La Edad de Eurasia como una era histórica de Bruno Maçãs

How can one fit this three-tiered conceptualisation of state incoherence into the Wendtian framework of RSCT sketched out in the previous chapter? The three tiers of state survival – inherent strength, ostensible stability, effective sovereignty – contain both material and ideational aspects, which an analysis of state coherence would thus have to include. This invites a combination of the macro- and micro-perspectives introduced in the previous chapter when operationalising this approach in terms of the overall theoretical framework employed here. To recap, the former concerns itself with the objective, epiphenomenal aspects of security interaction, the latter with the security discourse underlying these epiphenomena. Deficiencies at the core of this structure of

„stateness‟, effective sovereignty, are most obviously present in the security interaction both within the state concerned and in the wider region, and thus lend themselves readily to the macro-perspective: the symptoms of outright state failure (collapse or fragmentation) are easily discernable in a sub-state and wider regional context. The same goes for the features of ostensible instability. Identifying the lapses in the state‟s legitimacy that underlie these failures and instabilities, or differentiating between inherently weak or inherently strong (but stable) states would, however, require a

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discursive, micro-approach that identifies diverging values/identities and strategies of survival/definitions of threat.

Any analysis would thus have to combine a macro and micro-perspective to be entirely effective. The macro-perspective would examine the integrity of the state‟s existential core, its effective sovereignty, in effect preliminarily characterising the state as failed (collapsed and/or fragmented), unstable or stable; in addition, it would look at the more obvious indications of inherent weakness: corruption, a repressive or rentier state. The micro-perspective would shift one‟s attention to the outer ideational layer of legitimacy by evaluating the inherent strength or weakness of the state through existing patterns of securitisation; its goal would consist in identifying the deficiencies and fissures within the ideational structures that either help explain existing failures and instabilities, or could – in ostensibly stable but inherently weak states – form the basis of future destabilisation. Combined, the insights of these objective and interpretive approaches would allow for an assessment of the ability or inability of the state to maintain its force-legitimacy equilibrium by effectively filling the force-legitimacy gaps identified.

A macro-perspective could objectively assess the effective sovereignty of a given state:

does the state have an effective monopoly of legitimate force over its territory and population, and to what extent is this monopoly compromised? The presence of unrecognised state-like units on the territory of a state, the inability of a state to exercise such exclusive control are all symptoms of state fragmentation and collapse that are obvious from this objective viewpoint. So are the symptoms of ostensible instability: if there still is a monopoly of legitimate force, it will be occasionally and partially corroded through violent political unrest of various kinds, or armed secessionist movements. The macro-perspective can thus set the scene for a subsequent micro-analysis by characterising the state as collapsed, fragmented, ostensibly unstable or stable. Apart from this, it can identify the extent to which states are engaged in repression or cooptation, and the pervasiveness of corruption: all possible indicators of inherent weakness, regardless of the state‟s ostensible stability.

The exact pathways for a discursive micro-perspective analysis depend on the characterisation of the state as failed, unstable or stable from an objective, macro-viewpoint. If the state has been classified as ostensibly stable, an additional differentiation can be made between inherent weakness or strength: the examination of the state‟s legitimacy will concentrate on vertical and horizontal fissures that could lead to collapse, fragmentation or instability in the future. If, on the other hand, the state has been classified as failed or ostensibly unstable, the guiding question will be which

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lacunae in the state‟s legitimacy have contributed to state failure or instability; the state‟s inherent weakness can be safely assumed.

This approach would rely on the patterns of securitisation observed within and around the examined state. Within the framework of state (in)coherence outlined above, there is a clear relationship between these patterns and state weakness (or lack of legitimacy). One has to remember that the provision of security is the state‟s ultimate raison d‟être and source of legitimacy: the state is, in effect, an overarching, collective strategy of survival aimed at protecting collective values and identities. The conformity of sub-state securitisations with this collective strategy can be analysed from the points of view of argumentative and instrumental discourse introduced in the previous chapter: values and identities that diverge from the collective, state-centred benchmark will be visible within the argumentative portion of intra-state securitisations. On the other hand, perceptions of threat and strategies of survival that do not conform to the perceptions and methods implicit in the state‟s collective strategy for survival could be found in the instrumental aspects of the security discourse.

Analysing diverging patterns of securitisation from these argumentative and instrumental perspectives will make it possible to distinguish between the vertical and horizontal weakness of states through what could be termed mutual auto-securitisation, which occurs when the state is securitised as a threat (rather than valued as a guarantor of security) by significant sections of society, which are, in turn, securitised as threats by the state. In horizontally weak states, such mutual auto-securitisation will involve territorially and culturally specific out-groups that reject the state‟s collective identities/values in their argumentative security discourse, identify the state as a threat to their aberrant values and thus advocate deviant strategies of survival in their instrumental discourse. The centrifugal dynamics thus created will usually favour the emergence of aspirant-states or secessionist movements: unless these de-legitimising tendencies are suppressed and marginalised through force or cooptation, they risk degenerating into instability and fragmentation.

