La imposibilidad de la neuroética como ética fundamental

Eliminating the push factors that motivate European youngsters to depart for the Syrian-Iraqi war theatre cannot possibly be addressed by Muslim communities alone. Not only is Islam not the primary driver of their behaviour, their networks moreover operate at the margins of local community life, Muslim organisations and mosques, with whom they have almost no interaction. Nor can the push factors be neutralised solely by local authorities, however crucial their role might be in attempting to recon- nect (potential) Syria travellers with society.

‘Can you deradicalise a Muslim?’ a respected Belgian newspaper once wondered, undoubtedly not realizing how belittling such a headline was to Belgian citizens of Muslim faith. It expresses a widely held view in Europe, and in Belgium too, that Islam, and in particular a Salafist reading of it, is the key problem and that the solution is to ‘instil radical Muslims with more appropriate thoughts.’99 This has been the angle chosen by the UK government of David Cameron: ‘The root cause of this threat to our security is quite clear. It is a poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism that’s condemned by all faiths and faith leaders.’100 _{Other governments have}

followed suit. After the January 2015 attacks in Paris, Cameron’s French colleague Manuel Valls also endorsed this approach: ‘We have an enemy, and we have to identify it as such, it’s radical Islam and one of its elements, Salafism’.101 In the Netherlands too, a vigorous public debate is on-going on the relations between Salafism and jihadism, the former being called the conveyor belt to the latter. The Belgian prime minister Charles Michel also opined that the culprit is ‘a fanatical ideology that want to impose its obscurantist vision through extreme violence.’102 In media and official discourse – but also in deradicalisation programmes – radical- isation is often still narrowed down to the notion of a radical narrative that an individual catches as if it was a flu, and which then inexorably pushes him or her to its seemingly logical end, terrorism. This is a caricature of what a radicalisation process really represents. It is also a way of putting all the blame on the individual and his family and at the same time neglecting the role society plays. From its incep- tion, the concept of ‘radicalisation’ itself was already an oversimplification of an extremely complex phenomenon at the intersection of individual pathways and a societal context. In as far as the past can serve as a guide, efforts aimed at

99 _{De Standaard, 24 October 2014 and 9 January 2015.} 100 _{Quoted in The Guardian, 29 August 2014.}

101 _{Manuel Valls before the National Assembly, 18 November 2018. Quoted in Le Monde, 25 November 2015.} 102 _{Charles Michel quoted in Le Monde, 1 February 2016.}

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addressing the extremist ideology – the narrative – have seldom proven to be successful.103

An alternative explanation puts the blame exclusively on society, unable and unwilling to accept newcomers and address structural discrimination. The foreign fighter phenomenon is supposed to signal the failure of integration policies. This, too, is a reductionist statement of convenience. It not only reduces the individuals involved to mere puppets with no free will, it also turns a blind eye to the numerous success stories of migrants and their kin, successfully integrating into their new home country. It also overestimates the size of the subgroup in question. The jihadi scene in Belgium, as in the rest of Europe, is small and isolated, both in quantitative (numbers) as in qualitative (influence) terms.

Europol recently suggested dropping the term ‘radicalisation’ altogether, and replacing it with ‘violent extremist social trend’.104 Today’s foreign fighters phenom- enon is indeed not the result of the radicalisation process as it is usually understood (and succinctly described above). The fourth wave of foreign fighters is essentially an alternative pathway for deviant behaviour or, for some, a journey to Utopia, rooted in a ‘no future’ subculture. Vulnerability, frustration, perceptions of inequity and a feeling that by travelling to Syria they have nothing to lose and everything to gain, are common traits among those involved. For most of them it is thus akin to street gangs, drug trafficking, (juvenile) delinquency, with a larger-than-life dimension added in. But the route that they choose is one that not only leads them to extremism and terrorist violence, but also engenders a fierce backlash in their home country by enhancing the animosity against Islam, Muslims and migrants – which is precisely part of the environment they fled from in the first place.

