Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted.
Facts:
This case is about the last will and testament of Aleja Belleza. In her codicil, she bequeathed two parcels of land in Bacolod to Jorge Rabadilla. It was provided in the codicil that should Jorge die ahead of the testator, the property properties shall be inherited and acknolwedge by the children and spouse of Jorge. The testator also imposed obligations and conditions upon Jorge:
o Every year, he must give to Maria Marlina Conscolluela 75 piculs of export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar until Maria dies.
o Should Jorge die, his heir shall have the obligation to still give the sugar to Maria.
o The property shall not be sold, leased, mortgaged, to anybody except for the testator’s near decendants and her sister. And that should the property be sold, leased, mortgaged as buyer, lessee, mortgagee, as the case may be, must give 100 piculs of sugar every year (75 piculs of export and 25 piculs of domestic).
o Should any of the conditions in the will be violated, Maria Marlena may immediately seize the properties.
Jorge eventually died and was survived by his wife and children, among whom was Johnny (petitioner herein). Maria Marlena sued the heirs of Jorge, alleging that the conditions provided in
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Aleja’s will was violated. She claimed that one of the lands was mortgaged to the PNB and Republic Planters Bank, and they failed to comply with their obligation to deliver the 100 piculs of sugar.
The trial court ruled in favor of Johnny, holding that the action was prematurely filed, and that Maria must instead initiate intestate proceedings to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the codicil. The CA reversed. Hence, this petition. Johnny claimed that Art. 882 of the Civil Code regarding modal institution is not applicable as this was a case of substitution.
Issue:
Whether or not this was a case of modal institution governed by Art. 882. Held:
Yes. Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
The Court noted that this case can not be that of a fideicommissary substitution because one important element is missing. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The applicable provision is Art. 882 of the Civil Code which is known as modal institution wherein the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in- interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
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Conditional Institution
ELENA MORENTE v. GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA G.R. No. L-3891, December 19, 1907, WILLARD, J.
Art. 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and Art. 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower.
Facts:
The will of Consuelo includes the following clauses: (1) I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo; (2) That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, except the 1/3 part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any; (3) After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one of the properties belonging to me.
Gumersindo, married again within four months from the death of Consuelo. Elena, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition to annul the legacy made to him on the basis of his second marriage. The RTC denied the petition and ruled that the husband having married, he had the right to the use of all the property during his life and that at his death 2/3s thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother of the testatrix, and 1/3 thereof could be disposed of by the husband. Elena claims that by the mere act of marriage the husband at once lost all rights acquired by the will. It is neither alleged nor proven that any children have been born to the husband since the death of the testatrix.
Issue:
Whether or not Gumerisindo forfeits the legacy to him by reason of his second marriage. Ruling:
No. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and article 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower. It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in the second clause that he must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again. To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. There is nothing in the will that says that if he violates any of the clauses, he will forfeit the property given to him. It merely states that if he has children by anyone, 2/3s of that property shall pass to Vicente.
The will should be construed with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and there is nothing in the will which supports the argument of Elena.
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Legitime
REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL v. AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO G.R. No. 138774, March 8, 2001, PARDO, J.
A compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.
Facts:
Aida is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio and Cirila, who are now both deceased. Regina and Zenaida on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio with his common law wife Julia. Gregorio owned 2 parcels of residential land. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital, he confided to Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina and Zenaida. After Gregorio died, Aida inquired about it from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina and Zenaida. By virtue of the sale, the RD issued the TCTs under Regina and Zenaida. Aida filed a complaint for annulment of sale with damages and alleged that the signature of her late father on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan was a forgery. RTC dismissed. CA reversed. Issue:
Whether or not a legitimate daughter may be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children.
Ruling:
No. Even if the Kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Codeprovisions insofar as the transaction affected Aida’s legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code. Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent Aida from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
According to Art. 888 of the Civil Code: The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of 1/2 of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive Aida of her share in her father’s estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio must be determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.
SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (deceased), substituted by: ROSARIO SESPEÑE and their Children, namely: NICANOR JR., NELIA, NEMIA SEGOVIA, NOBELLA, NABIGAIL TAAY, NAZARENE MONTALVO, NORGEL, NEYSA, SILVESTRE, NORA MILCZAREK, NONITA CARPIO,
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NERLYN S. TUMBOKON, and NINFA T. SOLIDUM v. APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, and PAULINA S. DE MAGTANUM