Film thickness and mobility in OTFT

1. the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor.

2. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

3. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.

4. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.

5. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.

6. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage The difference of this case with Republic vs. CA was that there was no due search in locating the marriage license.

75. Leda vs. Tabang

Feb 21, 1992 – Per Curiam Facts:

6. October 3, 1976 – Mr. Tabang and Ms. Leda were married, solemnized by Judge Tavarro. It was performed under Art. 76 of the NCC as one of exceptional character. They were both 20 years old.

7. They agreed to keep it a secret until Mr. Tabang had finished his law studies. They got married, but did not live together.

8. When he applied to take the bar, he declared that he was “single.” After passing, Ms. Leda blocked him from taking his oath, claiming that he acted fraudulently. She also alleged that after his law studies, he became aloof and abandoned her.

9. The court deferred his oath-taking and required him to answer the complaint.

10. In his explanation: he admitted that he was "legally married”, but it "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies. He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" because to his honest belief, he still has to declare himself single since the marriage was not yet made and declared public." He further averred that he and Ms. Leda had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.

11. The Court dismissed the complaint and allowed him to take his oath in 1982.

12. But the following year, she filed this administrative case for his disbarment:

a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with her, assuming that the marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of their marriage

b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his application to take the bar c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the SC

d. For being guilty of having deceived her into signing the affidavit of desistance and the conformity to his explanation. He only introduced her as his wife to his family and friends so that she would withdraw the complaint

8. Attached to the complainant’s petition for disbarment is a letter addressed to her, allegedly written by him stating that while he was grateful for her help, he “could not force myself to be yours,” did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites, among them: the minimum cohabitation for 5 years before the marriage, and that the parties must at least be 21 yrs old.

9. In 1990, the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation recommended that he be indefinitely suspended until the status of his marriage is settled.

Issue: Was Atty. Tabang’s lack of good moral character sufficiently established?

Held: YES.

Ruling:

6. Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross

misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.

7. He adopted conflicting positions in the various pleadings. He admitted having been “legally married,” but denies its legality, and instead harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract.

8. He denies having sent the letter, but its very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning.

9. The factual scenario gathered from the records shows that he had reconciled with her and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to the complaint to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledged lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.

10. SUSPENDED from the practice of law (Buti nga sa’yo. Hehehehe =p) Concept:

FC 34 – No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together for at least five years and without any legal impediments to marry each other.

76. Niñal vs. Bayadog 2000 – Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Facts:

1. Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.

2. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months after or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.

3. Instead, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years 4. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of

nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license (The case was

filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights) 5. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons

who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family

6. The lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.

Issue:

1. Was the marriage of Pepito and Norma valid?

2. What is the nature of cohabitation contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code?

Held:

1. No, it’s void

2. That which has no legal impediment; cohabitation as "husband and wife"; it should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract (meaning there shouldn’t be any third party involved.

Ruling:

1. Civil Code governs this case (FC not yet enacted)

2. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio

7. There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license.

In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years

3. Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union.

4. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.

5. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.

6. In this case, Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.

7. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

8. Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

77. Manzano vs. Judge Sanchez 8 Mar 2001 – J. Davide

Facts:

1. On 21 May 1966, Herminia Borja-Manzano and David Manzano were married in Caloocan City. Four children were born.

2. On 22 Mar 1993, David Manzano contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Judge Sanchez.

3. Judge Sanchez claims that he did not know that Manzano was married. He showed evidence that Manzano and Payao noted in their separate affidavits executed on the same day that they were both separated.

4. On 12 May 1999, Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against Judge Sachez.

5. After evaluation, the Court Administrator recommended that the Judge be found guilty and fined 2,000 pesos.

Issue: Is Manzano’s second marriage valid?

Held: No. Judge Sanchez is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. OCA recommendation affirmed.

Ruling:

1. Not all the requirements for a valid exemption from marriage license based on Article 36 of the Family Code were present in the second marriage. The parties both had legal impediments to marry each other.

2. Judge ought to know that a subsisting marriage is an impediment which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. He cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting marriages because it was clearly stated in their affidavits.

3. Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie; much less authorize the parties to remarry. Free and voluntary cohabitation

with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting marriage. It merely exempts them from marriage license requirement. In this case, it was merely de facto since there was no judicial declaration of the separation.

4. Judge clearly demonstrated ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

78. Aranes vs. Occiano April 11, 2002 – Puno Facts:

1. Petitioner and her husband wanted respondent judge to solemnize the marriage at their home in Nabua, Camarines Sur because her husband had difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travel.

2. Respondent judge agreed but discovered when he was there that the parties did not have a marriage license. He declined to solemnize the marriage, yet conceded to them when they pressed him to do so because there was an influx of visitors and because a reset of the wedding may aggravate the condition of petitioner’s husband who had just recovered from a stroke.

3. Petitioner’s husband died and she was unable to claim the property and his pension from the Philippine Navy because the marriage was void at the very beginning.

4. Petitioner charges respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law because he wed the couple outside his territorial jurisdiction and because a valid marriage license was not presented at the time of the solemnization.

5. Petitioner wishes to withdraw from the case after she read respondent judge’s reply that he warned them from the beginning and that petitioner was negligent in not giving the marriage license.

Issue: Was there grave misconduct on the part of respondent judge?

Held: Yes.

Ruling:

1. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Art 3, which will not affect the validity of the marriage.

2. His act amounted to gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage without the valid marriage license. It is the marriage license which gives him authority to do so.

79. NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY July 19, 1996 – Romero Facts:

1. Complainant Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed this case to the Supreme Court against respondent Judge Henando Domagtoy of MCTC of Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency and ignorance of the law.

2. First, On Sept. 24, 1994, Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite his knowledge that Tagadan was merely separated from his wife.

3. Second, her performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario in October 1994 at respondent judge’s residence in Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

Defendant:

4. As to the first, Domagtoy contended that he merely relied on the affidavit issued by the RTC Judge of Bassey, Samar, which stated that Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. However, the certified true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borja showed that his civil status was “separated”.

5. Second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction”; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not a court may solemnize another marriage of a husband who was merely separated from his wife for almost seven years.

(2) Whether or not a Judge may solemnize a marriage at his residence.

Held: Both erroneous.

Ruling: