University student admissions are tightly regulated by the state. The central student admissions policy is widely regarded as ‘highly political’ and ‘socially sensitive’ in nature,
because it affects a large number of Chinese citizens,54 and has significant implications for social equity and political stability. The policy contains two major aspects: student admission quotas (zhaosheng jihua bianzhi 招生计划编制) and student selection methods (kaoshi luqu
fangshi 考试录取方式).
Firstly, each year the MoE determines the student admission quotas and numbers for individual national universities and defines their student recruitment ratios for different geographical regions and provinces. This is especially true of undergraduate recruitments. For instance, the MoE specifies the ‘geographic priorities’ from where a university has to recruit more undergraduate students each year, and provides detailed instructions on the percentage increase for middle and western regions in China and the percentage reduction for coastal provinces. Universities must comply with these rules precisely. In recent years, the national recruitment policy for postgraduate students has been increasingly relaxed, however, research universities remain subject to tight central regulation over postgraduate admission numbers, including PhD students.
The government claims that such a central mechanism ‘improves China’s social and economic equity’, ‘ensures an equal access of disadvantaged, remote regions to universities’, and ‘regulates universities’ practices, sizes and quality’.55 In early 2013, for example, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang issued a new directive and commanded national universities to recruit additional 30,000 undergraduate students from the less-developed middle and western regions in the same year. The rationale was to ‘help improve social equity and regional economic development’. Following Li’s decision, the government immediately altered the details of universities’ 2013 admission quotas only a few months prior to the national university entrance exam. Such episodes reoccur regularly.
My interviewees were clearly disgruntled about their lack of autonomy in student admissions. They consistently argued that this policy has hindered their selection of quality candidates,
54 Due to the large scale of the Chinese higher education system, this policy involves a huge number of Chinese
citizens. Based on the MoE statistics in December 2014, for example, China had 1,793,953 postgraduate students and 24,680,726 undergraduates enrolled at a regular higher education institution in 2013 (MoE, 2014f).
55 According to some officials I spoke to, by regulating university admissions and manipulating student numbers and
ratios, the state aims to ‘optimise mobility flows within the country’, ‘narrow gaps in wealthy and poor regions’, ‘look after the people from poor regions and with disadvantaged low socio-economic backgrounds’, and ensure ‘an equal access to top level universities’. In addition, national universities receive regular funding from the MoE partially based on their student enrolments, so some institutions may recruit a large number of students beyond their capacity for the sake of financial revenue. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to regulate their student numbers and ensure their academic quality.
limited student numbers and affected their sustainable growth. A senior university executive commented:
The quality and quantity of undergraduate and postgraduate students are vital for the development of research universities with world-class vision and mission, especially PhD students. An important task for research universities is to select and train talents. Due to the tight restrictions on student recruitment quotas and capped funding for each student place, the number of our quality PhD students is woefully inadequate. This will have significant impact on our long-term growth. The government does not understand or care how much research universities depend on their talents and young students. It cares more about political stability and savings [of university student funding].
Secondly, the MoE defines student selection methods and conducts unified national exams for university admissions, especially at the undergraduate level, despite the substantial disparities in education quality and capacity between different regions and institutions. For
undergraduate student selection, the MoE mandates gaokao (高考), the national university entrance examination system. For postgraduate recruitments, student candidates must sit the national entrance exams before taking individual universities’ oral and written tests. Leading research universities have gradually gained more autonomy to handpick their PhD candidates, but they are still subject to the state allocations of student enrolment quotas, as mentioned previously.