In vertically weak states, the deficient internalisation of values and identities throughout society and the consequent presence of aberrant strategies of survival will be visible from the micro-perspective in the low level of public trust in state institutions, seen as threats to the values prevalent within society rather than means towards greater security. Even in the most stable inherently weak states, the continued presence of non-state institutions as providers of security (the family, the clan, the tribe, informal networks) in a society‟s everyday security discourse could be seen as indicating state

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weakness, especially if they circumvent and contradict state-sanctioned procedures and strategies.

Once the extent to which state legitimacy has been compromised in society is known through the micro-perspective, the insights of the macro- and micro-approaches can be combined to answer questions as to the past, present or future ability of the state to compensate for these legitimacy gaps through the exercise of force (through either cooptation or repression). In the case of inherently weak states, forward-looking scenarios could be developed wherein the fissures observed can no longer be remedied by the state, leading to ostensible instability, or, in extreme cases, possible downward spirals towards state failure. In ostensibly unstable states, the inquiry could focus on the present inability of the state to compensate for deficient legitimacies, and the possible future emergence of vicious cycles leading from instability to failure. In failed states, the inquiry could take on an explanatory form, looking back at the reasons for state failure. Of course, in all three cases, the situation will also have to be analysed from a more positive, constructive point of view: could circumstances improve rather than deteriorate? In short, the micro- and macro-perspectives can be combined to analyse the past, present or future interplay of legitimacy, force and monopoly, and their relationship with state coherence. As conceptualised into the three-tiered schema above, the coherence of states is dependent on an often precarious institutionalised equilibrium between ideational and material factors, and any adequate approach would thus have to blend in both these perspectives.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed at developing the notion of state incoherence within the previously introduced, over-arching Wendtian framework of RSCT. After reducing the central function of the state to the provision of security, and linking Weber‟s definition of statehood to Buzan‟s tri-partite view, it disaggregated the phenomenon into a state‟s inherent weakness, ostensible instability and effective sovereignty, all three related, respectively to the ideational, material and institutional aspects of the state. Inherent strength/weakness was said to depend on a state‟s legitimacy (or lack thereof) within society; ostensible (in)stability on that state‟s ability to compensate for legitimacy gaps by projecting force into that society; and, finally, effective sovereignty on its resulting capacity to maintain an effectual monopoly of such legitimate force. A further distinction was introduced between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of state incoherence, resulting in a complex typology including: horizontally and vertically inherently weak/strong states, horizontally and vertically ostensible stable/unstable states and failed – collapsed or fragmented – states. The chapter subsequently delved

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into ways of applying the previously elaborated objective macro-perspectives and discursive micro-perspectives of RSCT to this set-up.

Throughout the framework outlined above, the multi-level nature of RSCT will have to be kept in mind; after all, the framework of this analysis – RSCT – is a multi-level theory, and any examination of intra-unit occurrences would thus have to take into account their broader, regional and systemic interactions. In evaluating the effects of the above-mentioned phenomena on the surrounding RSC and higher-level, great power interaction, as well as, conversely, the effect of regional and systemic security dynamics on state weakness, instability or failure will have to be included. From a macro perspective, one has the ostensible effects of failure and instability in terms of regional (and sometimes even systemic) overspill, or the demonstrable involvement of external forces in the internal affairs of failed, unstable or weak states. From a micro-perspective, on the other hand, the failure or instability of states may be securitised as a regional or systemic threat, or legitimacy gaps can be manipulated by external powers to their strategic advantage: patterns of securitisation that cross state boundaries will fall well within the purview of this inquiry. The many possible theoretical-empirical viewpoints made possible by RSCT – macro/micro, ideational/material, domestic/regional/systemic – will have to be used to the full in order to provide a detailed understanding of one of the most important phenomena in the post-Cold War world. Accordingly, the next chapter will move from the sub-state to the systemic level of RSCT by grappling with the issue of great power penetration (GPP) into RSCs.

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CHAPTER 4: GREAT POWERS AND THEIR REGIONAL ENTANGLEMENTS

The previous chapter, focusing on state incoherence, already dealt with one non-regional level of RSCT. While this opening of the black box of domestic politics may seem outside the purview of IR and International Security Studies to those adhering to more orthodox and parsimonious views of the discipline, within the context of inherently multi-level RSCT it was both a possibility and a necessity: the presence of domestically stable, recognised units is one of the prerequisites for the emergence of security regimes and communities, and thus directly impinges upon the patterns of amity and enmity observed on the regional, inter-state level. This chapter switches attention to the more conventional systemic level of RSCT, and its interaction with variables at the regional level: more specifically, the effect of great power penetration (GPP) on the security dynamic of RSCs.

The chapter‟s central question revolves around the involvement (or more pejoratively, interference) of great powers in regional affairs, and its effect on the security interactions and discourses within an RSC. For while at the lower, domestic level, constancy may prove crucial to the formation of distinctly regional, and relatively stable security relationships, at the higher, systemic level as well, the configurations of great power interaction, and their penetration into the regional level make an essential contribution to these security dynamics. The following sections will expand on the interaction of the systemic and the regional within RSCT in the following way. First, a definition of great power status compatible with the overall Wendtian framework will be devised. The subsequent section will build a material, subjective and intersubjective view of regional great power involvement. The aggregation of these individual involvements in the final section will lead a 1+3+1 typology of GPP, based on their varying polarity and amity/enmity: unipolar, cooperative-multipolar and competitive-multipolar, bounded by hegemony and disengagement on either side.