Población originaria y negra excluida del sistema educativo

Prior to the invasion, some analysts had discussed downsizing and restructuring Iraq’s military (Djerejian and Wisner, 2003: 5-6; Dobbins and others, 2009: 53). However, subsequent to the sweeping desertion experienced among Iraq’s military and police forces during the invasion, “prewar plans to use the Iraqi military forces for post-war stability operations were rendered impractical, at least in the short term” (Dobbins and others, 2009:

53). The quote emphasizes that following the voluntary dissolution of Iraq’s military, the U.S.

military and other organizations associated with the occupation determined that Iraq’s security forces should be officially dissolved and reconstructed later (Dobbins and others, 2009: 52-57). While expressing some reservations about the proposal, Bremer agreed to obey the dissolution edict, and officially instituted the decision to dissolve Iraq’s military and security services on May 23, 2003 (Dobbins and others, 2009: 52-57).

Therefore, the second major decision of the CPA was the dissolution of Iraq’s military, intelligence and police forces (Allawi, 2007: 155-159; Bowen, 2009: 75; Dobbins and others, 2009: 15; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 167; Tripp, 2007: 282; Ucko, 2008: 343). Bowen (2009) summarizes the decision’s content and scope:

CPA Order Number 2, titled “Dissolution of Entities,” abolished seven institutions: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of State for Military Affairs, the Iraqi Intelligence Service,

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the National Security Bureau, the Directorate of National Security, and the Special Security Organization. The order put every member of Iraq’s army, air force, navy, and air defense force, as well as the Republican Guard, the Special Republican Guard, the Directorate of Military Intelligence, and the Emergency Forces—some 500,000 men—

immediately out of work, many without any compensation. Although the roughly 300,000 conscripts could receive a small termination payment, no soldier with the rank of colonel or above was eligible for either a termination payment or a pension (Bowen, 2009: 75)²⁶.

The quote illustrates the scale of the decree and alludes to the social implications of the dissolution policy where a large number of Iraq’s security personnel were immediately made redundant without receiving compensation or being disarmed.

Hence, there were several obvious shortcomings associated with Order Number 2 (Allawi, 2007: 158). Foremost, no measures were initially implemented to provide alternative employment or financial compensation to many of those made redundant, creating animosity among former personnel who were now unable to provide for their families (Allawi, 2007:

158; Dobbins and others, 2009: 59; Tripp, 2007: 282). The act thereby exacerbated post-war unemployment (Bowen, 2013: 12) but also increased anti-occupation sentiment and attributed to accumulating post-war grievances (Allawi, 2007: 158; Hashim, 2006: 92-97; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 167). Humiliated and incensed, some nonviolently protested the decree and these demonstrations rapidly transmogrified into larger riots for which coalition troops were dispatched to contain (Allawi, 2007: 158). As protests and riots failed, humiliated officers and soldiers joined an emerging insurgency to counter occupying forces (Allawi, 2007: 243;

Dobransky, 2014; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256; Fontan, 2006: 227-235; Hashim, 2006: 92-97).

At this juncture, humiliation in the context of Iraq’s culture should be briefly examined.

Victoria Fontan (2006: 218) suggests that humiliation is synonymous with shame whereby an event “depriv[es] the subject of self-value, or self-respect, and also ultimately induc[es]

feelings of rejection. Shame is the result of the self-perception of failure to live up to certain standards and ideals.” In consideration of Fontan’s definition, shame is subjective and varies according to culture and experience. Providing increased insight into how honor and shame are conceptualized and practiced in Iraq, Avishai Margalit categorizes Iraq as a shame society, where an experience perceived as humiliating demotes an individual and their family’s social status, and demotion in turn encourages a reaction to reclaim or reconstitute the social standing of the offended (Fontan, 2006: 219)²⁷.

26 Comparatively, Allawi (2007: 157) estimates that 400,000, mostly Sunni Arab, soldiers were affected.

27 Avishai Margalit “differentiates between two types of society with regard to humiliation: guilt and shame societies. Members of guilt societies internalize their norms, and therefore feel guilt when they disobey them,

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Within Iraq’s culture, three broadly defined experiences constitute humiliation. These include: “A loss of physical force [ihtiram], the attempt to a woman’s ird [purity], and the disowning of one’s social rank [sharaf]” (Fontan, 2006: 219-220). Considering the three experiences that constitute humiliation articulated in the quote, the dissolution of security services was perceived offensive because of the loss of physical force and social rank (Fontan, 2006: 219-220). The act thereby humiliated soldiers and security forces, which prompted a response to regain honor. With this basic understanding of honor and humiliation outlined, our attention returns to recounting events following the dissolution decree.

