Límites territoriales y formas de explotación forestal

4.1.1 THE UNPOPULARITY OF THE HERODIAN CLIENT RULERS

The quoted textual sources reflect the unpopularity of the Herodian client rule. Josephus (J.W. 1.33) recounts a narrative where reports of an illness of Herod the Great, spurred on a subversive act of removing an image of a golden eagle. This eagle was placed by Herod over the entrance of the Temple from the Upper City. Herod was not as ill as the instigators hoped, and he had the perpetrators summarily executed. Why was the image of the eagle such an important symbol that it spurred

on protest action? Josephus indicates that it was deemed as contrary to the “law of their country”. What was this “law of their country” that the symbols broke? Was the eagle viewed as a transgression of the Jewish religious command against the display of images (Ant. 17.6)? Was the eagle viewed as a symbol of Roman dominance over and above the idealised Judean theocracy (as symbolised by the Temple)? Or was the eagle an indication of the patron-client relationship between the Judean elite and the Romans? After all, it was placed over the entrance of the Temple used by the elite coming from the Upper City. Due to the embedded nature of politics and religion, all these possible reasons may be relevant. But what is clear from the incident is that Herod the Great had a near absolute control of local Judean politics. Only upon his perceived death-bed did the perpetrators dare to act. Equally, the rule and immense achievements of Herod were not celebrated by the local Judean population, but was met with a desire to desecrate his legacy — as the removal of the eagle suggests. Not for nothing did the capital of Galilee, Sepphoris, rise in the revolt after the death of Herod. This revolt was cruelly suppressed by the Syrian legate, Varus (Ant. 17.10).

Similar tensions about an unpopular Herodian ruler is present also in the Gospels. In Luke 13:31–33 Jesus is warned of the impending action of Herod Antipas against him. The narrative irony is that the main antagonists of Jesus warn him of this danger. It appears to be a case of the enemy of my enemy is my friend. According to Luke, Jesus gives a dismissive reply and refers to Herod as “that fox”. Foxes were perceived to be insignificant entities in Old Testament thought.34 Rather, the rule of the Kingdom of God is stated as superior to the rule of the Herodians. Here Luke refers to the exorcisms and healings that Jesus performed as proof of the power of the Kingdom of God over and above Herod. But a rather sober admission is also given to the political realities of early Roman Palestine — Jesus is inexorably on his way to Jerusalem for a showdown with the Judean and Roman political leaders; a prophet cannot be killed outside the Judean capital.

34_{“That stone wall they are building — any fox going up on it would break it down!” (Neh 4:3,} NRSV). “Catch us the foxes, the little foxes, that ruin the vineyards — for our vineyards are in blossom” (Song 2:15, NRSV). Malina & Neyrey (1996:125) notes that the use of animal types – including this example of Luke – implies a stereotype that the audience immediately recognise without further explanation. The audience would “know” what foxes are like, and what qualities they would exhibit.

These textual sources depict the unpopularity of Herodian politics. They also hint at the larger political realities and influence of the Pax Romana — and how it overshadowed the possibility of political reform in the local Judean context. Social change was unlikely due to the way Roman imperialism shaped and maintained the political landscape of early Roman Palestine. This hold was so strong that even after the death of Herod the Great, palpable political change did not come.

4.1.2 THE NATURE OF THE PAX ROMANA AND JUDEAN POLITICAL IDEALS

Politics play an important role as a social domain to determine social cohesion or social conflict. Politics, by its very nature, are the broad description of the collective action of a nation (Hanson & Oakman 2008: Glossary [Kindle edition]). Politics describe how various social groups set collective goals for a nation. These collective goals are managed by the organs of the state, and serve as an expression for the collective will of a nation. Inevitably, the exercise of power is intimately involved with politics. The central questions in politics are: who has power within the state, how is that power utilised, and to what end is that power exercised? Equally important, for the purposes of this dissertation, is the question of how is the exercise of that power critiqued. This becomes a question of justice: the use of power is a moral issue because it profoundly impacts the lives of people and social groups. However, the problem with allocating morality to the exercise of justice and power, is that it requires a philosophical foundation to that measurement (cf. §7.5). In other words, if politics and power are intertwined, and if power needs to be critiqued on the basis of justice, then how is that particular philosophy of justice defined — and does the foundation to that principle of justice hold under closer scrutiny? This may be seen as a central issue for the social domain of politics in early Roman Palestine.

