement between the two countries broadly existed over the political and social trajectory of Iraq. Most notably, the United States deemed it necessary to invade and occupy Iraq to transform Iraq politically (remove Hussein and install a democratic government) and socially (overturn Baʻath Party leadership and Sunni control of government) (Allawi, 2007: 459). However, it was demonstrated in chapter 2 that many Iraqis rebuffed these objectives and condemned the United States for overturning preexisting social-political structures (Ryan, 2010: 66). The policy, thus, increased animosity toward the United States, whom Iraqis blame for the conditions endured and the contemporary predicament Iraq finds itself in. Amalgamated, all three components of a deep conflict relationship are present which reinforces the need for resolving or transforming the conflict.
Although we have proved the existence of a protracted conflict relationship, the literature on conflict resolution does not discuss U.S.-Iraq relations in particular, but rather concentrates attention at the regional level. Accordingly, it is necessary to reference macro level theory when considering conflict resolution at the micro level. Contemplating the depth of the cross-cultural conflict relationship at the macro level, Funk and Said (2004) construct a pessimistic image of bilateral relations between the United States and Arab/Muslim countries of the Middle East. Due to its relevance, their assessment is quoted at length. They surmise:
As distasteful as crude enemy images may appear to the moderate and largely apolitical majorities in both cultural regions, the preoccupation of image-makers and sensationalists with instances of confrontation and cultural divergence has fostered widespread attitudes of distrust and resignation to the seeming “inevitability” of conflict stemming from irreconcilable differences. These attitudes have become increasingly compelling to many in the wake of two Persian Gulf wars, the attacks of September 11, and the escalation of Israeli-Palestinian violence that followed the breakdown of the Oslo [peace] process. As a result, competition and violence are taken for granted as part of the natural state of things, rather than regarded as problems worthy of fact-finding and soul-searching investigation. All who would seek to understand conflict between Middle Eastern Muslims and the West must
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therefore face widespread and powerful perceptions that “our reality” and
“their reality” cannot meet, and that authentic security is to be found in cultural retrenchment combined with vigorous efforts to repress, repel, or convert the adversary (Funk and Said, 2004: 7).
Their quote reiterates that cross-cultural conflict in this instance is deeply rooted within both societies, founded upon historical experience and alternative goals. Depth of the conflict within society is equally witnessed in the manner in which the “other” is depicted.
The authors, for instance, articulate that Manichean perspectives of the “other” are mutually embraced. Manichean perspectives complicate conflict resolution because:
conventional discourse on “Islam and the West” is deeply laden with presuppositions of irreconcilable “otherness,” and tends to reinforce the idea that “we” cannot work with “them” until “they” become like “us.”
“Islam” and “the West” are regarded as exclusive, static categories;
cultural and religious factors are obstacles to peacemaking, not resources.
A “clash” is inevitable, and can only be managed (Funk and Said, 2004:
22).
The quote illustrates how said sentiment undermines the quality of relations. In such circumstances, scholars recommend conflict resolution be pursued to alter discursive narratives, perceptions and behavior, whereby the predominant and (deep) rooted nature of the conflict relationship can be altered over time.
Advocating conflict resolution at the macro level, Funk and Said (2004: 22-23) prescriptively suggest efforts be made to “counteract misperceptions and double standards”
that exist within both referent groups (among governments, societies and scholarship). Here the authors are suggesting a twofold, interrelated approach. One the one hand, cross-cultural misconceptions needs to be addressed. These include, for example, addressing the popular inaccuracy that all Muslims are violent radicals. On the other hand, rhetoric and actions have to parallel one another. For instance, the United States should more clearly articulate its objectives in the Middle East, and, thereafter, ensure that stated policy goals are reinforced by actions which adhere to those articulated objectives (Funk and Said, 2004: 22-23). In this manner, action would corroborate rhetoric, thereby surmounting one of the Arab/Muslim complaints (duplicity) emphasized and providing an environment where trust can be earned.
This macro level assessment parallels our micro level assessment noted earlier.
