One tried and trusted [lobbying] method is simply to research whether there are any other bodies that hold similar or identical views to your own. You can then form a temporary alliance with them, joining forces to try and influence government policy in a specific area.
Lobbying: the art of political persuasion by Lionel Zetter (2011, p. 56)
Introduction
Universities’ negotiations and interactions with the government in policy process play a central role in protecting and advancing their interests. This chapter and the next two are devoted to investigating the practices of university lobbying, including occurrences where universities decide to act individually or in a coordinated fashion vis-à-vis state actors. In this chapter particularly, I will explore occurrences where universities’ interests are aligned and therefore collective lobbying emerges.
Different types of organisations lobby differently.66 Scholars have studied the behaviour of lobby associations and the collective actions of interest groups in various economic sectors of China. When examining the steel, consumer electronics and software industries, for instance, Scott Kennedy (2008) finds that direct contact between businesses and government agencies is generally more prevalent than the actions of associations and interest groups. Associations remain minor players in the lobbying and policymaking processes. Businesses take little interest in associations and, when they do, the result is often failure. Kennedy’s work also reveals a certain degree of variation in the extent to which companies attempt to make use of associations (Kennedy, 2008, p. 165): the greater the dominance of State Owned Enterprises
66 As noted in Footnote 22, for-profit actors (e.g. corporations or trade associations) typically choose lobbying
techniques that differ from those of public interest groups and non-profit sectors (e.g. civil environmental groups). The nature of the policy issues influences a group’s lobbying strategy. In the US, for instance, higher education associations are occupationally based non-profit associations and generally fall into the category of non-profit sector. Cook, Gais and Walker suggest that such occupationally based non-profit associations are organised around an economic interest or livelihood and therefore appear to have more self-interest than citizen groups when lobbying, and they usually lobby much the same way that citizen groups do (Cook, 1998, pp. 139-140; Gais & Walker, 1991, pp. 117-119; Schlozman & Tierney, 1986, p. 431).
(SOEs) in one sector, the weaker the role played by trade associations (Deng & Kennedy, 2010, pp. 117, 114). Why?
In an economic sector that is dominated by a few leading SOEs, the large, elite firms are often able to capitalise on their considerable resources and direct ties with the officialdom to influence public policy. They are highly proactive and employ a wide range of lobbying tactics (Kennedy, 2008, pp. 163-167). In addition, the lack of legitimacy of lobbying in China (Cheng, 2006, pp. 44,47-48; Cheng et al., 2003, p. 63; Kennedy, 2009, pp. 213-214) and the political constraints over interest groups and social associations often weaken and restrict the role that trade associations can play (Kennedy, 2008, pp. 163, 171; Unger & Chan, 2008). Kennedy concludes that both ‘economic conditions’ (e.g., the size of a firm, and the level of competition and market concentration of the sector) and ‘political context’ (e.g., political institutions and official norms) shape businesses’ behaviour and choices on their collective actions as well as the businessgovernment interactions (Kennedy, 2008, pp. 163-174).67
Despite their different socio-economic characteristics,68 and the particular ambit of their operation, the major Chinese research universities to a certain extent resemble large SOEs. In particular, both have close ties and proximity to the state, and operate in the same political
67 Kennedy finds that economic circumstances and political context are significant factors that shape business-
government interactions across sectors and how businesses actually exert their influence. Economic factors are particularly salient, if not more than political factors. Economic factors include the level of economic competition and market concentration, and the dominance of SOEs or smaller firms in the sector, and firms’ own size. Political context (political institutions and official norms) includes, for instance, the state administrative and regulatory control of associations, the importance of direct political ties, the political system’s historical practice of compartmentalising information and semi-transparent processes, and unproductive formal institutions for aggregation of industry interests (Kennedy, 2008, pp. 163-164). As a result, attempts at influence peddling have been driven to take other forms. Lobbying is often highly fragmented, and companies rely on various informal tactics, from privately meeting with policymakers to influencing the media (Kennedy, 2009, pp. 213-214). Businesses mostly interact directly with the state on policy, not relying on trade associations, and they avoid challenging the government’s authority. Instead, deference to the state and finding win-win outcomes is the most common strategy (Kennedy, 2008).
68 Unlike either enterprises (marketing private goods) or government institutions (providing public goods) (R. Zhang,
2011, pp. 104-105), universities are quasi-public organisations (providing quasi-public goods) with concentrated knowledge, unique socio-economic attributes and functions, peculiar internal institutional structure, as well as independent and academic organisational value and culture. This distinctive nature of universities guides their operation and behaviour, and determines how they relate to and interact with the government and society (Zijie Huang & Cheng, 2010, pp. 190-192; Junzong Zhang, 2004, pp. 8-9). Higher education institutions are also
particularly sensitive and reactive to any changes to the institutional environment where they operate (J. Lin, 2004, p. 23).
economy and political system.69 The Chinese university sector is highly competitive but dominated by a small number of large, elite players (major research universities) in terms of size, capacity, influence, performance, productivity, and resources, none of which has a monopolistic position. These universities are subject to significant central control and the functional and administrative alignment with the state bureaucracy. They also heavily rely on the government’s funding resources and education policies rather than their market position. These attributes may add more distinctiveness to Chinese universities’ lobbying behaviour, affecting their motivations, logic of actions, and extent of political influence.
In many countries such as the US, the UK, and Australia, there are various active associations and lobby groups of universities, which are independent, incorporated organisations and legal entities. Examples include the elite advocacy groups such as the Association of American Universities (AAU, 2015a, 2015b; Cook, 1998, pp. 90-91), the UK’s Russell Group (Russell Group, 2015a, 2015b), and the Group of Eight Australia (Go8, 2015, 2016a, 2016b), all of which are formed by member universities based on their common interests, and have established a permanent secretariat. These university groups focus on influencing national higher education and research policy, and play an important role in the development of the university sector. They address institutional issues and government actions that affect universities, lead national higher education policy debates, submit policy proposals and present policy analysis, engage with the media to influence the public society, and even openly challenge the authorities on policy issues (AAU, 2015b; Cook, 1998, pp. 145-146; Go8, 2016b; Russell Group, 2015b). So is there a role or space for interest associations or policy advocacy groups in the Chinese university system? If so, are they weak or powerful? Would elite universities have similar or opposite preferences and attitudes towards collective strategies as those of businesses about trade associations? More importantly, what factors determine the elite universities’ choices on their interest alignment and joint lobbying?
This chapter follows the story of the creation, consolidation and decline of a university interest coalition known as ‘C9’, the first of its kind in China. Through tracing the long journey of the C9, we will gain an in-depth insight into the practices and limitations around the interest alignment and collective actions by the leading Chinese research universities in this unique political and social context. I will also identify some key factors that shape their collective lobbying and outcomes, and briefly discuss the main differences between universities and business which are outlined in Kennedy’s and others’ work.
69 For instance, the authoritarian political system promotes opaque policy process, lacks formal institutions for
Much of the information in this chapter derives from personal interviews, meeting documents, media reports and literature, as well as personal observations through my direct interactions with the C9 members and frequent involvement in their joint activities.