In order to continue this line thought, some background is needed regarding the socio-historical location of early Roman Palestine. The description of this social world serves as an important precursor to describing the political arena of early Roman Palestine. Since political systems vary greatly in different time periods and cultures, and are heavily influenced by other domains such as economics and religion, it should not be readily assumed that the socio-historical location of early

Roman Palestine is evident. The social world of early Roman Palestine fitted into a general type of socio-political system. Borg (2006:79–85)35 connects the social world of early Roman Palestine with a “preindustrial agricultural domination system”. As a “preindustrial and agricultural society”, early Roman Palestine was able to develop large scale agriculture and the accumulation of population in larger cities. This accumulation of a population was facilitated by the creation of a larger supply of surplus goods. As a “domination” system early Roman Palestine housed a wealthy and powerful elite class. This elite class developed as the population aggregated in the cities, and the need arose for governance for the burgeoning number of people. Typically, in such a social system, the elite consisted of about 1% of the population. They have a high concentration of resources at their disposal. Their various stewards, managers and servants (which is often dubbed as “the retainers”) enlarge this class to roughly 10% of the population. The other 90% of the population were mostly peasants, who struggled with subsistence farming on small parcels of land. It should be noted that in an agricultural society, access to the economy was based on productive access to land. Therefore, the economic outlook for the peasant family who lost their land was dire.

According to Borg (2006:79–85), a political domination system found in pre-modern agricultural societies typically exhibited the following characteristics: they were politically oppressive (since political power was kept among 1% of the population), and the peasantry was unable to attain the necessary power to enact their collective concerns on a larger political scale. A domination system was economically exploitative since the elite acquired from 50% to 66% of produce and trade, with little or no mechanisms for a trickle-down economy to help the peasantry. There was no, or little, mechanisms of distribution of resources.36 _{The exception was client/patron}

relationships (§ 4.1.3). Resources were bestowed by elite patrons based on face-to- face relationships with their dependents (clients). This was an inefficient mechanism

35 _{Borg is certainly not alone in this description of the broad social system of early Roman}

Palestine. Some of the concurring authors include: Houtart 1976:16–17; Fiensy 1991:2,156– 159; Rohrbaugh 1993:35; Saldarini 1989:36; Borg 2006: Chapter 9 (Kindle edition); Oakman 2008:251; Horsley 2012: Chapter 7 (Kindle edition).

of distribution of resources on a larger scale, and rather served as a method of consolidating power in the hands of elite. After all, this form of reciprocity “is thought to create and sustain enduring relationships of dependency, whether between individuals or between groups” (Schwartz 2010: Chapter 1 [Kindle version]). A domination system was also religiously legitimated, which is to say the elite was seen to rule by divine right (or at least that their actions were endorsed by the divine).37 Lastly, such system was kept in place by armed conflict or violence. Wars were fought to gain land and wealth. This enabled the direct acquisition of land or indirect acquisition by means of tribute (Borg 2006:79–85).

This domination system was embodied in the time of Jesus in the form of the Pax

Romana. The Pax Romana superficially means the “Peace of Rome” (or cessation

from war or discord). Ironically, the territories that Roman peace consolidated, were gained by waging war (Wood 2016:96). But on a deeper level it contained a particular political method, and a particular view on justice. For Crossan & Reed (2004:382) the Pax Romana espoused a philosophy of retributive justice. This meant that, from a Roman perspective, power was used in such way to protect Roman interest, and maintain a hierarchical social system (with the Roman elite at the top). This was justified on the back of Roman military prowess. This political philosophy was shaped after many years of civil war within the burgeoning Roman empire, and signalled a serious attempt to avoid such wars in future. The Pax Romana came to the fore after the ascension to power of Augustus in 27 BCE. It consolidated Roman vassals and territories into an empire with Rome as the capital. The Pax Romana was therefore also a legal mechanism, undergirded by Roman military power, in order to exercise Roman imperial designs (Wengst 1986:10).

