El papel fundamental de Kazajistán para China y OBOR

In the end, the individual projections of power into a region described in the previous section can be aggregated into what I shall call a „regional pattern of penetration‟, the systemic-regional portion of the security constellation surrounding a given RSC. Their structure and characterisation depends largely on the interaction between the different powers penetrating the region, including those powers that may be indigenous to the latter. Such a regional „pattern of GPP‟ serves as an intermediate category between the region and the system; with its own polarity and patterns of amity/enmity, and a membership that combines both extra-regional and „indigenous‟ powers, it captures the how system-level polarities and patterns of amity and enmity are „focused‟ in regionally specific ways through the interaction of the capabilities and interests of powers.

As was implied above, the projection of power by great powers is determined by both their capabilities and their interests, with the latter determining the distribution of projections of power throughout the system. As a consequence, it would be wrong to directly link the systemic and the regional: the former must be mediated, focused through a region-specific lens, constituted by interests, in order to become relevant in a particular RSC. Rather than conceptualising the systemic level and linking it directly with the regional, one would have to construct it from the unique perspective of the RSC that is the object of study (Miller, 1995). Empirically, this is supported by the significant „disconnects‟ one often encounters between regional penetrations and the systemic distributions of power and patterns of amity/enmity. Powers do not penetrate the various regions within the system equally; their presence is more pronounced in some RSCs than others, and their patterns of amity/enmity will sometimes (but more rarely) be at variance with specific configurations of cooperation or competition, from region to region. Some participants at the systemic level might be indifferent to a particular region and thus be irrelevant, as great powers, to the polarity of systemic-regional penetration there. Differences in interest may amplify the capabilities of some great powers in certain regions, and temper them in others. Alternatively, great powers with an overall cooperative relationship may be more competitive at a specific regional level. Thus, what is relevant to the regional level is not the overall structure of the systemic level, but how this structure is ultimately transferred onto the regional level through interventions by great powers as the polarity and amity/enmity of region-specific patterns of GPP.

As far as system-level penetration goes, Russia and Japan – if one takes them as system-level great powers – are hardly relevant to the security dynamics of African RSCs. China is, as it has clearly decided to project its power into the region (mostly through no-strings-attached aid) in pursuit of raw materials (Alden, 2005). An analysis

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of system-region interaction could thus reasonably omit Japan and Russia. The above also explains to a great extent why great powers sometimes accept defeat in far-flung regions in spite of their overwhelming system-level superiority. The enormous military prowess of the United States was ultimately inconsequential in Vietnam (Betts, 1980) precisely because a lack of interest limited its willingness to use its capabilities to the full; the extreme military unipolarity of today‟s international system would arguably be far more relevant in case of interventions in regions of high interest, like Europe or East Asia. Similarly, there have been (admittedly rare) historical cases of cooperation or competition between great powers that diverged from the overall systemic pattern of amity or enmity. This could be argued to be the case between the US, the UK and France in contemporary Africa (regionally competitive, systemically cooperative) (Alden, 2000), or, conversely, between the otherwise fractious Western great powers in East Asia – especially China – during and after the Boxer rebellion (Otte, 2007).

Thus, each region will have a unique group of great powers interacting within its pattern of GPP. Apart from those powers penetrating the region from above and outside, they will also include indigenous great powers³², which both penetrate and are part of the region.

These aggregate patterns of GPP will be classified along two dimensions:

Firstly, their „polarity‟: the sum of great powers penetrating the region as described in the previous section, and the distribution of power between them. As stated above, such penetrations would necessitate three distinct components: a physical presence on the macro-level, subjective great power „discourses of penetration‟, and at least some

„discursive dependence‟ of the RSC on the penetrating great power.

And, secondly, their „amity/enmity‟, based, from a macro-perspective, on their overt cooperative or competitive behaviour, and, from a micro-perspective, on the convergence or divergence of their subjective „discourses of penetration‟, or, in other words, the compatibility/incompatibility of subjective motivations for regional involvement. This runs entirely in parallel with the idea of discursive convergence/divergence underlying amity/enmity within the region proper, as described in chapter 2.

