4. Discussion
4.1. Effects due to the assumption for the type of DOS
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EVARISTO VAQUILAR, Defendant-Appellant March 13, 1914 – Trent
Facts:
1. Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two separate informations with parricide, in one for the killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of his daughter.
2. The manner charged and to have wounded other persons with a bolo 3. Several witnesses’ accounts showed that the defendant
- appellant had 'felt pains in his head and stomach."
- eyes were very big and red and his sight penetrating" at the time he was killing his wife and daughter, and that - according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy
- he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was - headache and stomach trouble about five days prior to the commission of the crimes
- looked very sad at the time
- In jail: his head is not all right;" that "oftentimes since he came to the jail when he is sent for something he goes back he does without saying anything, even if he comes back he does not say anything at all
- every other night he, the appellant, cries aloud, saying, "What kind of people are you to me, what are you doing to me, you are beasts."
Issue: Can Evaristo Vaquilar be considered insane using the accounts of the witnesses?
Held: No.
Ruling:
1. There is vast different between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does.
2. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind," "idiot," or "lunatic."
3. witness' conception of the word "crazy" evidently is the doing of some act by a person which an ordinarily rational person would not think of doing.
4. It is not at all unnatural for a murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and strike promiscuously at those who attempt to capture him.
5. The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow prisoner is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person.
6. The reflection and remorse which would follow the commission of such deeds as those committed by the appellant.
7. People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court said: "The court very properly continued with an explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity.”
8. People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), But passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the law may extend to persons under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from criminal responsibility.
9. Well settled that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system, where the person is mentally sense, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed under its influence. Care must be taken to distinguish between mere moral insanity or mental depravity and irresistable impulse resulting from disease of the mind.
People v. Rafanan
September 29, 1962 – Per Curiam Facts:
1. The Santellas: Venancio and his son Alfredo (lived in one house together with their wives), and Juan (lived 5m away with his wife) had just retired when they became captives to three men dressed in maong pants and fatigue shirt, each carrying a firearm, and to Dionisio Rafanan.
2. The Santellas were herded away in marching formation, the armed men following close behind with their guns aimed at them.
3. Juan, who was able to untie his hands, then jumped sideways. Immediately, the armed men fired at the same time. With the exception of Juan, the two were badly wounded.
4. After having sensed that the gunmen had left, Juan hurried to the barrio lieutenant’s house and reported the incident.
5. Dionisio came back, fetched Josefina (Juan’s wife) to her house and in Avelina’s (Alfredo’s wife) ransacked the contents of a trunk:
3 blankets, a gold ring, and cash.
6. The incident was duly reported to the constabulary detachment, and it was not until after 5 days that a young boy, upon interrogation, revealed the hideout of Dionisio and his companions.
7. The Patrol proceeded there, a battle ensued, and Lt. Mencias recognized Dionisio as one of the persons at the top of the hill.
When the firing subsided, the patrol rushed to the place, but it was already deserted. The outlaws left items, among which were those ransacked from Juan’s house.
8. The identity of Dionisio as one of the 3 who shot and killed the 2 Santellas has been established beyond doubt by the evidence for the prosecution. He was recognized by Josefina and Avelina.
9.In Juan’s testimony before the Justice of Peace:
1st – Dionisio and his other companions shot his father and his brother.
2nd – He now fully recognized the companions. He also included 3 others, including Benjamin Rafanan because according to the Constabulary, they were with the group from which the items taken from his house had been recovered. He then said that these 3 were not among those who came to his house, but they stayed in the fields where his father and brother fell.
Issue: Is the guilt of Benjamin Rafanan proven beyond reasonable doubt?
Held: No. It is presumed that Juan read the statement or that it was read to him before he signed the same. The evidence for the defense shows that Benjamin joined Dionisio only after, the latter being then engaged in recruiting HUK members.
Ruling: The judgment appealed from is affirmed with respect to appellant Dionisio. Benjamin is acquitted.
Concept: There is a presumption that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
Standard Oil vs. Arenas 25 Jul 1911 - Arellano, C.J.
Facts:
1. 1908 Dec- Villanueva and Siy Ho, as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil Company of New York, the sum of P3,305. 76, with interest.
2. Said sureties-debtors failed to pay their obligations so Standard Oil sued them.
3. 1909 Aug- CFI sentenced all the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff company the sum of P3,305.76, together with the interest
4. Then Villanueva’s wife petitioned that his husband be relieved from the judgment/sentence because according to her:
- on July 1909, the his husband Villanueva was declared to be insane by the CFI. So because of this insanity, she was appointed as husband Villanueva’s guardian.
- now as guardian, she wasn’t aware of the proceedings (her husband giving the bond) and that when her husband gave the bond, he was already in the state of permanent insanity
5. Court granted petition but didn’t relieve Vicente Villanueva from judgment because when he executed in December 1908 the bond in question, he understood perfectly well the nature and consequences of the act performed by him and that the consent that was given by him for the purpose was entirely voluntary and, thus valid .
