La racionalidad y la libertad

(1) th e Freedem of the W ill, Ft,2 . s e c t©4,

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A»«*‘ * W k Matodb M# VfpcmmA WA i t ia W t# ©a# ' ' '"" *

^Maibla t t MMk # «n " W tw feat* i##m ra or ia «qr»

thing without g m m t^ $m t such « for## eeomtitut## #m# kind # csoi»atl«i. Th# v#z^ fact th a t i t I# m "attlv t* / for## to

m

«xptiolt ©tatoMit of i t s Wwmmt CmmaHty# t%at i t oouoe#

isi

not iwpovtontf

mâ

%Wr# i t Amotion# i# mot i# o r tm t. The very fact th a t# i# am "active" foma# iadioat## ita cmnaality» Bm## doaXarea Bénard©# i t la

Im

poaaihi# t# poatulat# am "aative" fore# a# Camaality nithamt grmti%% th at i t ewaaa withim th# o rb it of the owaol aerie#, amé #u#h a ©erie# mmt aSwiqni involve tne eeeential eiemaata# thee# ar# amteoantatt and oenaequent. In other nor## # oame i# ll e # am effeot# and ia its e lf a re su lt of some p rio r gva### reject# the idea th at nay omne #am ha#Km

to emiat of its e lf * So adadts that i t is quite impeasibl# to

tm m

the #0 0% oamaee of a ll «ffèota# hot he ia e ist# that

thw e amnt be m m "eemeo" Why the effect is nhat i t i# and not smeatMsg quite different* Therefore# he Ohargee hi#

oppcmant M th tahi% r^hag# in w "mcnmed" ammo# while Id# Whole syetam of Causation deanodi a sure and o b l a t e link###

Of the camaal eerie## W ear# #aye that i f i t i# one# ^fsmtod # a t m Emommed" came earn eniet# then# the tWLe iysteem tie thought of mam is in mün#» Anything em hi^pan# and ^ Wnd of mam and the universe are in ooaplet# eearu- WLw,

mû

order# system and are m p lè te ly unthlakehle* In an m eeM m ttm of the Third Antinoay# i t mm ohecrved that Kant treated such am ar^m m t with respect# and declared i t to he the hasia of a conflict In itm oa^ fet# he In­

sisted th at this via# W Cmmation had# a t least# am# serlen# defect* I t le f t the h a m mind #i#% m an#### f m a i

sorios thidh went baedc sad forward to infinitude* Bdmsrd# ■I

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ha# m W # adsgivm #* for him the camcal se rie s were

l#M #*nted by dod and M il he amd#d by #d# and: th is is m added reasam fo r h is hcterwdnim#*

'T' »•

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’Whom ve speak of cause and effect, oatoeedent and ooneequent. fundamental and dependent, detersdning and determined# in the f ir s t Being, w o ie s e lf-

existent, independent, of perfect end absolute slwplio-

Ity

and im w tabllity, and the f ir s t <^ee of a ll

things I doubtless there must he less propriety in eudh represm tatione, than when we ©peak of derived dependmt heinge, # 1 0 are eompounded, ^ liab le to

perpetual sutatlon end eueeession#" vD

Therefore, Bdwsrde cannot agree with Kant that the generally aooepted vies of causation confronts the human mind with a

dilemaa, and he sees no reason to postulate a "spentcneity" of cause in man to escape from the dilemma presented in the causal series in nature* Wwards would be prepared to aooept the division of Reality and Appearwoo, of Bmmsna and Fhenommia, but he would include the whole of mm as appearance and phenomenon because he is a "dependent" being by the very act of his creation and the nature of his fin ite constitution#

Later, i t w ill be observed that idwards carries the conflict into the arena of th is supposed "absolute" humm Freedom by declaring that @od alone has Freedom in th is absolute sense, because God alone has real Morality. dod himself is Deter- mined, but i t is Doterminatioa by Bis own self-leg islated Moral Law. I t is d iffic u lt to see how Kant can answer th is

type of Moral Determination Mich is so sim ilar to h is own. I^eocnd. BOwards is most anxious to understand this postu­

lated active, freedom-foree, in man, and he presses his oppeci- ent to say whether ©uoh a freedom-force has bean termed "sdtive^ beoause of tho manifestation© of ac tiv ity , or Whether there

is some resident "dormant" activity in men regardless of its manifestations. In other words, is there some "re&crvoir" of this "freedom#foroe" waiting to be turned on at the needed occasions, or does the occasion of Freedom create i t s own activity? Edwards is sure that whatever reply i s given to

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euoh on InvottigatIon such a reply w ill rovoal tho abeurdlty of fciuch a poctulatod active nature in

mm*

l or tho very idea of "dormant" activ ity ie a oontrodiotion in terras, iXctlvlty

ik

active or i t 1^ non-existent* Further, a dor- mmt freedom-force would be without moral value* I f the

oocaelon for "freedom-willing" create© its own power, uOh a power, which was onco non-exlstm t, oannot begin to oxict without a "cause",

mâ

this involves his opponent in saying that X reedoc and its inherent force are factors wltliin the orbit of the causal sorlos, Wiich is a ll that idwarde de­ mande of Reason for oonfirnntion of hie system of Determinism. Third* Edwards would argue that the postulation ef an active,

freedoi -force in man has l i t t l e or nothing to do with the essential Freedom of the w ill, for i t postulates sush a force external to tho villl.

