The symposia in the following three years took place at Nanjing University (NJU), USTC and HIT, respectively. During this period, their lobby collaboration was further consolidated. The focus of their discussion had shifted from the conceptual analysis of the idea of world-class universities to specific government policies. The convenors of the symposia moved to their president’s offices and started to include more informal networking activities, including banquets, lab tours and local sightseeing.77 Journalists continued to be invited to the open sessions.
The nine executive deans of graduate schools became highly active and collaborative. They held separate, concurrent joint sessions on specific policy issues during and between the symposia, which they also invited relevant government officials to participate. This helped them acquire policy updates, present policy concerns, and offer suggestions and
recommendations directly to the government.78
The nine university leaders played a growing part in driving the group activities, too. They began to hold a separate joint meeting during each symposium, attended by senior
government representatives, where they discussed policy issues and strategies informally.79
77 In the earlier years of the symposia series, the main coordinators at each university were the policy research
offices, higher education research institutes, as well as the 985/211 offices (often located within the graduate schools).
78 For instance, in 2006, the meeting discussed the reform of the university admissions policies so as to increase the
universities’ autonomy in selecting and recruiting students. In 2007, the meeting discussed national policies and university operational issues including increasing institutional autonomy on the use of government funds, and the reform of university human resources system.
79 The attending government officials varied each year. They often came from the MoE and the Academic Degrees
Committee of the State Council (located at the MoE), the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and others. Within the MoE, the participating officials regularly came from the MoE Department of Higher Education, the MoE Department of Development and Planning, and others. The university leaders often asked these participating officials to brief
They agreed that the attendance of all nine presidents was important and hence should be mandated. If a university president was unable to join the annual symposium, the party secretary of that university (who generally doubles as chairman of university council and the top party representative of a university) or a vice president would fill in.80 The MoE and State Council were frequently involved in these activities. In addition, after each of their annual symposia and presidents meetings concluded, the nine universities submitted a joint report to the relevant government departments, summarising the universities’ policy discussions and advocacy.
A university president said:
Each year we focused on the current, major policy issues at our annual joint meetings. Our discussions and views were often picked up by the government and media, shaping
forthcoming policy agendas and directions, and impacting on the sector and society.
On one side, they promoted a generic, pro-education agenda with a big-picture, in-principle approach. For instance, they drummed up the importance of the strategy to ‘build world-class universities’, and the central role of Projects 985 and 211. They appealed for a higher funding rate for each university student and a regular increase of the central budgetary allocations for national education. They asked the government to remove rigid restrictions and frequent audits for the spending of the government funds, and to allow universities to have a greater discretion on student selection and admissions. They advised the government on the reform for the central university entrance examinations, the degrees awarding system, as well as research training models. In particular, they pushed for an ‘institutional governance reform for modern universities’ to enhance the power and autonomy of university academics.
Apparently, these issues largely reflected their own policy concerns, firsthand experiences and development priorities. Yet, they were also long-term challenges affecting many other
universities. Hence, by taking the lead to negotiate these issues with the government through collective actions, the group played a positive role in seeking resolutions and improvements,
them on current policy issues, such as the policy plans and measures for the undergraduate recruitment reform and the postgraduate entrance examination reform.
80 In terms of the internal hierarchy in universities, university presidents are in charge of daily academic and
professional operations, but they are supervised by their party secretaries (who double as chair of the university council) and need their approval on significant institutional matters. Chapter 2 and Diagram 2.1 provide details about their roles in the senior university management system. In addition, notably, not all the university leaders participated in their joint meetings in 2003, 2004 and 2005. In 2006, however, all the nine university leaders attended the forum.
which would benefit other stakeholders in the higher education community and society at large.
On the other, they focused on three specific areas of joint advocacy, and adopted a focused, localised approach to advance their special interests and competitive advantage.
First, they debated with other national institutions on the ‘elitism versus equity’ models for allocation of the government funds, and strongly advocated that the state should concentrate its financial resources on a small number of elite players. Since 1999, other national
institutions had actively lobbied the state for their fair share of the 985 investments, which resulted in the expansions of Project 985 membership. The inclusion of more institutions unavoidably led to a dilution of the central resources. Hence, to prevent its further expansion, since 2003, the nine promoted a performance-based, high-entry point threshold for any university to enter the Project 985, and a regular accreditation and periodic performance review system.
Additionally, in order to maintain their large share of the funding, they jointly advocated ‘funding concentration’ and ‘separate funding’ strategies. For instance, at one joint meeting, the nine members drafted and proposed a long-term strategic plan (to 2020) for future Project 985, based on the needs of the ‘comprehensive development of the top-tier universities’. In the proposal, university presidents outlined their achievements as a result of Projects 985 and 211 funds, and called for a separate set of funding conditions for the first nine universities to further strengthen their development. Moreover, over the years, they highlighted their leading role in the ‘national mission to advance science and education’ and ‘building a knowledge economy’, which was shaped by the official directives, commitments and language. They repeatedly employed the rhetoric and slogans of the state to legitimise and frame their claims, such as ‘concentrating energy on the targeted areas (key stakeholders) to accomplish large undertakings’ (jizhong liliang ban dashi 集中力量办大事), and ‘achieving breakthroughs through prioritisation’ (zhongdian tupo 重点突破).
