2. Were the properties excluded by the Court of Appeals form part of the conjugal partnership of gains? Held: NO. Court of Appeals' Decision sustained.
Ruling:
1. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. Finally, the "psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
2. Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina case), the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
3. Sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence, homosexuality, physical violence or moral pressure to compel petitioner to change religious affiliation, and abandonment are grounds for legal separation, but not for declaring a marriage void.
4. In Marcos v. Marcos, the Court ruled that if the totalities of the evidence presented are enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, there is no need to resort to the actual medical examination of the person concerned. An expert witness would have strengthened her claim of his psychological incapacity. In this case, the testimony of Dr. Lapuz on his psychological incapacity was based only on her two-hour session with petitioner. She failed to prove psychological incapacity or identify its root cause. She failed to establish that respondent's psychological incapacity is incurable.
5. Petitioner also failed to prove that respondent's psychological incapacity was existing at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Petitioner only cited that during their honeymoon, she found it strange that respondent allowed their 15-year old companion, the son of one of respondent's house helpers, to sleep in their room. However, respondent explained that he and petitioner already stayed in a hotel for one night before they went to Baguio City and that they had sexual relations even before their marriage. Respondent explained that the boy was with them to take pictures and videos of their stay in Baguio City and had to stay with them in the room due to monetary constraints.
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage.
135. Te v. Te, Republic
2009 - Nachura, J.:
Facts:
1. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu
2. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. They stayed at Rowena's uncle's place.
3. On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20. The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated like a prisoner
4. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family
5. They finally parted ways
6. After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
7. The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature (dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent)
8. CA ruled that psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven.
9. On appeal to SC, He insists on both he and his wife are psychologically incapacitated. He also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent.
10. While OSG contends that the root cause of the psychological incapacity was not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina were not satisfied.
Issue: Was psychological incapacity on both parties sufficiently established?
Held: Yes Ruling:
1. The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity.
2. the psychological assessment, which the Court considers as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent.
3. Indeed, petitioner (husband), who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decision without advice from others. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him.
4. the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
5. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
--HERE GOES THE SUPER LONG OBITER--
- Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
- And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
- Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
*Then there's this super long part, which in part says:
a) The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Baviera, considered the inclusion of the phrase “and is incurable” but Prof. Esteban B.
Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and
Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under “special cases and special situations,” hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
b) Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application.
c) Yet, as held in Santos, the phrase “psychological incapacity” is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support.
Yet, as held in Santos, the phrase “psychological incapacity” is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support.
-Court mentioned Molina again. (not pasting it anymore! pasted it too many times already. refer to other cases =p sayang sa ink) (sorry, this case is so fond of obiter, but might as well include some of it since it really discusses psych incapacity)
-Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards (Molina), without too much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as “courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.”
--In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
-The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
- Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
- At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
136. Ting vs. Velez-Ting 31 Mar 2009 – J. Nachura Facts:
1. Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez were married on 26 Jul 1975. They had six children.
2. Upon passing the medical board and residency program, Benjamin worked as an anesthesiologist at Velez Hospital owned by Carmen’s family. Here, Carmen worked as the hospital’s Treasurer.
3. On 21 Oct 1993, Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity due to:
a) Alcoholism which affected his family relationship and profession b) Violent nature due to excessive drinking
c) Compulsive gambling habit
d) Irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give financial support
4. In support of her petition, she presented Dr. Oñate who evaluated Benjamin from the TSN taken during his deposition.
Benjamin has already gone to South Africa to work as an anesthesiologist. Dr. Oñate concluded that Benjamin suffers from a personality disorder.
5. In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He presented Dr. Obra who evaluated him based on the TSN and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Pentz, a psychiatrist from South Africa who personally examined Benjamin. Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with Benjamin’s personality.
6. On 9 Jan 1998, the trial court declared the marriage null and void due to Benjamin’s psychological incapacity.
7. On 19 Oct 2000, the CA reversed the ruling upon Benjamin’s appeal. It said that Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories and not on established facts contrary to the guidelines in Santos and Molina.