Edwards attempt© to sta te his case by saying that the very osoonce of Freedom consists in "choice", and "choice" is acting according to the preference of the adnd* Freedom of w ill consists in doing

^khaX

is "agreeable" to the mind.

I t does not mean al#%^ acting Ir^Rüse, or even on what might bo termed "inclination"* Doing what is agreeable to the mind my be doing one’s duty, or i t may mean following

one’s inclinations fo r ple ature* Huoh w ill depend upon the

char actor of the person making the particular choice, but i t is th is act of Jholce which constitutes the reedom of the W ill, Once the ohoioe is made there is an end to : reedoa, because tho ac t, good or ev il, is now determined by the choice* Therefore, to speiJt of an active "froedom-force" in man oon- v(%w no meaning to iMuards. For r e a l nativity begins

mA

ends in particular operations of the n il! througgi Jhoioe, and there lo always a ground, or a cause th e i i l l chooses one

lin e of oonduQt ratW r than luiotlier* A permnont freedom- fores in man waiting to bo turned on by the R ill utxm particular

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o o caslo n s I s m th ln k a b le aocordiizg to Edwards* For i t

pootuXatOB on a lre a d y caatssfaoturod & tore o f Froedoa which h a s

no r e a l m oral v a lu e . Even i f ho w ere to g ra n t th e em letm o e

o f ©uch a v i t a l F ree d e o -fo ro e re s id e n t i n man, ho oomnot exeopt o r exclude i t s o p e ra tio n from th e lam o f o a u c a tlo a , because to ’t a p ’ t h i s a lre a d y e x le to n t r e s e r v o ir o f a c t i v i t y th e R i l l would have t o be moved by scuae ground o r c a u se , mod

t h i s a g ain in v o lv e s th e W ill i n th e c a u sa l m e riw . % e

e x iste n c e of ’% heer" w ili- f o r o e I n mm i s no r e a l argum ent f o r ead^tenoe o f r e a l "Freedom" i n n an .

The Whole p o in t o f th e above d is o u ss io n i s to atte m p t to u n d e rstan d th e d if f e r e n t in te r p r e ta tio n s p u t upon d a o sn tie n

by Kant and th e D e to rm in ists. Both ap p ear to sa y th a t th e

c a u sa l p ro c e ss i s u n iv e rs a l and i n f l e x i b l e , b u t Kant r e ­ s t r i c t s such c a u sa tio n to es% )irical mm and th e w orld of

phenomena* Be i n s i s t s upon suoh a lim it a ti o n .

"m d c o n se q u e n tly , s in c e n a tu r a l n a G o m e lty i s to be met w ith o n ly in th e s e n s ib le w o rld , th ik a c tiv e bein g must i n h ie a c tio n e be ind ep en d en t o f, and f r e e from

a l l su ch n e c e s s ity . Ho a c tio n begime in thi© a c tiv e

b eing i t s e l f I b u t we may y e t q u ite c o r r e c tly sa y th a t #&e a c tiv e b ein g o f ^ i t s e l f begins i t s e f f e c ts i n th e

s e n s ib le w orld*" CD

The above e x tr a c t from Kant in d ic a te s th a t th e review o f th e argum ents used by Edwards a g a in s t th e p o s s ib le e x is te n c e o f a "freed<N s-foroe" i n man i s n o t b e a tin g th e a i r a s f a r as

th e K antian Defence o f Freedom i s oonoem ed. The im p o rtan t

p a r t of # e above e x tr a c t I s , how ever, th e re fe re n c e to " n a tu ra l n e c e s s ity " * Kant soys I f " n a tu ra l neoes© ity " were th e only c a u s a lity to be met w ith in th e w o rld , th e n Freedom

would bo im i^ossible* CS) H ere, i t i s im p o rtan t to o b serv e

th a t Edwards f u l l y a g re e s w ith Kant* B deards had bema oharged

w ith making man a mere autom aton, and handing him ov er to th e

law s of N a tu r a l n e o e e s ity " . Edwards repudiate© uch

a ^large

and 8aysi<*

(1)K. r* V* A.641# (8 ) E .r. V. A*684*

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"It le Indeed a plain dictate of ooamon senae, that natural neee©city 1© wholly Inconsistent with ju st prolee or blame . . . . There le no vice, fa u lt, or moral

ev il a t o il In the effeot done, nor are they lAo are

ttas»

neoeaaitated. In any Mae worthy to be punished,

hated, or in tho loaat diereepocted, on that aeoount#"(D m other vorde, if there i t nothiz^ else In the world but

