3. El instrumental conceptual en relación con el tema de estudio
4.7. El problema exterior y la tensión interna
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and idoaUsm alike are faced with a problem to ehleh| 8 0 fa r, phlloeophy hme found no eatiefaotory eolutlen.
Thie ie the problem of ehoeing how we have knowledge of
other things then ourself and the operations of our own mind. Locke oonZders th is problem, but idiat he says is obviously unsatisfactory. ... Locke states that lib erty depends upon the necessity of pursuing true happiness and upon the government of our passions. This opinion he derives from his doctrine that private and public interests are identical in the long run . . . ,
(Bertrand Bussell. History of Western Philosophy., Pages, #35, #38.) **ind thus, by a due consideration, and examining any good proposed, i t is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby in i t s turn and place i t may come to work upon the w ill, and be pursued. Per good, though appearing and allowed ever so great, yet t i l l i t mas raised desires in our adnds, and thereby made us uneasy in i t s want, i t reaches not our w ills, we are not within the sphere of its activ ity , our w ills being under the deteaatnatlom only of those uneasinesses which are
present to us, idtieh (whilst we have any) are always se lio itin g | and ready a t hand to give the w ill its next determination... .. . .. . . . . . . . Per. the mind having in most cases, as is evident in ex perience. a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of Its desires; and so a ll, ene a fte r another, is a t liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on a ll sides, and weigh them with others.**
(Locket Be say Concerning Human TMerstanding.
"Power". 47-48.)
"Pree agency with Locke thus consists a t la s t in "power to suspend" volition. But unless in th is man rise s above a merely natural causation of motives, he is no more ethically free in suspending the voluntary execution of a desire than in any other exercise of w ill. A power to suspemd volition necessarily thus dependent, leaves man s t i l l a part of the mechanism of nature."
(Dr. A.C. PTaser: Poot-aote to Locke*s Bssay.
vol. I , page 345,)
"Mr. Locke sayst- "The w ill signifies nothing but a power or a b ility to prefer or choose"...But the Instance he
mentions, does not prove that there is anything else in wil l i hft* but merely preferring; . . . . so ^ t i f we carefully dLstlhgulch the proper objects of the several acts of the w ill, i t w ill not appear by th is, and such-like instances, that there is any difference between volition and preference."
(Bdwards, The Preedom of the Will: Part 1, Sect. 1.)
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There can be l i t t l e doubt that Loeke set out to expound a eye tern of Determini#*. Ae already observed, hie intimate friend and dieoiple$ Colline, had no doubt th at Loeke «me a Detexaialstf and there ie a very interesting Observation by lecke upon the a b ility of Collins to grasp his real meaning. I t is quoted by or# A.C. Praser in h is in tro duction to Locke's ThiBsy on the Human understanding.
Writing to Collins, Locke says: . . . "You have # ccsprehcnsive knowledge of i t , and do not stick in the incidents, ehiOh I find momy people do#"(^) Sovovor, i t is possible to ask «Aether the system of Determinism esqHxmded by Locke in th is work is consistent with its e lf . Re raises a host of problems, which, i f pressed to th eir logical oenolusion, would have compelled him to modify the system of Determinism he was set upon expounding. Bis le tte r to Molyneos, a l ready quoted, indicates the very deep tnoertalndy, i f not inconsistency of his views won Liberty and Beoessity, and h is elaboration of these views In the Bsssy does not decrease the imoortainty.
m the chapter en titled "Power", he sets forth upen the troubled waters of th is vast and complicated subject, and i t is obvious that by the term "Power" he means the causal process. He does not use th is la tte r term in say diroot and fu ll meaning, but i t i s clear that i t is the csnsal process which leads him to the discussion of the w ill. Purther, «Aen he comes to discuss the "Ideas of Relation of Cause and Bffect", in a la te r chapter, he has very l i t t l e to say because he has exhausted the theme under the heading
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Of "Power"* He begins by observing th at tabs mind sm ss to tbs kaoeledge of tAe oanssl prooess or "Foeer" by
"sefleeting also on what passes within its e lf , and obeerr> lag a w nstsnt <Aaz%# of i t s ideas, sometimes by the im- praseion of sutwasd ohjeots on the s m e s , end sometimes by tbs deteminatiOB of i t s own ohoioe#"(l) IM te would have h is readers beliewe th a t "Power" is thas a "WLw^e"
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whiah Is the resu lt of msay other ideas# is #theosf of the causal process Ihhssdted by msse, but ssALfied in a weiy constderahle mssnsr. However, to Lecke, the
iwocess has a positive and a negative sw eet, th at is , Fewer to %mhe" a Wecge mad Power to "reeeive" a change, o r, as he terms i t . Active and Passive Power#
The sceptiaiSR of Hume is apparent in Locke upon tbd# question of insight into the causal process* Ve have a very imperfect idea of th is % ctive" power, s t i l l , he does not press such scepticism on the shatraot idea of power, bnt goes on to focus attention upon the power chserved in tho W ill. Hsw, i t is ju st a t th is point tim t Locks b% ins to get his diseussien of Determinism into real d iffiw ltie e . He gives the ispressiaa lAat I* has a wealth of ideas cm
th is sUhjeet a t his dUposal, bet he is not qtdte sure as to the eutecme of the dtscwsificn ef these ideas# Be «moeurs to be finding his way smcmg a vest array of data without aiy decisive idea of the sod towards «A1A he neves# i t i s ohviems that be is most snmioas to avoid dsgmatism upen th is isM S Of Liberty and Hecessity, and he conveys #ie impressim that he is permitting the facts to speak for themmelves, that i s , to his readers and even to himself# th is pains taking gsesAng for tra th , th is deliberate testin g Of the tCKture of arguments for value is very commsmdshle. y et, th is permitting the facta to speak for themselves o ftm
- 86
result# in Inoko raiclna problem# whioh are tmaaswered, and making etateraonte Whloh, I f allowed to epoah fully for thmoeelwee, would involve bis omotral argument in endless tw istings and tusniags, and even oontradlotiw , o r, a t le a s t, grave modification of the previous statement. Looks c^pears to look a t tbs problem of Liberty and Beoessity from, a t le a st, four dietinotive points of view* These points of view are aU highly relevant to the quostioa under dlsousslm , but the basic queetlon is , how can these respective points of view be tmited in one central theme and doctrine of Determinism? What does Looks really teach hpoB Human Freedom? Perhaps the beet way to see the value of such a question Is to allow Looks to put his points of
view in tho following order. ihe tit le s used are not
Looke'e, but i t is f e lt that they sum up what ho is saying i;pon each of these aspects#
U)
ix m sm m ÊmUiwrrty of Astioq
Perhaps the most emphatio extract of th is point of view i s the following*-
"8e th at the Idea of liberty i s the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, acoerding to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them Is {nreferred to the other;
Where either of them is not in the power of Qie agent te be produced by him according to his v o lltlm , there ho is npt^at lib erty ; that agent is under necessity* "
inanimate objects cannot bo said to possess Freedom, for such Freedom is Intimately related to "Thought", and, therefore, such objects cannot be capable of preference* Locke Is always rather anbigÿwws about thie question of preferring and w illing. Later, i t w ill be observed, tliat Bdwards declines to allow Locke's distinction between preferring and w illing. Here and now, i t ic of in terest to sec how Locks compares these two ideas#
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