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When discussing the ‘no-go zone’, university executives I interviewed have generally displayed two different attitudes. The first one is ‘complete understanding and deference’. A university president, for instance, explained to me that in his view the party leadership did not conflict with his university’s autonomy. He said:

53 _{Another policy relating to the party leadership is the drafting of individual university constitutions (daxue} zhangcheng 大学章程). It serves as a customised compact that lists the operational guidelines and autonomy of a university, and is drafted by individual universities but strictly scrutinised by the government for approval. Some university executives I spoke to perceive it as a way for the government to ensure that a university complies with the ruling of the party and the government.

Some people are critical about the party leadership over universities, especially the ‘president accountability system under the leadership of the party committee’. They describe the system as ‘the person in charge [party secretary] is not accountable, and the accountable person [university president] is not in charge (lingdaode bu fuze, fuzede bu lingdao 领导的不负责，负责的不领导)’. They claim that the party interferes with universities’ business too much, and that the party leadership should be removed from universities for the sake of ‘protecting academic autonomy’ … Their analysis is based on a misunderstanding and confusion about the Chinese political context and the relationship between the party and universities. To begin with, China is a socialist country led by the Communist Party. Party leadership is a fundamental principle of university administrations, which should not be confused with the institutional autonomy of universities. In terms of a university’s operations and management, we [universities] can still decide on some important matters at the University Council

(xiaodonghui 校董会) like American private universities. China can develop world-class

universities without having to adopt the university governance system of foreign countries. Evidently, Chinese universities have developed rapidly in recent years. University leaderships’ political orientation and discourses are influenced and monitored by the state, and their careers are determined by the state too, so it is no surprise that university leaders align closely with party priorities. They are required to maintain deference and loyalty when discussing the party or their political positions. As Pan points out, to pave the way for their future political careers, university presidents need to accommodate political trends and ideologies and perform well in implementing the university’s political tasks (Pan, 2007, p. 137). Yet, the majority of university leaders hold, at least privately, a different view. The second attitude—‘discontent, compromise and avoidance’—was more common amongst my

university interviewees. During our private conversations, they frowned, expressed scepticism and frustration about these rigid political rules. They agreed that ‘party leadership’ restricts institutional autonomy and academic freedom in numerous ways. Yet, they also seemed to have accustomed themselves to the reality and understood the negative consequences if they challenge the rules. They have generally adopted a compromising and avoidance approach, burying their personal scepticism in public, at work and at official settings. They share a common view that in order to survive and grow, national universities have no other options but to ‘build a tacit understanding and agreement and develop a positive relationship with the central government’.

In particular, university leaders have maintained a clear perception of what is allowed and what is not, and adapted to policy issues carrying different levels of political risk. A university executive pointed out:

We [universities] know what subjects are open for discussion—we know what can be discussed, and what cannot. Universities can always interact with the government on policies, as long as the fundamental party leadership and political issues, such as the central appointment of university leaders, remain untouched, because they are not up for negotiation or consultation. Many other policy issues related to university operations or government process are open for intervention and are subject to influence.

Despite different private attitudes and convictions, the outcome is the same: universities surrender to the absolute leadership and authority of the party, abide by its fundamental political principles, and do not contest in the ‘no-go zone’.

Interestingly, there is also an informal element to the university–government interactions in the rigid and sensitive ‘no-go zone’. Instead of challenging these rules, some elite university executives take advantage of them and play their cards to advance their institutions’ interests. For example, university leaders employ the ‘central appointment of university leadership’ to facilitate flows of policy information with Beijing and enhance their universities’ political influence and personal connections with the state powers (see Chapters 4 and 5).

‘Contention zone’: key constraints and conflicts

The ‘contention zone’ refers to a range of rigid central policies that are applied to all national universities in various key academic and operational areas. Examples include student

admissions and the conferral of academic degrees. Decisions in these areas are regarded as prerogatives and entitlements of autonomous universities, but are subject, in China, to

intrusive intervention and strict central regulation. Essentially, policies in the ‘contention zone’ are intended to strengthen the state’s political control over education, maintain social stability, and force universities to deliver on nation-building priorities and goals. The ‘contention zone’ policies inevitably clash with the scholarly nature, interests and strategies of national research universities, and threaten their academic activities, institutional operations and long-term missions. The universities envisage that intense negotiations with the state on these issues are required to seek practical solutions, protect their rights, and advance their interests.