Second, the group advocated that privileged treatment and a much greater institutional autonomy should be provided to the nine leading players, so that they could achieve world- class quality sooner, set up successful exemplary models in the sector, and help develop sound public policies. These privileges would include favourable student admission quotas, relaxed university personnel policies, greater flexibility for their use of government funds, generous operational expenditures, a higher government funding rate for each student at the nine institutions, as well as a separate quality assessment and evaluation system. In particular, they proactively pursued opportunities and permissions to undertake new policy innovation and
reform trials at their institutions.81 They argued that as the most reputable and mature Chinese universities, their local policy trials would be able to provide good examples, test new ideas, and reduce the risks and drawbacks often caused by broader reforms. Essentially, the goal of such experimentation was to seek legitimate privileges and competitive advantages in autonomy and resources.Individually and collectively, the special, trial policies they advocated included a pilot trial of autonomous student selection, new research training models, PhD admissions reform, and the elimination of standardised national postgraduate entrance exams. For example, in 2007 and the following years, the group collectively lobbied the state for a local policy trial of ‘PhD admissions reform’ at their institutions, with the aim to lift policy restrictions and increase allocated student quotas in their recruitment of PhD students. They organised joint group meetings with officials and also interacted with them separately. In addition to presenting data, facts and policy analysis, the nine members kept reminding these officials that they had the moral support and backing from the top leaders who handpicked them to ‘build Chinese world-class universities’ as a national strategic priority. They claimed that the current policy restrictions of PhD admissions severely hindered universities’
development and undermined their fulfilment of the national goals and missions. They pleaded that it was an obligation and responsibility of the central government bureaucracy to support their endeavours, alter the policy parameters, and deliver on the leaders’ directives. There would be ‘negative consequences’ if the relevant departments did not make the changes soon. In the end, they received the permission for a 10% annual increase in PhD admissions in exchange for an increased efficiency with non-performing students,82 which was a much greater allowance than other universities. This was seen as a significant success in a policy area that had long been off limits for any negotiation.
As an interviewee heavily involved in the policy trial suggested, this special policy trial had ‘opened the door’ to a greater flexibility and incremental reform for the future. Once the
81 Policy experimentation has a long tradition in China. Sebastian Heilmann has observed an unorthodox
combination of novel policy experimentation with long-term policy prioritisation in China over the last few decades in the economy field, which is characterised by ‘foresighted tinkering’ (Heilmann, 2009). Heilmann observes that the Chinese point-to-surface approach entails a policy process that is initiated from individual ‘experimental points’ and driven by local initiative with the formal or informal backing of higher-level policy-makers. If judged conducive by the government, the ‘model experiences’ from the initial experiments will be disseminated, refined and expanded to more and more regions (Heilmann, 2008, pp. 2-4, 29-30). Such approach is in fact commonly seen and well developed in education policies. I will discuss this more in Chapter 5.
82 A policy green light was eventually given to the C9 members, but with certain conditions. As a compromise, the
thinking of the government has some ‘inertia’ (guanxing siwei 惯性思维), it will lead to a long- term, regular increase. He added:
Our universities will continue to negotiate and push for a larger increase each year— 10% this time, 20% the next. This policy [trial] has helped increase the autonomy in this area for other national universities too and ultimately benefited the entire sector. Third, the nine universities cautiously sought the government’s recognition and endorsement of their formal grouping with ‘the top nine’ branding. Having been increasingly exposed to the experience of university groups internationally, the nine agreed that forming a university coalition with like-minded peers would maximise their mutual interests and policy influence, as well as help achieve their individual goals. By formalising their collective brand and quality threshold, they would strengthen their privileged, leading status in the competitive sector, and secure their funding concentration and greater autonomy. If successful, the establishment of their elite university group would become China’s first of its kind and a significant new experiment in the sector.
However, it was a tough issue. Social groups and associations were tightly regulated by the Chinese government. The tension between the nine and the other universities was growing. The MoE had reduced its support and involvement in the group since the Project 985 crisis ended in 2004. In facing these obstacles, the nine institutions spent several years testing the waters, setting the scene and laying the foundation.
The university leaders publicly promoted the importance of their ‘grouping’ for the country and the potential win-win outcomes. They also acted prudently and highlighted their loyalty and commitment to the government and its directives. For instance, in 2005, the then Nanjing University President Jiang Shusheng, who was chair of the 2005 symposium, made an opening address stressing that the nine universities had a strong sense of national responsibility and faith, and should strengthen their concrete collaboration and take some coordinated actions on common policies. Their network would facilitate China’s goal of developing world-class universities (NJU, 2005). In 2006, the group chair, USTC Party Secretary Guo Chuanjie, reiterated that university coalitions such as the US’s AAU played an important part in driving the development of the higher education sectors in their countries and the world. Similarly, the nine Chinese research universities’ collaboration network should be strengthened to advance Chinese higher education’s world-class development (USTC, 2006). Again, in 2007 the nine university leaders promoted their joint view that as the research leaders shared national responsibilities and common goals, their coalition should be crystallised and endorsed by the nation. They argued that they should not fight alone and single-handed, instead they should
grow and mature together through positive interactions. Forming a research university coalition was the global trend and practice, and should also be considered in China. In that year, a formal collaboration agreement for research training was signed by the nine universities (HIT, 2007).
As they had agreed at the 2004 joint meeting, they had been ‘waiting for the right time’ and preparing for the next significant milestone of the group.