El marco legal relacionado con la educación inclusiva en Honduras

As the United States arrogated control of Iraq as an occupying power, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), supervised by Jay Garner, was dispatched to oversee what had been projected as a short-term occupation (Bowen, 2009: 58; Brennan and others, 2013: 22; Tripp, 2007: 279). The ORHA itself had been briskly established. From the point of its initial establishment to its arrival in southern Iraq, the ORHA had approximately two months to recruit personnel, organize and prepare for deployment (Dobbins and others, 2009: 7; Rathmell, 2005: 1022). Following the invasion, a token team from the ORHA first entered Iraq in early April 2003 without Garner (Bowen, 2009: 56). It established itself in “Umm Qasr as a testing ground to calibrate its approach to the post-invasion environment” (Bowen, 2009: 56). During this testing phase denoted by Bowen, the ORHA experienced several critical challenges, including U.S. cross-agency coordination deficits and localized civil unrest opposing the occupation (Bowen, 2009: 56). Its experiences foreshadowed acute challenges the ORHA would encounter following its permanent relocation to Iraq’s capital later that month (Bowen, 2009: 56; Brennan and others, 2013: 23-25). After Baghdad fell into coalition hands, Jay Garner arrived in Baghdad on April 21, 2003

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to manage a relocated ORHA that was now responsible for commencing operations throughout the country (Bowen, 2009: 59; Dobbins and others, 2009: 7; Tripp, 2007: 279).

Garner’s chain of command ran through the U.S. DOD (Perito, 2005: 3), with the OHRA’s primary objectives as providing humanitarian relief to Iraqis (Rathmell, 2005: 1022-1023), assisting for refugees, maintaining basic government services, and establishing law and order throughout the country (Brennan and others, 2013: 23; Tripp, 2007: 279). While quite complex, scholars argue that OHRA’s restrictive mandate partially illustrates the perceived ease with which the George W. Bush administration expected the occupation to progress (Tripp, 2007: 279), while its chain of command underscores the superiority of the DOD within the administration’s policy hierarchy. OHRA objectives likewise underscore the false assumption policymakers had, as they assumed that Iraq’s pre-war governing institutions and security forces would continue to function subsequent to the invasion (Brennan and others, 2013: 23; Rathmell, 2005: 1023). Succinctly, Garner assumed that his organization would acquire temporary control over a generally functional government, military and police force inside Iraq (Perito, 2005: 3). Emphasizing his expectations, the ORHA head optimistically projected that political “elections for a transitional government [would occur] within 90 days of his arrival” (Dobbins and others, 2009: 38). This expectation denoted in the quote determined the strategy that Garner prepared and implemented as head of ORHA.

To hasten the re-institution of Iraq’s governing and security framework, ORHA’s strategy hinged on “reconstitut[ing] as much of the old administration they could by recalling people to their posts, setting up temporary offices and guaranteeing salaries” (Tripp, 2007: 279). The arrangement summarized in the quote included the incorporation of low-level Baʻath party members into Iraq’s post-war structures (Dobbins and others, 2009: 7). To assist with this political transition, Garner “set up an interim Iraqi advisory group made of key Sunnis, Shi’ites, and Kurds to put a local face on the occupation government” (Dobbins and others, 2009: 8). The advisory group mentioned was to assist ORHA staff, the latter of whom were projected to temporarily serve as governing functionaries, and then transition into an advisory role for Iraq’s (temporary) governing body until a new government could be elected (Dobbins and others, 2009: 8; Perito, 2005: 3). This transitional arrangement had been endorsed by 300 diverse Iraqi representatives, who had attended the Baghdad Conference held on April 28, 2003 (Dobbins and others, 2009: 38-39). The conference concluded with members agreeing to meet one month later (in May 2003) to form a transitional government that would assume control of the country from the ORHA (Dobbins and others, 2009: 38-39). Circumstances on the ground ultimately compromised the arrangements agreed upon.

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To his credit, Garner intended to engage Iraqis in dialogue²⁰ concerning how they desired post-war reconstruction to evolve and which changes they deemed appropriate (Tripp, 2007:

279). Garner’s planned approach thereby conformed to Djerejian and Wisner (2003: 2) recommendations to engage and consult Iraq’s society throughout the occupation. However, Garner’s strategy was shelved following the proliferation of insecurity (Dobbins and others, 2009: 8-9; Tripp, 2007: 279). When violence and civil disorder intensified, it exceeded a magnitude the U.S. had projected and prepared for (Allawi, 2007: 94). Although the U.S.

military had planned for the possible sabotaging of Iraq’s oil fields, and thereby ordered U.S.

troops to secure fields in Kirkuk and Britain’s troops to take control of the Rumaila fields in Basra (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 247), the United States military neglected to anticipate widespread civil unrest (Allawi, 2007: 94). The decision to secure oil fields, as opposed to imposing law and order, offer credence to Paul Williams’ (2006) assertion that the invasion was primarily about obtaining control of Iraq’s natural resources. It equally played into the fears of the Iraqi people.

The outbreak of looting and violence that manifested throughout the country during the first weeks of the occupation undermined the ORHA’s operational capacity (Allawi, 2007: 94;

Bowen, 2009: 59-60; Dobbins and others, 2009: 8). The U.S. administration, nonetheless, appeared oblivious to events on the ground. Despite the proliferation of instability, on May 1, 2003, aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, with an over-sized banner proclaiming “Mission Accomplished” in the backdrop, President George W. Bush publicly declared the end of major combat operations (Bellamy, 2004: 131; Brennan and others, 2013:

25; CBS News, 2008; Dobransky, 2014; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 248). According to the President, Iraq had been liberated and reconstruction of the country had commenced. The ceremony proved premature because violence escalated over successive months. The spiral of insecurity prompted Bush to later claim that elements of the ceremony had not been adequately clarified (CBS News, 2008). Instead of the ceremony representing the end of major combat operations in Iraq, Bush insisted that the ritual was meant for U.S. service members on that particular navy vessel (CBS News, 2008). Despite the President’s attempts at concealing his impulsive action, the fact remains that security in Iraq spiraled beyond U.S.

military control, and major combat operation in Iraq would persist for nearly a decade.

20 Dialogue is defined here as a constructive, symmetrical means of communicating, in which “minds open to take in new ideas and perspectives, modify earlier assumptions, and rethink judgments” (Saunders, 2009: 376-378).

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Analysts attribute the deterioration of security to numerous causes, namely the inadequate number of occupying troops and failure of leaders to provide orders to those troops in theatre (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 57; Edelstein, 2004: 49; Haass, 2009: 257; Record, 2007:

86). In total, the coalition committed 173, 218 troops to the invasion, which critics suggest was insufficient for maintaining law and order during the occupation (Rathmell, 2005: 1022;

Tripp, 2007: 275). With insufficient numbers, and absent orders to intervene, coalition police, military and security contractors (or security forces) proved either unwilling or unable to restore order and thereby left civil violence largely unaddressed (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 194-197). By early 2004, social-political dynamics escalated from sporadic civil disorder into a complex, violent conflict comprising of an insurgency²¹, sectarian and criminal violence, and terrorism (Allawi, 2007: 173-230; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 259; Hicks and others, 2011: 2). Adding impetus, key decisions made by U.S.-led occupying authorities precipitated destabilization and undermined reconstruction of Iraq by furthering popular resistance and sectarian divisions (Allawi, 2007: 155-159; Barakat, 2005: 578-580). The evolution of, and explanations for, the intensification of insecurity are detailed below.