"natural ' Heceaaity, then x roedom is l%x>esiblo and moral judgments are iapeasible. These statemanta by Kant and Edwards w e important not only because of the agreement tdiioh

they register upon one of the oentral conoopte of th e ir con- fllotin»^: eyctesk, bnt because of the manner in which they seek a way of oeoape from involving man in mere "natlNkUl" Beoeesity. The method of Kant is by an appeal to noumeoa and phsnoaeoa. Every object has an In te llirib le and a sensuous aspect, and

N atural" Necessity has reference only to the ^eaomsnol and the sensuous. The nouasnal and the in te llig ib le aspects ix>£s6ss a Aiueality a ll th e ir oen. I t i& Freedom Xiusallty,

and is different from "natural" Causation in that i t is original and is wcaimcd. All th is is completely repugnant to Edvards. uhile giving due «eight to the rational or sp iritu a l aspect of man, he ie on^zle to ccxicoive of an

"uncaused" cause. Hl^ reason for this is that he believes that Decessity" governs both God and men. There are too types of '9eoossitar". One might be termed "Natural", md the other They are the same in that they both possess the essential features antooedent and conséquent* Yet, they are different in that "natural" Hoces^lty possesses force, cow ilsion, and is irre s is tib le . "Philo©ophioal" Necessity, however, must never be regarded as force or compulsion* I t is siqply the logical relation of eubjoot and predicate. Perhaps i t is better to allow Edwards to put h it case in his own words I-

— 164 —

"Philoeosiileal 1« really nothing cl## than the fu ll and fixed coxmectien between the thli%# «to­ n ified by the etxbjeot and predicate of a p ro p œ itio i, which affirme eemethlng to be t«je*"U )

"fhiloeophieal" Booessity oooee into operation in the very law# of thought. For Inetance, i t 1# u tte rly iapo##ible for the hnmn mind to dmoy the exletenee of being in or to poeVolate uodvereal and aheolute "nothing". Further, each Heeoeeity operates in the statement# that two and two make four, or that a ll right line# drawn from the centre of a eircl# to the circumference are equal. He refers to vdzat he terms a quality of Neceeeity in doing one’# duty, and also to what

Kmt

term# the hypothetical imperative, or what RdwardS term# the "ceneeqoential" Heceeelty* 8e ia sle ts that these as­

pects of "jiAiloe^&ical" Necessity cannot be said to be " irré sistib le ", that is , in the general use

of

that term. Xn a eense they do qoœ>el assmat, but i t i# a very different meaning from tha^ found in "natural" Necessity. "Philosophical" Necessity operates in a universal end an inflrndble manner,

but i t does not exempt man from moral responsibility, fo r i t does not violate moral standard#. This quality of "philo- eophloûl" Necessity is the highest omoept

in»ich

is available to human Hessen. I t is from suoh a quality of Necessity that the human mind in fers. (1) Moral Neceseltyi (2) Natural Necessity. Moral Necessity might be sold to operate "When

md^^m eio^e» # iCh h@ c ^ ^ t % discharged from." (B) Natural Necessity is that discem ibl# and obvious course of events in %Alch the v ita l feature of Choice is absent.

I t 1© th is

mspram

ccmoept of "philosophical" Nocosslty in­ herent in the very texture of Mud and thought which moke# i t quite i% ^ # ib le for Edwards to grant the existence of any

The Freedom o f the R ill. Pt. 1. 6«ot«3.

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quality of ^auuality which hae its root© l:i vdsat Kant has teriaed "an original act, ©uch can

\sy

its e lf bring about

m at

did not exist before".(D

At th is point of the dikcussion, two postions press forward fo r oensideratioA. F irs t, did Kant maintain the concept of "philosophical" Necoeaity? soocnd, hae Kant boon ablo to re -

oonoile such a oonoept with his views upon nouaonal and jjAensBsnal Causality?

f i r s t , in reply to tho former question there con be l i t t l e doubt that the whole of the c ritic a l Philosophy is oonoemed with the exposition and vindication of such a oonoept, o r, in Kontifin language — the p ossibility of A P riori synthetic propositions* The foUoaing extract indioatee the depth of Fhnt'e in te re st in such a eonoiqzt:*f

"In the synthesis of appeoranees the loanifold of repre­ sentations is always suooessive. Now no object is hereby represented, since through this succession. Which is common to a ll apprehensions# nothing is distif%Msbed from enythlng else. But Immediately I perceive or assume that in th is suoceesicn there is a relation to

In document Teoría, Sociedad y Poder en Talcott Parsons, C Wright Mills, Jürgen Habermas y Anthony Giddens : una contribución a la Teoría Social contemporánea (página 131-135)