Perspectivas de Francia sobre OBOR

Chapter 5 set out a number of macro-perspective characteristics for each of the different types of state incoherence elaborated previously. To recap, the typology elaborated in chapter three included a horizontal and vertical dimension, referring to types of incoherence associated with secessionism and generalised instability, respectively. In addition, distinctions were made between inherent weakness, ostensible instability and failure – collapse and fragmentation – (see table 3, p. 109), each with corresponding and micro-characteristics. From the macro-perspective employed here, all states in the Southern Caucasus do have readily visible, serious internal deficiencies. Obviously, with de-facto states existing on their de-jure territories, Georgia and Azerbaijan are both fragmented, while Armenia, lacking any minorities, is horizontally strong. According to the indicators of vertical weakness and instability suggested in chapter 5, all three regional units are inherently weak and display occasional signs of ostensible instability. All three states are rated either partly free or not free by Freedom House, and score badly on Transparency International‟s Corruption Perception Index (both macro-level indicators of illegitimacy and hence, inherent weakness); and a history of political unrest exposes all regional units‟

ostensible instability, or their inability to maintain themselves as their societies‟

preferred „strategy of survival‟ among large parts of their populations.

In terms of political freedoms and civil liberties, Freedom House (2008c) awarded Georgia the highest regional score, 4⁵⁰, which was a slight deterioration from previous years, mostly due to the heavy-handed repression of anti-government demonstrations in November 2007 by the Sahakashvili government. While Freedom House does describe Georgia as an „electoral democracy‟, that evaluation was only partially confirmed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 2008: serious challenges were identified by the OSCE-CoE observer mission, which simultaneously judged both elections to have in essence conformed to Georgia‟s international commitments (OSCE/ODIHR, 2008a, 2008b). Other organisations point to continuing limits on the freedom of electronic media, as critical television stations and reporters have been systematically taken over by pro-government interests in recent years (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2007). But while the country‟s divided opposition – now including important elements of the forces behind the „Rose Revolution‟ of 2003 – continues accusing the government of authoritarian tendencies, it is nevertheless safe to say that

50 Freedom House grades states‟ political rights and civil liberties according to an inverted scale from 1 to 7, with 1 denoting perfect freedom/protection of rights, and 7 a complete absence of freedom/protection of rights. For a complete methodology, see Freedom House (2007).

139

„rump Georgia‟⁵¹ remains the relatively least autocratic state in the region. At 67^th place in Transparency International‟s 2008 corruption perceptions index (Lambsdorff, 2008), it also remains the Southern Caucasus‟ least corrupt country, in no small measure thanks to extensive reforms following the 2003 Rose Revolution. Vertically at least, it seems to be the inherently strongest in its region, in contrast to its extreme horizontal fragmentation into de-facto states and its potential problems with other minorities, notably the Armenians of Javakheti, discussed previously in the context of Armenian-Georgian relations.

Armenia, like Georgia, was ranked „partly free‟ in the 2008 Freedom House report (2008a); it scored slightly lower than Georgia in terms of both civil liberties (4) and political rights (5); this may, however, present an exceedingly positive picture in light of recent developments. Tellingly, the FH report explicitly states that Armenia is not an electoral democracy, every election since independence having been marred by irregularities and fraud. The report furthermore refers to rampant nepotism, restrictions on press freedoms (especially in the case of electronic media), limited academic freedom, arrests and harassment of opposition members. Events surrounding the presidential elections in 2008, when at least 11 citizens were killed during demonstrations against presidential elections judged flawed by international observers (OSCE/ODIHR, 2008c), have further pushed Armenia in an authoritarian direction (International Crisis Group, 2008a). Dozens of opposition supporters remain in jail, and the failure of Armenian authorities to free what are described as „political prisoners‟ has opened the possibility of the country losing its voting rights within the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE, 2008). At 109^th place in Transparency International‟s index, Armenia scores considerably lower than its northern neighbour Georgia in terms of corruption. Within the preceding typology, it can be said these macro-perspective criteria suggest an Armenian polity suffering from considerable vertical inherent weaknesses; conversely, in the absence of any sizeable, territorially distinct ethno-religious group, Armenia remains horizontally inherently strong.

Azerbaijan is the only recognised country to have been judged „not free‟ in the 2008 Freedom House report, achieving scores of 6 and 5 on, respectively, its respect for political rights and its protection of civil liberties (Freedom House, 2008b). The report states that “elections since the early 1990s have been considered neither free nor fair by international observers.” It points to extensive corruption, limits on press freedom (again, particularly in the case of electronic media), the jailing of opposition journalists, and some restrictions on academic freedom as problems weighing on the country‟s

51 I.e. Georgia, minus the two secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

140

claimed liberal-democratic credentials. Despite a boycott by the fragmented opposition and continuing serious deficiencies in the electoral process, international observers did judge the October 2008 elections to be an improvement over previous ones (International Election Observation Mission, 2008). And, for the moment at least, it does seem as if the Aliyev regime has been able to maintain the country‟s stability through a combination of repression and cooptation, although it remains to be seen whether its oil wealth will be able to maintain the country‟s stability over the longer term. ICG in particular has pointed to the potentially destabilising effects of an inevitable drop in oil revenues on Azerbaijan and the whole region (International Crisis Group, 2007). Apart from that, the final macro-indicator of inherent weakness, corruption, puts Azerbaijan, at 158^th place in Transparency International‟s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index table, easily outscoring both Georgia and archrival Armenia in that dubious category.