8. On 17 Nov 2003, upon Carmen’s motion for reconsideration, the CA reconsidered its previous ruling and sustained the trial court’s decision. It cited the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages issued by the SC on 15 Mar 2003.
Issue: Was the marriage void due to Benjamin’s psychological incapacity?
Held: No.
Ruling:
1. The totality of evidence presented by Carmen was insufficient to prove that Benjamin is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such at the date of the marriage.
2. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations. The balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra’s findings since it was based on Dr. Pentz’s psychological evaluation report who personally examined Benjamin.
3. The Court has not abandoned the Molina doctrine. The new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages only relaxed the stringent requirement enunciated in Molina. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.
4. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
137. Azcueta vs. Republic [important case]
May 26, 2009 - Leonardo- De Castro Facts:
1. Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met and got married on 1993, after only 2 months from their first meeting.
2. Marietta (petitioner) wishes to have her husband deemed psychologically incapacitated in order to have her marriage annuled because he is emotionally immature, irresponsible and fails to adapt himself to marriage life and to perform the essential responsibilities of a husband.
3. At one point, her husband had lied to her that he had gotten a job, when in fact he was merely just getting money from his parents. He cried like a child when he admitted to Marietta that his job was fake.
4. Also, she claims that they only had sex once a month and that she never enjoyed it.
5. His response to the statement of her not enjoying sex is that sex is sacred thus it should not be enjoyed or abused.
6. Her husband also does not wish to have a child yet because he is not yet ready.
7. Marietta, as well as the cousin of Rodolfo testified in support of this petition.
8. A psychiatrist deduced from the petitioner's testimonies that the husband is suffering from DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings.
9. The psychiatrist adds that the root cause of Dependent Personality disorder was because his mother was the dominant figure in the family, and that this made him ineffectual and inept, characterized loss of self-confidence, and constant self-doubt.
10. The psychiatrist also reported on the maturity and independent character of the petitioner in this case.
Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is adequate to deem Rodolfo psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.
Held: Yes Ruling:
1. Petitioner testified in court on the facts upon which the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under oath before the lower court and was cross examined, she thereby presented evidence in the form of a testimony. Significantly, petitioner's narration of facts was corroborated in material points by the testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo.
2. It was proven that Rodolfo, ever since childhood, always makes himself available to his mother's needs, and thus made him an
“easy prey, [and was] easily engulfed into her system.”
3. The Supreme Court upholds the deduction of the reputable psychiatrist who has worked in his/her field for 40 years (refer to the concepts area to know more about the disorder)
4. It is clear that Rodolfo had been psychologically incapacitated during the time of marriage and perhaps even before the marriage. This is rooted in his upbringing and family life.
5. SC cannot agree that Rodolfo's irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be attributed to immaturity or youth. He was already 29 years old when he went into marriage.
6. The dependent personality disorder is incurable in nature, and the fact that it started so early in Rodolfo's life makes it even more difficult to say that it could ever be cured.
Concept:
1. Dependent Personality Disorder- it is considered a permanent and incurable in nature. It cripples psychological functions related to sex, self-confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. (NOTE: this does not mean that if one has this it is an instant sign to say he or she is psychologically incapacitated. It always depends on the severity of the condition.)
2. We realize that psychology is by no means an exact science and the medical cases of patients, even though suffering from the same disorder, may be different in their symptoms or manifestations and in the degree of severity.
138. LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, Petitioner, VS. CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, April 16, 2008- CORONA
Facts:
1. H&W: Lester Benjamin S. Halili and respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili
2. They were only 21 and 19 years of age, respectively, when they got married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila.
3. After the wedding, they continued to live with their respective parents and never lived together but maintained the relationship nonetheless.
4. A year after, the couple started bickering constantly. Petitioner stopped seeing respondent and went on dates with other