The Pax Romana held distinct benefits for those under its sway. After the years of devastating Roman civil war (which caused destruction in various territories in the Mediterranean), the need arose for stability and peace in the region. The Pax provided that and more. It ensured an infrastructure of a high quality. Extensive networks of Roman roads improved trade and communication. The Roman legal

37 _{The cultural and religious legitimation of elite politics in early Roman Palestine is explored}

system gave a cogent and stable system of settling disputes and maintaining order. Roman legionaries destroyed piracy and banditry on trading routes, and more importantly, protected territories from attacks from rival empires such the Parthians. All in all, the Pax Romana would reign supreme for at least two centuries and provided a high level of wealth creation in the empire (Perry et al 1996:144–150).

The Pax Romana presented some problems though — and especially so in early Roman Palestine. In reality the Pax Romana (and the imperial ambitions it undergirded) resulted in an increasing spiral of violence in Judea and Galilee (Horsley 1987:26–27). Illustrations of this spiral of violence can be found38 _among

the Judean prefects (6–41 CE). Pontius Pilate came to be known as the worst perpetrator of political violence during his time of service in 26–36 CE. Pilate was involved with three separate incidents of escalating social unrest with political blunders (Newsome 1992:294–296). Cumanus (48–52 CE) slaughtered a crowd when they protested the rude gestures of a Roman soldier during Passover, and was accused of receiving bribes by the Samaritans in order to ignore the robbing of Jewish pilgrims. Felix (52–60 CE) tried to solve the growing crisis of banditry in the countryside in a cruel manner. He was also involved in the political murder of the high priest Jonathan (Ant. 20.8). Felix led a military action against the popular prophet dubbed as the “Egyptian”. 400 people were killed and 200 captured. Felix is also the procurator who took the apostle Paul captive (Newsome 1992:302). Even Felix’s own compatriots left a disparaging depiction of him. Tacitus described him as a person with “the power of a king in the spirit of a slave” (Hist. 5.9). Under Festus (60–62 CE), the spiral of violence became unmanageable, as the rural areas fell under the sway of the bandits and social unrest increased in the urban areas. He tried to contain the situation with military actions against the bandits. The last procurators Albinus (62–64 CE), and Florus (64–66 CE), were not able to contain the situation and made it worse by taking bribes. Florus became little more than a

38_{Most of these depictions is from the narrative accounts of Josephus. The argument here is} not that his account of early Roman Palestine is historically verifiable, merely that textual sources from that time period depict an escalation of political violence. The lack of textual sources makes multiple attestation of Josephus’ account complicated (§ 1.9). But the point is, in the perspective of an author such as Josephus, political violence escalated in an alarming fashion.

brigand, and apparently pillaged towns at the slightest provocation (Newsome 1992:299–302).

According to the social theories of Camara (1971:30–31), such a “spiral of violence” typically develops as political action and reaction of oppressor and oppressed evolves. This spiral typically follows four stages: in the first stage, injustice inflicts harm on the subjugated social group. Injustice is defined here as a form of institutional violence, enforced by unjust laws. During the second phase the subjugated group reacts by means of protest and resistance, which is often expressed in the form of mass demonstration. The third stage is the repression of protest and resistance by the powerful. Such repression may be achieved by means of psychological means (such as intimidation), or physical means (such as the use of military force). As a result of repression, the resistance is driven underground as a means of survival. This leads to the fourth phase, namely revolt.