32 One could argue that indigenous regional powers would have to be included as well, insofar as they are able to challenge penetrating great powers. If power is taken to be constituted by capability and interest, their power could become comparable, from a region-specific perspective, to that of their great power counterparts.

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Keeping this in mind, it now becomes possible to establish a typology of GPP based on these two, material and ideational variables of polarity and discursive convergence/divergence. To this effect, the concepts of polarity and amity/enmity will be operationalised somewhat less complicatedly than in the case of RSCs. Where polarity is concerned, a simple distinction shall be made between unipolar and multipolar³³. As regards amity/enmity, there will be a straightforward differentiation between competition and cooperation, rather than the necessarily more complicated conflict formation/security regime/security community differentiation in chapter 2. The result will be the 1+3+1 typology of GPP seen in table 1: unipolarity (where amity/enmity is irrelevant as a variable), cooperative multipolarity and competitive multipolarity at the centre, bounded on either side by two related concepts – hegemony and disengagement – that fall outside the definition of penetration proper, the former because it implies the effective overlay of regional security dynamics (and consequently, the absence of a functioning RSC), the latter because it refers to an absence of GPP. I shall now discuss these different categories one by one, applying the objective/subjective/intersubjective framework as necessary³⁴.

Table 1: 1+3+1 Typology of Regional Great Power Penetration Great Power Penetration

Partial Discursive Dependence No Anarchy / Discursive

Dependence

Hegemony in effect means the overlay of regional security dynamics by a single great power, and its complete military, economic and/or political domination of the RSC.

From the objective, macro-perspective, hegemony thus entails an overriding presence by one great power within the RSC: the existence of a formal alliance with most units of the RSC, the stationing of troops throughout the RSC, its economic/commercial predominance within the region, leading to a significant impairment of regional anarchic conditions. From the micro-perspective, the crucial factor is the absence of autonomous patterns of securitisation. The security of regional units is entirely,

33 An additional, structurally significant differentiation is possible between multi-polar and bi-polar: there is, indeed, an important difference between the dynamics of 2-player and n-player games from a purely rationalist point of view, and this is bound to reflect upon the security dynamics of a given region. I have steered clear of an explicit differentiation in this text, mostly for purposes of simplicity and clarity (to avoid an exceedingly complex 1+5+1 typology), preferring to treat bi-polarity as a special form of multi-polarity.

34 The scheme presented here is, in effect, based on the adaptation of a mainly materialist/macro-perspective framework suggested by Benjamin Miller (2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2007; Miller & Kagan, 1997;

Miller & Resnick, 2003).

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willingly or unwillingly, attuned, subordinated to the interests of the hegemon, instrumentally and often argumentatively as well. In other words, subordinated states take care to adjust their security-seeking discourse and behaviour to the hegemon‟s, and often end up pursuing similar values or even sharing an identity with their hegemonic overlord; the Gramscian (Cox, 1983) slant in this ideational part of the concept is evident. Failure to do so usually results in „corrective‟ punitive measures by the latter.

Disengagement implies the exact opposite: the irrelevance of any great power to a region‟s security dynamic. The question is how to establish whether a great power is relevant to the region‟s security; after all, in today‟s globalised world, great powers (and lesser states, for that matter) do tend to have a presence of sort in regions around the world, without necessarily being relevant to regional patterns of securitisation. The three-tiered conceptualisation of individual GPPs can serve as a guide. Objectively, a disengaged great power‟s relations with the region in question will be minimal, and generally imply that the power in question is unwilling to bear significant material costs in order to (directly or indirectly) maintain a regional presence, either through the support of proxies or through a substantial presence of its own. Subjectively, the great power must perceive the region to be of no or only marginal interest to the maintenance of its security: in other words, the region must not feature in its network of securitisations. Intersubjectively, the region‟s security dynamic must not be affected by the great power‟s above-mentioned minimal, objective presence. Neither the great powers‟ peers, nor the RSC units must include whatever limited presence the great power may have within the region in the instrumental and argumentative aspects of their mutual securitisations. This does not mean that the units don‟t take account of the presence of these great powers on the systemic level; it does mean, however, that the activities of great powers within the RSC remain too insignificant to affect relationships of security between the RSC units. Disengagement thus amounts to the material absence, subjective indifference and intersubjective irrelevance of great powers vis-à-vis a given RSC.