6. Wife appealed saying that the lower court erred in ruling that the monomania of great wealth, suffered by the defendant Villanueva, does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the one herein concerned.
Issue: Does Villanueva’s state of monomania imply incapacity on his part to execute the bond involved in this case?
Held: No.
Ruling:
1. Medico-legal doctrine which supports the conclusion that such monomania of wealth does not necessarily imply the result that the defendant Villanueva was not a person capable of executing a contract of bond.
2. There was no proof to the claim alleged by the wife. It wasn’t shown whether monomania was habitual and constituted a truthful mental perturbation in the patient; that the bond executed by the defendant Villanueva was the result of such
monomania, and not the effect of any other cause; and that the monomania existed on the date when the bond was executed.
3. Plus, the bond was executed December 1908, and his incapacity was not declared until July 24, 1909 (a year after executing the bond).
4. SC agrees with Trial Court in saying that that a person's believing himself to be what he is not is not a positive proof of insanity or incapacity to bind himself in a contract.
5. And there were testimonies given by physicians and even a judge testifying to the sanity of Villanueva particularly during the time of the execution of the bond.
6. Court said: Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved. And this has not been proved in this case.
7. It is very evident that on December 15, 1908, when Villanueva subscribed the obligation now contested, he possessed the necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed.
Hernandez vs Santos 7 Aug 2009 – J. Corona Facts:
1. Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (Lulu) was born on 14 Feb 1947 to spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan. Maria died during childbirth. After Maria’s death, Felix left Lulu to the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero San Juan.
2. On 16 Dec 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. They had 3 children: Cecilio, Ma. Victoria, and Teresa, the petitioners.
3. Lulu inherited valuable real properties from Maria and Sotero San Juan estimated at 50 million pesos.
4. In 1957, Lulu went to live with her father, Felix. She stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5 due to her violent personality.
5. Upon reaching the legal age, she was not given full control of her estate. Felix exercised actual administration of her properties.
6. In 1993, the Hernandez siblings took over the task of administering her properties due to the demise of Felix. During 1968 to 1993, Felix and the siblings squandered Lulu’s properties.
7. In Sep 1998, Lulu asked the assistance of her maternal first cousin, Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that the Hernandez siblings dissipated her estate. Upon seeing her sorry physical state, Jovita brought her to several doctors for medical examination and was found that she was suffering from tuberculosis, rheumatism, and diabetes.
8. Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory of Lulu’s estate but was ignored by the siblings.
9. On 2 Oct 1998, Jovita filed a petition for guardianship in the RTC of San Mateo. In a decision on 25 Sep 2001, the Court declared Lulu incompetent and appointed Jovita as guardian over the person and property of Lulu.
10. Upon appeal by the Hernandez siblings, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling on 29 Dec 2004. The siblings appealed to the SC.
11. Meanwhile, Lulu moved to an apartment in Marikina but was abducted by the Hernandez siblings in Nov 2003. Jovita filed a habeas corpus petition in the CA on 15 Dec 2003 which was granted on 26 Apr 2005. The Hernandez siblings appealed with the SC which was consolidated with this petition.
Issue: Does the declaration of Lulu as incompetent require the appointment of a guardian over her person and property?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
1. Where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice.
2. Under Sec. 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, diseases, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may be properly place under guardianship.
3. There’s no compelling reason to reverse the CA. Jovita was validly appointed as guardian and as such, the habeas corpus in her favor was in order.
Concept:
NCC Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract: (1) Unemancipated minors; (2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
Cordora vs COMELEC 19 Feb 2009 – J. Carpio Facts:
1. Petitioner claims that respondent has committed an election offense for violating the election code. Petitioner claims that he was untruth when he said that he was eligible to run for office.
2. Petitioner says that respondent acquired American Citizenship through naturalization.
3. Petitioners says that Respondent has come back from trips and claims at immigration that he is an American citizen.
4. Respondent (whose mother is Filipino) claims that he was not a naturalized American but obtained American citizenship when his father, an American, petitioned him to the U.S.
5. Respondent claims that he was educated as a Filipino and has lived in the Philippines since birth.
Issue: Is Tambunting a naturalized American Citizen?
Held: No.
Ruling:
1. It is because that he has an American father and a Filipina mother which allows him to be BOTH Filipino and American BY BIRTH (Natural and not naturalized)
2. It was not necessary for respondent to acquire American citizenship through the naturalization process.
3. Other trips back to the Philippine show that he claimed to also be a Filipino.
4. Dual citizenship is NOT a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position.
Concept:
1. Dual Citizenship- is involuntary and is imposed because “we have no control over the laws on citizenships of other countries”
(Bernas)
a. those born of Filipino fathers / mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of Jus Soli
b. those born in the PH of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father’s country such children are citizens of that country.
c. those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced PH citizenship.