As the groups of incensed and protesting soldiers multiplied, and insurgent activity started to increase, the CPA and DOD were forced to establish a scheme for compensating low ranking soldiers and conscripts (Allawi, 2007: 158; Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-60). A review was undertaken in July 2003, and a compensation scheme was established to remunerate low-ranking soldiers (Allawi, 2007: 158; Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-60). While the scheme did not guarantee employment of those soldiers or officers made redundant, it did provide a degree of compensation. According to DOD assessments, the compensation scheme successfully reversed the trend of protests and is thereby projected to have reduced popular animosity and the probability that former soldiers would become participants in the insurgency (Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-60)²⁸. Nevertheless, the compromise was temporal.

An associated problem of CPA Order Number 2 is that there was no systematic effort to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate soldiers or police officers made redundant (Ucko, 2008:

344-345). In instances where disarmament orders were issued, their implementation was haphazard (Ucko, 2008: 346-353). Failure to disarm meant that former members of the security services were already armed and could join the insurgency to counter the occupation and their maltreatment (Allawi, 2007: 158; Ucko, 2008: 344-345). Disarmament was a controversial and complex undertaking in Iraq, which may partially explain why it was not implemented. For example, during instances of implementation, the act of disarming equally humiliated former soldiers because it removed an important source of family protection (Allawi, 2007: 158; Hashim, 2006: 92-97; Wyatt-Brown and Fontan, 2005). Consequently, there was a high risk of offending men by removing their weapons, a policy by which

whereas the externalization of norms in shame societies leads their members to seek to maintain their honor and good name in the eyes of others, this at all costs” (Fontan, 2006: 219). As indicated, Iraq falls in the latter category (Fontan, 2006: 219).

28 Following implementation of the DOD payment scheme, insurgents started offering financial rewards to entice recruits for the insurgency. Dobbins and others (2009: 60) note “that insurgent groups began to pay young men

$100 to kill a U.S. soldier and $500 to disable a Bradley or Abrams armored vehicle.” This counter-offer is believed to have tempted Iraqis to join the insurgency (Dobbins and others, 2009: 60).

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humiliating consequences were equally probable to compel Iraqis to join the insurgency (Wyatt-Brown and Fontan, 2005). In this frame, disarmament produced a paradox, where failure to disarm ensured armed men could join the insurgency, while implementation was equally probable to offend Iraqi men and drive them to join the insurgency.

Despite growing insecurity, the process of reconstituting security forces was postponed for several months while U.S. officials determined the size and structure they believed Iraq would need (Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-62). Following contemplation, CPA Order Number 22, promulgated on August 18, 2003, re-established Iraq’s Army (Dobbins and others, 2009: 62).

Thereafter, recruitment and training of military and security personnel began (Bowen, 2009:

124-135). The process of re-establishing Iraq’s security forces was, however, complicated by a lack of trainers, facilities and other resources (Bowen, 2009: 124-135). As a result, it took seven years for Iraq’s military to be re-established to a sufficient degree where it could qualitatively and quantitatively operate independently (Department of Defense, 2010: 41).

In summary, the dissolution of Iraq’s security services proved problematic. Associated policies, namely disarmament, were haphazard and poorly implemented, with its fallout increasing the number of challenges encountered during the occupation. Most importantly, the acts of dissolution and disarmament incensed former soldiers and are suggested to have contributed to social instability (Allawi, 2007: 157; Bowen, 2009: 75; Brennan and others, 2013: 28; Dobransky, 2014; Hashim, 2006: 92-97; Rathmell, 2005: 1024). Overall, dissolution of the security services qualifies as another example of structural violence.

With two primary examples of structural violence delineated, the next subsection outlines the origination and development of violence under the occupation. While violence spanned eight years and several governing bodies (outlined in section 1.4), insurgent and civil violence took root under the CPA’s mandate. As mentioned, coalition inability to provide security equally constitutes another example of structural violence perpetrated by the United States during the occupation.