The unipolar/multipolar, competitive/cooperative forms of GPP are situated between these two extremes of hegemony and complete disengagement. It is important here to make a clear distinction between hegemony on the one hand, and the unipolar penetration of an RSC on the other. The latter simply refers to the penetration of an RSC by one single power, with other units retaining their ability to pursue autonomous foreign and security policies. While the region‟s security dynamic is affected, in whole, by one single external, or internal „centring‟ power, regional units preserve some independence in determining their external relations according to autonomous patterns

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of securitisation. In case of hegemony, however, the RSC in effect ceases to function because of the severe impairment of regional anarchy: endogenous patterns of amity and enmity and polarity are overridden by a common submission to the hegemon by all or part of the units, giving it the role of final arbiter in intra-regional disputes. Units still formally survive as sovereign entities, but over the longer term, their foreign and security policies are determined (willingly or otherwise) by the dominant great power‟s interests; deviations from this norm are usually localised and by and large temporary³⁵. While the difference between unipolarity and multipolarity is fairly straightforward, and based on the number of powers (indigenous or external) penetrating the region, the variable of amity/enmity, as defined through cooperation and competition deserves some wider discussion. On a macro-level, the co-operative involvement of several great powers within a region can become apparent through their presence in joint peacekeeping or peacemaking operations, the presence of formal or informal decision-making and coordination mechanisms regarding the region. The co-ordinated and compatible nature of the powers‟ micro-level discourse is crucial in determining the stability and longevity of these co-operative arrangements; whether they co-operate on opportunistic strategic considerations that happen to coincide, common material interests or genuinely shared values makes a difference in terms of discursive stability, and, hence, the continuity of co-operative behaviour. A competitive relationship between different great powers involved in a region, on the other hand, manifests itself on the macro-level through the existence of opposing alliances (of varying formality) between units within the RSC and their respective great power sponsors, or frequent, intra-regional proxy wars, as well as divergent coercive and incentivising policies aimed at either forcing or persuading units at bandwagoning with one or the other power, or combinations of powers. From a micro-perspective, such competition will be the result of conflicting and incompatible subjective discourses of interest by the great powers, and the exact nature of these incompatibilities, and their interaction with the regional security dynamic will be crucial in determining the effect of GPP on regional security.

The importance of these patterns of GPP lies in their varying influence on the security dynamics of penetrated regions; in effect, different types of penetration impose different structural constraints on the discourse and behaviour of units (Miller, 2000, 2007; Miller

35 The USSR‟s role in Eastern Europe – if one takes it as a region separate from Western Europe – during the Cold War could certainly be described as falling under hegemony, thus defined. The security interests of the socialist bloc were very much subordinated to those of the USSR, certainly during the earlier years (Rubin, 1982). Decision-making was very much centralised in Moscow; the Brezhnev doctrine later saw to it that it deviations from the norms concocted in the Kremlin were punished (Jones, 1977).

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& Resnick, 2003). As argued in previous chapters, the rump materialist and structural theoretical approach applied here not only opens discourse to the explicitly acknowledged influence of the physical, material world; it more generally allows for the limiting influence of structures (both ideational and material) on the agency of individual actors. Patterns of penetration are such constraining structures, bending discourse towards certain outcomes without, however, any kind of determinism or automatism.

As such, they influence the four constitutive variables of RSCs – boundaries, anarchy, polarity and amity/enmity – by creating inter-regional interaction centred on penetrating powers, by distorting the polarity of a given RSC, by mitigating its anarchy and by exacerbating or dampening existing patterns of amity and enmity.

Patterns of penetration can also be linked to what Buzan and Wæver have called the

„external transformation‟ of RSCs, either through their combination into

„supercomplexes‟ – groups of RSCs whose still-distinct security dynamics display a high measure of interdependence through their joint penetration by one or several great powers – or through their outright merger or division (Buzan, 1991, p. 219; Buzan

& Wæver, 2003, pp. 53-61). Two or more otherwise disparate regions might „transform externally‟ into a supercomplex through their common penetration by one single, or several, interacting great powers, as in the case of the Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian RSCs and China (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 155-156). Conversely, a RSC where penetration is geographically disparate – with different great powers penetrating or even overlaying different sub-complexes – might fall apart, as arguably happened in Europe after the Cold War (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 346-351).

