Rusia

Chapter 3 made a number of clear theoretical-conceptual distinctions regarding different elements of state (in)coherence. Most generally, there was the differentiation between the phenomenon‟s two dimensions, vertical and horizontal (Holsti, 1996, pp.

91-97). Also, three tiers of state incoherence were identified: inherent weakness, ostensible instability, and state failure (collapse or fragmentation). The inherent strength and weakness of states was linked to their legitimacy as strategies of survival, a quite ideational element implying a necessary micro-analysis of societal discourse.

Ostensible stability/instability, on the other hand, was made dependent on the ability or inability of the state to exercise material power over a given society in order to suppress any imperfections in its legitimacy, something more easily discernable from a macro-perspective. Finally, state failure was linked to the inability of the state to maintain an institutional monopoly its effective sovereignty in the face of challenges to its power and authority. These three tiers and two dimensions also allowed for a typological differentiation between inherently weak, ostensibly unstable and fragmented/collapsed states.

Table 3: Macro-characteristics of inherently weak, ostensibly stable and failed states

Horizontal Vertical

As in the case of amity/enmity, the assessment of a state‟s strength/stability will have to be approached from both macro- and micro- perspectives. The method employed in this case will oscillate between these two viewpoints: firstly, a number of objective criteria will distinguish between (horizontally/vertically) failed, unstable/stable,

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weak/strong states. Secondly, a deep analysis of the discourse will help to discern the underlying patterns in the legitimacy of the state, and thus, provide a clear understanding of the element at the core of state coherence. Only a combination of these two perspectives will present a full picture state coherence, one that can be subsequently linked to amity and enmity at the regional level.

Looking at the issue from a macro-perspective, the differences between the collapse, fragmentation and continued survival of a given state are relatively discernable. A vertically failed, collapsed state is characterised by the absence of an effective government, with authority diluted among numerous political factions battling over control of one state, without, however, themselves laying claim to separate statehood.

A horizontally failed fragmented state has divided into a number of entities that display most, if not all qualities of empirical statehood (Jackson, 1982), recognised or not.

Ostensibly unstable states are likewise easily identifiable from a macro-perspective.

The presence or absence of armed secessionist movements is the main, and quite obvious criterion pointing to horizontal instability. Vertically, a society‟s adherence to the constitutional legal-political framework is empirically assessable over time; whether or not internal political processes remain peaceful, and whether or not transitions of power occur according to the constitutional order provided for by the state is historically more or less evident. In the case of longer-term unstable states, the inherent weakness of a state can moreover be safely assumed.

The distinction between inherent strength and weakness is trickier to discern from the macro-perspective in the case of ostensibly stable states, and would necessarily have to be complemented by micro-perspective discursive analysis to be entirely effective. It is nevertheless preliminarily possible by looking at the level of political repression applied by a given state onto its society, and the corruption that indicates a lack of internalisation of a state‟s institutional norms. Simply put: an ostensibly stable state with a relatively high degree of authoritarianism will likely be inherently weak, and one where minimal repression is required for the effective functioning of state institutions, inherently strong; similarly in the case of relatively elevated levels of corruption (Buzan, 1991, pp. 57-111). The indices of political and press freedom provided by Freedom House (2007) can point to such repression, and, hence, to the inherent weakness of states deemed „partly free‟ or „not free‟ under its classification system, even in the absence of overt instability. Quantitative measures like Transparency International‟s Corruption Perception Index (Lambsdorff, 2007; Sampford, Shacklock, Connors, &

Galtung, 2006) can also give an indication as to the level of corruption in a given society, suggesting the existence of the „legitimacy gaps‟ that constitute inherent weakness.

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But as mentioned above, accurately assessing and understanding a state‟s inherent strength or weakness inevitably involves a foray into the micro-perspective. Here, the starting point is Migdal‟s (1988, pp. 27-29) view of the state as a „collective strategy of survival‟, introduced in Chapter 3. Seen this way, a state‟s legitimacy (the factor underlying inherent weakness or strength) can be assessed from the discursive micro-viewpoint, in both the argumentative and instrumental aspects of a society‟s security discourse. Argumentatively, state weakness manifests itself through a deficient internalisation of the collective values and identities propagated by the state, in either a generalised manner (in the case of vertical weakness), or in an ethno-territorially distinct way (in the case of horizontal weakness).

In the former, vertical case, ethnically and territorially diffuse alternative values and allegiances – „primordial sentiments‟, in Geertz‟ (1963) words – continue to exist within society to the detriment of the effective functioning of the state. In the latter, horizontal case, these alternative values, identities and allegiances have a distinct, ethnic and territorial focus, leading to the threat of separatism. Within the instrumental portion of the sub-state security discourse (dealing with the identification of threats and choice of means), the failure to internalise the state as a „collective strategy of survival‟ is apparent in a tendency to recognise the state as a threat to security rather than a means towards it (again, maintaining the distinction between horizontal and vertical weakness through the element of ethno-territoriality), as happens so often in cases of societal securitisation, when clearly discernible, territorially distinct out-groups view the state as a societal threat to their identities, while they are viewed, in turn, as political threats to the territorial integrity of the state.