In terms of ostensible instability, all units in the Southern Caucasus are prone to political unrest; and, apart from the scarcity of free and fair elections, none of the regional units have experienced constitutional transitions of power to successors that were not pre-approved by the incumbent. In Azerbaijan, there were two transitions of power between 1991 and 1993, both of them extra-constitutional government overthrows. In the first, the Azeri popular front removed Azerbaijan‟s last Soviet-era leader, Ayaz Mutalibov, after the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian forces in 1992. His fervently anti-Russian successor, Abufaz Elchibey, was ousted in a bizarre coup by an Azeri businessman-turned-warlord following defeats at the front in 1993.

Heidar Aliyev, general secretary of the Azeri Communist party from 1969 to 1982, and a former politburo member came to power as a result. Despite another attempted coup in 1995, and some violent opposition demonstrations, the Aliyev dynasty (Heidar was succeeded by his son, Ilham, in 2003) has been able to maintain stability within Azerbaijan ever since, through a combination of co-optation and repression (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b, pp. 5-6; Nichol).

With a recent history littered with political violence, Armenia remains an ostensibly unstable state. Armenia‟s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, was forced out of office through a bloodless constitutional coup in 1998, after having clung on to power by sending tanks onto the streets of Yerevan following forged elections in 1996 (Astourian, 2000). On 27 October 1999, little more than a year later, gunmen perpetrated a massacre in the Armenian parliament, killing six parliament members along with the speaker, Karen Demirchyan, and the prime minister, Vazgen Sargsyan, leading to a six-month power-struggle between two factions within the group that had come to power in 1998 (Bravo, 2006, pp. 503-506). The current president, Serj Sargsyan, was

141

the approved successor of his predecessor (and the winner of that power struggle), Robert Kocharyan, who had to proclaim a state of emergency following bloody clashes between demonstrators and security personnel in March 2008 (International Crisis Group, 2008a). While Armenia is horizontally strong and stable – thanks to its ethnic homogeneity – it continues to be vertically weak and unstable, with its authorities regularly losing control over a society suffering from an absence of the rule of law in both the political and economic spheres.

Georgia‟s recent history similarly doesn‟t bode well for its continuing stability. Its first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was ousted in an armed revolt (Way & Levitsky, 2006, pp. 397-400), and subsequently died in an apparent suicide. His successor, Eduard Shevardnadze, survived several assassination attempts – alleged to have been masterminded by Russia (Geyer, 2000, p. 61) – only to be overthrown in the Rose Revolution of 2003. While Saakashvili did command considerable popularity in subsequent years, his democratic credentials were shaken in November 2007, when opposition demonstrations were violently suppressed by his security forces. To its credit, the Georgian government did regain some legitimacy by organising generally free and fair elections in 2008; but an apparent determination in Moscow to realise regime change in the country continues to put Georgia at risk of destabilisation in the future (International Crisis Group, 2008d). Crucially, the country has not yet had a constitutional transfer of power from incumbent to opposition, the ultimate test of long-term vertical stability; and, in its absence, for all its purported democratic credentials, any stability it may exhibit would have to be taken with a grain of salt. What‟s more, minorities within rump Georgia (the aforementioned Javakheti Armenians) might present a challenge to its horizontal stability in the future.

The three unrecognised entities in the Southern Caucasus will be dealt with cursorily in this section, partly because of the lack of data, partly because the extensive involvement of external actors (Russia, Armenia) makes it difficult to gauge their self-supporting strength and stability. The main conclusion one could make from political developments in 1993-2008 is on the relative vertical strength of both Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, both of whom seem to have more-or-less independently functioning and reasonably (by Caucasian standards) stable political systems, as opposed to the fractious and highly dependent South Ossetia (Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2008). South Ossetia seems to be the vertically weakest entity in this sense, having suffered from a serious split in its political elite with the defection of Dimitri Sanakoyev to the Georgian side in 2006, detailed in chapter 8: neither Nagorno-Karabakh nor Abkhazia ever saw the emergence of a similar political force seriously advocating reunification with the metropolitan state.

142

The other two de-facto states display characteristics of state weakness that are not unlike those seen in the region‟s „legally established‟ units, especially during elections (Caspersen, 2008). Abkhazia in particular seems to have a vibrant political culture that does at times display both independence from Russian control, and the periodic instability associated with elections throughout the region, as indicated by the turmoil surrounding the 2004 presidential ballot. The outcome of the October 2004 polls in favour of Sergei Bagapsh, the candidate not initially favoured by either Moscow or the incumbent, was overturned and not recognised by either Russia or the pro-government candidate. After forceful Russian „mediation‟, Bagapsh was eventually allowed to take power after a re-run – on a joint ticket with his opponent – early the following year (Fuller, 2004; Peuch, 2004b, 2005). Following the 1999 parliamentary murders in Armenia and the subsequent tensions within Armenia‟s elites, Nagorno-Karabakh‟s political stability did suffer from infighting that pitted factions led by Robert Kocharyan and Serj Sargsyan against those of one-time local strongman and former defence minister, Samvel Babayan. But the issue was resolved by the comprehensive removal from power and imprisonment of the latter, and the de-facto republic has remained stable ever since, holding relatively peaceful elections that regularly draw the condemnation of both Baku and the outside world (ANN-Groong, 2004).