Following the protests in Baltimore in April 2015, Barack Obama drew a surprising parallel that can be easily applied to the current foreign fighters phenomenon. After meeting youngsters in the Bronx, he referred to ‘a sense of unfairness and power- lessness’:

We see ourselves in these young men. I grew up without a dad. I grew up lost sometimes and adrift, not having a sense of a clear path. The only difference between me and a lot of other young men in this neighborhood and all across the country is that I grew up in an environment that was a little more forgiving. And at some critical points, I had some people who cared enough about me to give me a second chance, or a third chance, or give me a little guidance when I needed it, or to open up a door that might otherwise been closed. I was lucky.105

103 _{Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind. New York/London, Routledge, 2009, p. 4.} 104 _{See note 19.}

105 _{Remarks by the President at Launch of the My Brother’s Keeper Alliance. New York, West Bronx, 4 mei 2015.}

(https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/04/remarks-president-launch-my-brothers- keeper-alliance).

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In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the French novelist Erik Orsenna desig- nated in the same vein ‘le terreau de désespérance’ [the breeding ground of hope- lessness] as the real culprit. This description closely fits Latifa Ibn Ziaten’s ‘feeling of abandonment’. In her book Mort pour la France (2013), she passionately argues with youngsters, including those living in the Izards district of Toulouse where Mohammed Merah grew up: reconcile with the country where you were born and raised. But at the same time, Marianne too is in need of some soul searching in order to overcome her own demons and to take care of all her children – without excep- tion.

Is there a light at the end of the tunnel? Following the series of tragedies in 2014 and 2015, authorities decided upon highly visible, far-reaching repressive measures. These are the easiest part of the answer. Some of the measures were merely meant as window-dressing. Others might turn out to be irrelevant or, worse, counterpro- ductive. But at the same time there seems to be an increased consensus, at least within the Belgian polity, that repression alone will never be adequate by itself, and that prevention is equally crucial.

‘Prevention’, however, comes in many different forms and colours. Understood as the strategy to counter the push factors behind the youngsters’ rush into Syria, it is a complex endeavour that will need time, resources, patience and forward-thinking. Results will never be straightforward. Compared to repressive measures, preventive efforts will always be more circumspect and difficult to gauge. Moreover, prevention lends itself less to political grandstanding. Even more important is realising that government action can only be part of the solution, perhaps even only a small part. In the realm of security, authorities play an irreplaceable role. In prevention, however, responsibility is much more widely shared and the involvement of many is needed.

Fortunately, today authorities, Muslim communities and local organisations feel pressed to address the issue head-on. Their quest for explanations and remedies to resist the lure of IS has visibly become more persistent, judging by the rapidly increasing number of meetings (both public and informal), workshops, in-house discussion groups and self-help groups for affected parents.

Stopping youngsters from leaving in the first place is the essence of effective preven- tion. Each departure represents a human tragedy. From a place where only the law of the strongest prevails, no one returns unharmed, and certainly not a teenager or a young person in his or her twenties, who is at odds with himself or herself, and with society. Neither polity nor academia has fully come to grips with the fault line in society that gave birth to the subculture in which this fourth wave of foreign fighters thrive.

The real issue is to find a way to make them understand that they have a future and thus a stake in society. No deradicalisation nor disengagement program will bear

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fruit if it fails to recognise the importance of addressing the context that permitted the emergence of the current foreign fighters wave and that provides motivation and direction for groups and individuals to use violence.106

To this end, the efforts of many are needed: government, civil society, media and citizens. If this is not addressed, once IS’ momentum has passed and its winners’ image crumbled, other hot spots will arise and again attract youngsters into similar journeys. Only when hope in the future is offered will the breeding ground dry up and youngsters cease to be drawn ‘to a country they do not know, in a culture they are not familiar with, and where a language is spoken that they do not understand.’107