From a practical point of view, assessing a state‟s vertical strength is indeed more problematic: it is relatively easier to analyse ethno-territorially distinct competing identity discourses rather than the deficient „internalisation‟ of one state identity or ideology in society at large. The latter will often be cloaked by the ostentatious state-centred discourse of elites and counter-elites, who will often describe their actions as in defence of the collective values, identities and strategies of survival espoused by the state. This presents considerable difficulties from a purely discursive point of view, as those in control often use the rhetoric of statehood, issue pompous declarations in support of the state while instrumentalising that very state for their narrow interests and carefully covering up the corruption that is inherent to vertical state weakness.

The key to solving this problem lies in the consideration of the praxis of securitisation along with the security discourses in wider society. First, the macro-perspective will already have answered the question as to the ostensible instability or failure of a given

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state; in the case of unstable states, their political volatility will in itself be a clear indication of inherent weakness, more obviously so in the case of failed states.

Second, even if political instability has been averted through repressive or cooptative state force – as in the case of rentier states – that repressive and cooptative force, as observed from the macro-perspective, may in itself be seen as an indication of inherent weakness, as argued above. A vertically ostensibly stable and inherently strong state will not have to rely on a large inward-looking security apparatus or widespread patron-client networks to remain stable. Third, discourse remains relevant: even the mendacious rhetoric of elites has its value as an indication of the identities and values that a given society strives for. And, unless a society is totalitarian, the deficient legitimacy of a state and the consequent presence of aberrant strategies of survival will be visible from the micro-perspective in the low level of public trust in state institutions, often described by ordinary citizens as threats to the values prevalent within society rather than means towards greater security; the continued presence of non-state institutions as providers of security (the family, the clan, the tribe, informal networks) in a society‟s everyday security discourse will point to aberrant „strategies of survival‟.

The main focus of this thesis will be horizontal weakness, because horizontal legitimacy ties mostly into the divergence and convergence of the security discourses of distinct sub-state groups with those of the state, rather niftily relating to the juxtaposition of divergent/convergent security discourses seen at the regional level in the case of amity/enmity. My micro-analysis of horizontal state weakness will, basically, seek out such ethnically/territorially specific discourses of security within states, assessing the extent to which their inherent collective identities are compatible with the state‟s (argumentative), as well as the extent to which they designate the state as a threat rather than a provider of security (instrumental). In fragmented or ostensibly unstable states, the aim will be to evaluate the impact of the alternative discourses of separatist state-like units or secessionist sub-state ethnic groups on regional amity/enmity. And even in ostensibly stable but inherently weak states, suppressed societal securitisations of ethnic minorities could point to the emergence of future conflict, and a possible deterioration in the regional level of amity/enmity. But how exactly are these alternative, ethnically distinct discourses of security linked in with this variable?

At the beginning of this chapter, I hypothesised that state incoherence would have a significant effect on the level of hostility within a region. I shall now refine this statement into two working hypotheses that might explain this outcome. Firstly (and most obviously), the level of enmity within the region might be affected directly, with the central state trying to reassert its authority and effective sovereignty by suppressing or

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aiming to suppress the alternative identities of unrecognised statelets (in fragmented states) and secessionist movements (in unstable states). If one takes the de-facto statelets as regional units (as I decided to do in chapter three), the absolutely incompatible nature of their identities with those of the central state‟s skews amity/enmity in a region towards the revisionist conflict formation part of the spectrum.

Secondly, amity/enmity might be impacted upon indirectly, because of the overlap of such secessionist identities with those of or within (recognised) neighbouring units, or the instrumental exploitation of such separatisms by these very neighbours. This could even happen in the face of ostensible stability – that is, in the absence of overt separatist moves by a minority – if that minority‟s subservience to the central state is based on active and successful repression by the latter.

State incoherence in the Southern Caucasus (Coppieters, 2001; Malek, 2006;

Matveeva, 2002) will thus be analysed according to the above framework: first a macro-perspective view of the effective sovereignty, ostensible stability and inherent strength or weakness of the three states, and, subsequently, a micro-analysis of domestic security discourse, with the specific aim of assessing the horizontal fractures within underlying societies and their links to amity/enmity, in particular within the political and societal sectors. The changing narratives and definitions of statehood prevalent within the different states will be considered in detail, as well as the basic discourses within secessionist units, while the security discourses of ethnic minorities that the macro-perspective might have identified as candidates for future unrest (the Armenians, Azeris and Ajars in Georgia, the Lezghin and Talysh in Azerbaijan) will be touched upon. Of crucial interest will be the ways in which these competing alternative identities behind state weakness feed into regional patterns of amity and enmity, as hypothesised above. In fragmented states like Georgia and Azerbaijan, secessionist identities could do so by underpinning unrecognised state-like units that push the RSC towards increased enmity, because of the de-facto revisionism implied by the central government‟s imperative aim of rolling back the factually existing status quo. Enmity between established states could also increase through the repression (real or perceived) of alternative collective identities associated with identities of neighbouring recognised units, leading them to turn revisionist, as in the case of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh in 1990-1992.

Great Power Penetration and the Dependence/Independence of Regional