In particular, gaokao has become a focal point in Chinese society and in the education sector due to its unique social role and its one-size-fits-all approach. It is not only a unified, standard exam for universities to select and recruit students. It is also a symbol for equal, open access to opportunities and fairness for all socio-economic backgrounds, which is similar to the role of the Chinese imperial examination system. As it affects the interests of a large number of citizens and families, it is commonly understood that any major changes related to gaokao can potentially lead to widespread public discontent and social instability.56 Hence, the
government tightly controls this policy area to prevent risks and negative consequences. Notably, since 2003, the MoE has conducted a small reform trial for some leading universities to select and admit undergraduate students more autonomously (zizhu xuanba luqu gaige
shidian 自主选拔录取改革试点) (MoE, 2013a). Students still need to sit the gaokao but are
56 For example, one university director in charge of student admissions shared with me his understanding. He
explained that Chinese society is full of various guanxi factors. A few universities ‘went a little too far’, and made some unethical decisions (nepotism and corruption) on student admissions that caused a big stir. Following this, the MoE decided to strengthen its regulatory power and specifications about student selection.
also tested by individual universities. Some of these universities started to collaborate on joint student testing and selection. However, students selected and recruited under the
‘autonomous selection’ policy cannot exceed 5% of each university’s total student recruitment quota. Most university students are still admitted through gaokao. In addition, since late September 2014, the State Council has tightened up the rules regarding the autonomous student recruitment trial and suspended all self-initiated university coalitions for joint student testing and admissions (State Council, 2014; Guo Zhang, 2014; Zhe Zhang, Zheng, Wang, & Xing, 2010),57 because their collective policy ideas and activities have allegedly undermined the order of national student admissions and led to conflicts and chaos in the sector.
The leading research universities I interviewed have strongly criticised the various student recruitment policy constraints and the state’s political motives and pressures. They have maintained the view that it is in the universities’ right to follow academic principles, values and priorities, and choose their own quality students for education and research (independent of where they are from), and that this practice ultimately supports their world-class development and long-term missions. A university director for student recruitment explained how gaokao has failed the Chinese research universities:
The centralised gaokao contains fundamental flaws and limitations. It has constantly failed in judging students’ true potential, motivation and talent … The Chinese higher education sector is highly diverse, with various types and different levels of institutions, from a few first-class research universities to many specialised and professional training institutions. One single unified exam paper is extremely inadequate, ineffective and unscientific in distinguishing the different levels, qualities, skillsets and types of students. The universal, one-size-fits-all approach goes against our academic values and principles. It does not work for our leading research universities. It is damaging our development.
Another university vice president commented:
As a leading research university, we aim to train our students to become leaders in various fields and play important roles in society. However, currently, many students selected solely based on the national unified exams are ‘exam machines’ who lack personal drive, desirable qualities, and general skills. We should be allowed to select real talents who can truly meet our own criteria and can be trained as future leaders.
57 These coalitions include ‘Beiyue’ (北约), ‘Huayue’ (华约) and ‘Zhuoyue’ (卓越) (Zhe Zhang et al., 2010). For their
Funding
Despite increased economic opportunities and financial investment in the higher education sector, many university leaders I interviewed have described university funding policy as a ‘key constraint’ and ‘the topmost autonomy issue’. National research universities are heavily dependent on government funding. For example, a vice president from a science-intensive university told me that 90% of his university’s annual research funding comes from the government. He added, ‘So to speak, government funding policies determine our life and death. No money, no development. Funding policy is vital for our universities’ growth and competiveness.’ However, a flawed central university funding system is seen as having severely restrained autonomy and development.
Worthwhile research requires long-term support. Although some central departments have become increasingly aware that investment in universities requires a long-term,
comprehensive strategy, the Chinese government in general maintains a ‘planned economy’ approach. Instead of emphasising consistent, sustainable block funding(baozhangxing jingfei
保障性经费) for universities to use with reasonable autonomy,58 the state channels its large funding through short-term, temporary ‘special projects’ or ‘programs’ (zhuanxiang 专项), which have specific deliverables and deadlines. The goal is to direct universities’ activities to carry out nation-building priorities and tasks.59 Examples of such special projects include Project 985, Program 86360 and the 2011 Scheme.61
Special programs have a temporary and unstable nature. The discontinuity or a major adjustment to funding programs and policies can lead to significant consequences for universities which heavily depend on these revenues. Universities feel financially insecure about their future directions. For example, Project 985 has become one of the most important funding sources for leading national research universities, and is regarded as their ‘source of basic living allowance’. A number of university presidents I spoke to were deeply worried
58 Regular block funding is a type of recurring funds calculated by a formula based on enrolments and staff (Wang C.
2000; Hua 2002) with budgetary allocations from the Ministry of Finance through the Ministry of Education and other sponsoring Ministries.