Hence, many scholars recommend implementing conflict resolution to manage conflict continuation or escalation by deconstructing negative psychological, behavior and social components and their effects (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 12-17; Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-359;
Hartwick and Barki, 2002: 5; Kriesberg, 2001: 60-61; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 6-7, 35-62; Worthington, 2006: 9-16). The minimal objective, in context, should be the neutralization
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of arguments favoring the use of coercion and violence vis-à-vis the other (Funk and Said, 2004: 1-23). Reference to conflict resolution in the U.S. and Iraq context, however, presents three fundamental theoretical dilemmas that must be contemplated and addressed. First, the invasion and occupation of Iraq exacerbated criticism of conflict resolution as a theory and practice (Johansen, 2004: 1-4; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 3). The critiques proffered will be briefly analyzed below. Second, there are imperative theoretical and epistemological divergences within the field of conflict resolution in the West that require clarification (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 30; Reimann, 2004: 2). Several differences within Western theory are examined in this chapter and the next. Lastly, theoretical and practical divergences across cultures are suggested to exist, and these must equally be qualified to determine how interstate conflict resolution might be pursued across these cultures (Avruch, 2003: 2; Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006: 53-54; Reimann, 2004: 11). Cross-cultural comparisons are examined in the forthcoming chapters 5 and 6 of this research.
Returning our focus to the first dilemma, the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq had negative implications on contemporary conflict resolution and peacebuilding discourse (Johansen, 2004: 1-4; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 3). Since conflict resolution has been closely associated with practices such as the international proliferation of democratic governance and humanitarian intervention, both of which fall under rubric of peacebuilding, the George W.
Bush administration’s commandeering of corresponding objectives to justify the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq had profound implications on how the discipline and practice is appraised (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 3). Most importantly, the militarization of state building and the proliferation of democracy in Iraq discredited peacebuilding within scholarship and among the international community (Johansen, 2004: 1-4; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 3). According to Ramsbotham and others (2011: 6), critical scholarly discourse can be reduced to three critiques which hypothesize conflict resolution: (1) is impotent for resolving conflict (the Realist critique); (2) its practices are implemented in an uncritical, unbalanced and unjust manner (the Marxist critique); and (3) it is inapplicable or inappropriate across cultures because its theories and practices are predominantly perceived as Western in style and approach. While these criticisms have merit, and should be contemplated, they are not irrefutable.
In my opinion, U.S. operations in Iraq fall victim to critique number two. The United States implemented its reconstruction and peacebuilding strategies in Iraq in an uncritical, unjust and unbalanced manner, as outlined in chapter 1. Among other faults, the policy was imposed, culturally insensitive and ineffective due to the high degree of popular rejection of
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the program, an approach I strongly criticize and discourage. However, the objectives of proliferating democracy, human rights and other associated peacebuilding goals, I believe, were included into the Bush administration’s list of justifications because the WMD-terror arguments failed to garner sufficient popular support. Therefore, I would argue that peacebuilding objectives were secondary to the removal of Saddam Hussein, and the Bush administration was less concerned with pursuing peacebuilding as a theory and practice, and more interested in exploiting the theory to advance U.S. geopolitical interests and garner international support. While my assumption might explain the administration’s limited attention given to peacebuilding in Iraq, it is not designed to justify U.S. actions or deflect warranted criticism. Instead, I wish simply to highlight that I conjecture U.S. prioritization of
the program, an approach I strongly criticize and discourage. However, the objectives of proliferating democracy, human rights and other associated peacebuilding goals, I believe, were included into the Bush administration’s list of justifications because the WMD-terror arguments failed to garner sufficient popular support. Therefore, I would argue that peacebuilding objectives were secondary to the removal of Saddam Hussein, and the Bush administration was less concerned with pursuing peacebuilding as a theory and practice, and more interested in exploiting the theory to advance U.S. geopolitical interests and garner international support. While my assumption might explain the administration’s limited attention given to peacebuilding in Iraq, it is not designed to justify U.S. actions or deflect warranted criticism. Instead, I wish simply to highlight that I conjecture U.S. prioritization of