2. Dual Allegiance- a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states. This is voluntary.
MIGUELA R. VILLANUEVA, RICHARD R. VILLANUEVA, and MERCEDITA VILLANUEVA-TIRADOS, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, ILDEFONSO C. ONG, and PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondents.
May 26, 1995 – Davide Jr.
Facts:
1. The disputed lots were originally owned by the spouses Celestino Villanueva and Miguela Villanueva
2. Miguela Villanueva sought the help of one Jose Viudez, the then Officer-in-Charge of the PVB branch in Makati if she could obtain a loan from said bank.
3. Jose Viudez told Miguela Villanueva to surrender the titles of said lots as collaterals.
4. further facilitate a bigger loan, Viudez, in connivance with one Andres Sebastian, swayed Miguela Villanueva to execute a deed of sale covering the two (2) disputed lots, which she did but without the signature of her husband Celestino.
5. Miguela Villanueva, however, never got the loan she was expecting.
6. She found out that new titles over the two (2) lots were already issued in the name of the PVB.
7. First, the titles was issued for Jose Viudez, which in turn were again canceled and new titles issued in favor of Andres Sebastian, until finally new titles were issued in the name of PNB [should be PVB] after the lots were foreclosed for failure to pay the loan granted in the name of Andres Sebastian.
8. Miguela Villanueva sought to repurchase the lots from the PVB after being informed that the lots were about to be sold at auction. The PVB told her that she can redeem the lots for the price of P110,416.00.
9. On the other hand, Ildefonso Ong offered to purchase two pieces of Land that had been acquired by PVB through foreclosure.
10. 23 November 1984, while appellant was still abroad, PVB approved his subject offer under Board Resolution No. 10901-84 11. The PVB was placed under receivership pursuant to Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 334 dated 3 April 1985
12. 26 May 1987, Ong tendered the sum of P100,000.00 representing the balance of the purchase price of the litigated lots 13. Ong's demand for a deed of conveyance having gone unheeded, he filed on 23 October 1987 with the RTC of Manila an action
for specific performance against the Central Bank.
14. PVB has been back in operation since 3 August 1992
Issue: Is the offer made by Ong and sale of property perfected during the receivership of PVB?
Held: No, Ong's offer to purchase the subject lots became ineffective.
Ruling:
1. There is no doubt that the approval of Ong's offer constitutes an acceptance, the effect of which is to perfect the contract of sale upon notice thereof to Ong.
2. Ong did not receive any notice of the approval of his offer.
3. PVB was placed under receivership pursuant to the MB Resolution of 3 April 1985
4. The PVB was then prohibited from doing business in the Philippines, and the receiver appointed was directed to "immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes."
5. Under Article 1323 of the Civil Code, an offer becomes ineffective upon the death, civil interdiction, insanity, or insolvency of either party before acceptance is conveyed. The reason for this is that:
[T]he contract is not perfected except by the concurrence of two wills which exist and continue until the moment that they occur. The contract is not yet perfected at any time before acceptance is conveyed; hence, the disappearance of either party or his loss of capacity before perfection prevents the contractual tie from being formed.
6. It has been said that where upon the insolvency of a bank a receiver therefor is appointed, the assets of the bank pass beyond its control into the possession and control of the receiver whose duty it is to administer the assets for the benefit of the creditors of the bank. Thus, the appointment of a receiver operates to suspend the authority of the bank and of its directors and officers over its property and effects, such authority being reposed in the receiver, and in this respect, the receivership is equivalent to an injunction to restrain the bank officers from intermeddling with the property of the bank in any way 7. In a nutshell, the insolvency of a bank and the consequent appointment of a receiver restrict the bank's capacity to act,
especially in relation to its property
8. Ong's offer to purchase the subject lots became ineffective because the PVB became insolvent before the bank's acceptance of the offer came to his knowledge. Purported contract of sale between them did not reach the stage of perfection
Concept:
- an offer becomes ineffective upon the death, civil interdiction, insanity, or insolvency of either party before acceptance is conveyed
- the receivership is equivalent to an injunction to restrain the bank officers from intermeddling with the property of the bank in any way.
Osmena vs. Osmena
January 26, 2010 – Justice Corona Facts:
1. Chiong Tan Sy and Quintin Osmena, Chinese nationals, had three children, including Bernarda and Ignacio.
2. Chiong Tan Sy bought two lots. Ignacio, being the only Filipino citizen in the family at that time, the lots were placed in his name.
3. Before Chiong Tan Sy died, she executed a will in which she enumerated her properties. The ancestral house was specifically
3. Before Chiong Tan Sy died, she executed a will in which she enumerated her properties. The ancestral house was specifically