So far in this chapter, I have shown how the leading research universities perceive their long- term missions and national roles, and how their social position is enhanced by various factors and strategies, ranging from cultural and historical influence, to the peculiar alignment of their own administrative structure with that of the central bureaucracy. Autonomy and academic freedom are understood as intrinsic values and principles of a modern university, and a
precondition for a university to fulfil its role and responsibilities toward society (Thorens, 2006; Junzong Zhang, 2004). China’s national research universities, even the most influential ones, still endure inadequate institutional autonomy and academic freedom, and are subject to strict state controls. How does university leadership understand the crucial constraints in the policy environment that hinder their institutions’ long-term development and scholarly nature, and how do they perceive their capacity to negotiate various entitlements and influence different policies?
I have had the opportunity to attend a large number of meetings between Australian and Chinese universities. Discussion about academic and research collaborations often led to comparisons of national education policies, particularly on university autonomy, between the two countries. At one meeting in December 2014, for example, a Chinese university
representative pointed out that the Chinese government had the discretion to alter or abolish any academic program offered by a university at any time. Australian universities’
representatives suggested that this would be unthinkable in Australia as their universities had the right to select and determine subjects without the government’s interferences. In such settings, executives from Chinese national universities often openly express their frustration about the over-regulation of the education sector by the Chinese government.
Before detailing the key policy challenges, it is important for me to point out one salient governance strategy of the Chinese government in the higher education sector. The state manages universities of different tiers with a so-called ‘stratified’ or ‘hierarchical approach’ (fenceng duidai 分层对待). This means that, comparatively, the elite national research universities enjoy greater institutional autonomy and a higher level of funding than lower- ranking tertiary institutions (Jupeng Yang & Su, 2012). Such a differentiated approach is documented in the National Outline for Medium and Long-term Educational Reform and Development (20102020) announced in 2010 (CPCCC & State Council, 2010). Under the government guidelines, a small number of selected leading universities are offered a greater autonomy and additional funding for improving their academic management.
There are a range of reasons for this approach. These prestigious universities are generally considered by the state as low-risk, reliable and mature. They are also highly proactive in lobbying the government and seeking more autonomy and policy flexibility. Additionally, the government becomes aware that the top-tier players should be given a greater autonomy in certain areas, so that they can strengthen their growth and capacities, and better serve their role assigned by the Chinese leaders in the nation-building projects. A university vice president suggested:
Building world-class universities in China has been a national development strategy, reflecting Chinese leaders’ directives and guiding the government’s actions. Therefore, the central government has decided to provide special support to a small number of leading national universities, including some Project 985 recipients, in various policy areas, because they are in the best position to become world-class … Such support includes more generous funding and some more flexible regulations.
The elite Project 985 universities, for example, enjoy more autonomy for independent institutional reforms and local policy experiments within the campus than the non-985 universities, such as establishing new research departments and undergraduate programs,49
49 Many universities are required to go through an evaluation and approval process with the government to set up
and establish new undergraduate programs, but the leading institutions can now establish them independently (xueweidian ziwo shenpi 学位点自我审批) as long as they notify the MoE and register them for the record (bei’an
the self-awarding of senior professional titles,50 and undertaking research training reforms.51 As mentioned earlier, the leading universities’ executives also receive higher official ranks. In contrast, the non-985 universities’ applications for new academic programs and local reforms are subject to strict regulation and scrutiny by the state. This is largely because the state attempts to control their quality and practices to reduce the risks of mishaps and chaos in the sector.
Despite such a ‘stratified approach’ that can guarantee some privileged access to funding and more flexible regulations, not all policy areas are the same. Even the most innovative Chinese universities remain heavily influenced by the MoE policies and edicts. Institutional operational and academic areas, such as the appointment of university leaderships, the conferral of academic degrees and student admissions, are still centrally controlled and involve minimal consultations.
What issues do universities contest? How do they know what issues they are allowed to challenge and what remain off limits? Through interviews, I have identified three ‘policy zones’ characterised by different levels of autonomy, including a ‘no-go zone’, a ‘contention zone’ and an ‘autonomous zone’. It has become apparent to me that certain ‘policy zones’ allow for more autonomy and universities’ intervention than others depending on the level of political risks and potential for social chaos and instability. Universities’ interactions with the government are shaped by a clear perception of what is allowed and what is not, by the urgency of the issues and the potential threat of action. The leading research universities feel that the
‘contention zone’ requires intense negotiation and proactive actions with the government, if it is not to endanger their operational activities and long-term missions.
‘No-go zone’: unchallengeable principles
A set of policies and principles that relate to the leadership, ideology and the legitimacy of party authority are not up for discussion. I include these policy issues in the ‘no-go zone’. They include the central appointment of university executives, the ‘cadres under party supervision’ system, and political education. They are the principles that affirm the ultimate leadership and control of the party-state over universities. University executives and staff unanimously avoid
50 At regular universities, senior professional titles of academic staff, such as professors and associate professors,
have to be officially assessed and granted by the government, but a small number of leading universities are authorised to decide and award the titles for their own staff within their institutions.
51 Doctoral supervisorship at most universities, for instance, needs to be approved by the government through
challenging these structural rules, admitting that these are too sensitive and difficult to change.