59 For some national universities, the programme funding has accounted for over 50% of budgetary allocation. 60 With the endorsement of Deng Xiaoping, a ‘High technology research and development plan’ or ‘Program 863’
(gaojishu yanjiu fazhan jihua 高技术研究发展计划) was launched in November 1986 (MoST, 2010b). See more information on the official website of the Project 863: http://www.863.gov.cn/1/1/index.htm.
61 For example, the design of the 2011 program to a large extent reflected the government’s instrumentalism and
top-down approach. The government framed some themes and prioritised areas, and with the control power of funding, it channelled universities and their research into national short/mid-term socio-economic development needs rather than encouraging them to undertake free knowledge exploration and discoveries.
about the uncertainty of the future development of Project 985. They suggested that if the government cancels or overhauls the special program, it will severely affect their universities’ current operations and future development plans. A university executive commented:
The government wants to see investment returns as soon as possible, so it likes project- based funding. However, these type of government projects exist today, and may not exist tomorrow, especially when the state leaders and the directives change. Instability and insecurity have a huge impact on our universities.
In addition, university activities are required to meet the government’s development priorities. Government bodies specify the scope of research they intend to support and monitor the quality and timeline of the work. This puts research universities in danger of losing sight of their deep mission, scholarly nature and capabilities, which make them unique participants in national innovation systems and major contributors to national wellbeing (Brodhead, 2014). To be allocated funding from these special programs, many research universities have to divert energy from more productive and sustainable strategies. They pay more attention to competing for such resources than to their scholarly works, and constantly adjust their
research priorities and orientations to meet the official selection criteria.62 For example, as Ma observed, the government expects their invested research projects to have immediate
outputs, which has resulted in increased pressure on basic science researchers (W. Ma, 2003, p. 17).
A university president explained the conflicting priorities between the research universities and the government on such funding policy:
The government manipulates our universities to follow its ideas and plans through its funding policy. We have spent too much time meeting their needs, chasing their money, adapting ourselves to those government programs. We do need the money. I have to visit the central ministries every week to lobby for such funding … In my view, the government should distribute most of the funding in a consistent, sustainable manner that allows universities to develop more freely towards our own goals and priorities. Last but not least, Chinese universities are subject to rigid spending rules and financial audits for government funds. In particular, the lack of financial discretion has created a significant gap between need and supply (Y. Kang, 2013). For example, Project 985 provides significant
university development funds, but universities are only allowed to spend the money on
62 Furthermore, the overly frequent quality assessments and financial audits of those special projects also become a
big administrative burden for universities, which are not only repetitive and time-consuming, but also intrusive, interfering and forceful. Universities feel overwhelmed but still have to take a part in them.
specified areas such as laboratory equipment.63 Similarly, many government research funds adopt a ‘partial funding system’, which does not cover overheads and staffing costs. It is often the case that the more research projects a university receives, the more money it must find from somewhere else to cross-subsidise.
With special programs quickly accumulating over time, the universities find it is increasingly challenging to sustain their academic activities and ongoing operations. A university research executive concluded:
As research universities, we have the original, ultimate roles and missions of free exploration, fundamental research and innovation, and talent training. We should be allowed and supported for undertaking these beneficial activities autonomously. However, our government controls the university funding and commands where the money can be used. This is very unhealthy, damaging the academic nature of research universities. It is time to return to the original point and allow research universities to fulfil their roles.
Facing funding constraints, the research universities have increasingly engaged in negotiation with the government. They have filed complaints and petitions to the government, and advocated a sustainable funding system, a long-term investment commitment, and a greater autonomy in financial matters. For instance, C9 universities persistently lobbied the state on the continuation of Project 985 and on the improvement of its spending rules. The government later extended the funding rounds of the project and lifted some of the spending restrictions (see Chapter 3). As a C9 university president claimed, ‘The strength and wellbeing of Chinese research universities is critical to national innovation. We [universities] should be allowed to develop more freely. We need to have sufficient space and resources to focus on our long- term efforts without the current policy constraints and interferences.’