All four of these phases can be recognised in the examples given above: the laws generated by the Pax Romana created an environment where various Judean groups expressed protest (for example movements shaped by popular prophets such as the “Egyptian”, or the cutting down of the golden eagle over the entrance of the Temple). This protest was met with repression in the form of violence (military action against the followers of the Egyptian, and the execution of those who removed the eagle). The Roman elite understood the possible threat of these popular movements, and took swift action to try and prevent growth thereof among the general population. After all, the threat of Herod Antipas against the life of Jesus (Lk 13:31–33), can be interpreted as the political action of the oppressor to prevent the growth of the Jesus movement. Therefore, in order to understand the unfolding spiral of violence in early Roman Palestine, a closer look is needed into how the Pax

Romana shaped the elite Judean political ideology and aspirations, as well as the

alternate political ideals of the Judean peasantry.

4.1.3 ELITE JUDEAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN EARLY ROMAN PALESTINE

The Romans generally followed the same pattern of rule in their various territories, and this pattern comprised of three steps. First, military conquest of the territory was

completed; then the extraction of tribute was set up as a means of funnelling resources towards Rome; and lastly local elite client rulers were appointed (Horsley 2010b:108-110). The appointment of local client rulers followed the Mediterranean social custom of patronage. Patronage can be described as a model or construct that social scientists use to examine different power relationships. The basic definition of patronage by Moxnes (1991:242) is followed in this dissertation:

Patron-client relations are social relationships between individuals based on a strong element of inequality and difference in power. The basic structure of the relationship is an exchange of different and very unequal resources. A patron has social, economic and political resources that are needed by a client. In return, a client can give expressions of loyalty and honor that are useful for the patron.

For Chow (1991:26-28), patronage exhibited the following features: patron-client relations were exchange relations. This is to say that the patron gave to the client what he needed, and the client reciprocated by giving to the patron what he wanted. Patron-client relationships were asymmetric. This is to say that the two parties were not equal in power. The patron was more powerful. Such a relationship was particularistic. This means that resources were given to particular individuals and groups, not given universally. This made patronage very personal in nature. The patron-client was also supra-legal, binding and voluntary. This means that patronage often superseded official laws and customs, and was based on a mutual understanding. These relationships were long term, and entered into voluntarily. Lastly, such a relationship was vertical: it bound the client and patron together, often to the exclusion of other patron-client networks. All of these features meant that patronage often served to concentrate power in the hands of the very few, since it built highly personal networks around the powerful.

For Malina (2001: Chapter 1 [Kindle version]) three factors had to be in place for patronage to be effective. In the first place, the social value of reciprocity39 _{had to be}

39 _{Reciprocity is an expression of the principle of “one good turn deserves another”.}

embraced by both parties. This bound the patron and client together, since a client was socially obliged to respond to the benefaction of the patron. Patrons sought clients since it enhanced their honour and prestige, and created dependents who have to respond with loyalty. But this sort of relationship only worked well where reciprocity underpinned patronage. Patronage became a strong social custom in the Roman empire because it was undergirded by social value of reciprocity (Schwartz 2010: Chapter 1 [Kindle version]). In the second place, there had to be unequal status between the patron and the client. This means that reciprocity becomes espoused by patronage in societies where there are high power discrepancies between various social groups and individuals. This means that early Roman Palestine was an excellent environment for patronage. Finally, there had to be proximity between the patron and the client. If only a few in society held a high measure of power, then power became inaccessible for the many unless it was accessed by personal contact with the powerful. This meant that patronage operated with a face-to-face means. Access to power became highly personal between individuals. Power was not transferred by means of impersonal institutions, as per universalist societies,40 but was derived from personal relationships.

Patronage then, is a form of negative reciprocity where there is a strong power discrepancy between the patron (who has power and resources) and the client (who lacks power and resources). The patron gives palpable resources and goods to the client, who then reciprocates with less palpable goods such as honour and loyalty. In effect this social custom led to the lasting concentration of power among the elite, and none more so than the Roman elite. This custom of patronage meant that the Roman Pax depended on a “face-to-face” method of rule. Local client kings and