In addition, the indigenous polarity of a given region may become practically irrelevant if it is heavily penetrated by extra-regional powers; the balance of power in a given region may be determined not so much by internal factors – the capabilities of units themselves – as by alignments and alliances with sponsoring powers. The intensity of penetration, its polarity and its unipolar/cooperative or competitive nature would be crucial in determining by how much such intra-regional factors would lose their relevance, with increased penetrative multipolarity and competitiveness adding to the complexity of analysis.

GPP also qualifies the anarchic nature of a given RSC, with the hegemonic, unipolar, multipolar-cooperative, multipolar-competitive and disengaged categories very much acting as a continuum allowing increasing anarchy within a given RSC³⁶. Thus,

36 Several authors working within the English School also broached the subject of international systems with varying levels of anarchy, albeit outside an explicitly regionalist framework. Wight (1977, pp. 21-29) thus distinguished between sovereign state-systems and suzerain, hierarchical systems. Watson (2007,

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unipolar or co-operative multipolar involvements will limit the margins of manoeuvre of regional units in counteracting the objectives of those powers; the systemic level will dampen the autonomous and anarchic regional security dynamic to a considerable degree as the powers are able to impose themselves more efficiently onto the region, and interactions at the systemic-regional level will thus be of disproportionate importance in understanding region-level security. The contrary is true for competitive multipolar penetrations: here, regional units will often see their options multiply through the possible bandwagoning with different powers vying for influence. Anarchic conditions will unmitigatedly prevail. As I shall hypothesise in the following chapter, such patterns of penetration have a significant influence on the amity/enmity variable through their effects on the presence and/or structure of regional anarchy. GPP is thus one of the structures pressuring discourse and behaviour in certain directions through its effects on the security dynamic of a given region; and the effects of such varying patterns of penetration on patterns of amity and enmity the Southern Caucasus will figure among the subjects of the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

Conclusion

This chapter has formulated the third, and final, conceptual building block to this expanded, „Wendtian‟ version of RSCT, by developing the notion of great power penetration alongside the already refined concepts of amity/enmity and state (in)coherence. After defining great power status, it turned its attention to individual great power involvements and their material-objective, subjective and intersubjective manifestations. The objective aspects referred to a great power‟s physical presence in and interaction with the given RSC; the subjective tier developed the region‟s role within the great power‟s subjective security discourse through four ideal-types: shared identity, material interest, systemic strategies and universalised values;

intersubjectively, GPP was also expounded in terms of the discursive (in)dependence of regional units vis-à-vis the great power. The result was a 1+3+1 typology based on the polarity and amity/enmity of aggregated great power involvements with a given RSC: unipolar, cooperative-multipolar and competitive-multipolar patterns of GPP, all bounded by hegemony on one side and disengagement on the other.

But as explained before, this thesis will not be a solely theoretical exercise; it will aim to demonstrate that such a hybrid, multi-dimensional framework could be used for the

pp. 19-22) similarly elaborated a more detailed spectrum of anarchy and hierarchy (independence, hegemony, dominion, empire). Although they run parallel to the framework presented here, a crucial difference is their sole concern with the undifferentiated quantitative level of anarchy versus hierarchy, as opposed to the qualitative and multi-dimensional pattern of great power involvement as differentiated according to polarity and amity/enmity, which is the object of discussion here. The above-mentioned

pp. 19-22) similarly elaborated a more detailed spectrum of anarchy and hierarchy (independence, hegemony, dominion, empire). Although they run parallel to the framework presented here, a crucial difference is their sole concern with the undifferentiated quantitative level of anarchy versus hierarchy, as opposed to the qualitative and multi-dimensional pattern of great power involvement as differentiated according to polarity and amity/enmity, which is the object of discussion here. The above-mentioned