Selection of quantities for comparison

- In determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider a. all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the

b. witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying,

c. the nature of the facts,

d. the probability or improbability of their testimony, e. their interest or want thereof, and

f. their personal credibility

De Jacob v. CA

August 19, 1999 – Justice Panganiban Facts:

1. Dr. Alfredo Jacob died, leaving behind his estate, his spouse (Tomasa), who was also the Special Administrator for his various Estates, and a legally-adopted son (Pedro).

2. During the proceeding for the settlement of Dr. Jacob’s estate, Pedro sought to intervene, claiming his share as the adopted son and sole surviving heir. He questioned the validity of the marriage between Tomasa and Alfredo.

3. Tomasa opposed the motion to intervene, questioning Pedro’s claim as the legal heir.

4. The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro, sustaining his claim and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as non-existent.

5. This decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Is the marriage between Tomasa and Alfredo valid?

Held: Yes.

1. It was established that Dr. Jacob and Tomasa lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The proof is an affidavit executed by them. Clearly, the marriage was exceptional and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code. This code governs this case because the questioned marriage took place before the Family Code became effective.

2. A secondary evidence is allowed if the original has been lost or destroyed. The testimony of Msgr. Yllana, the solemnizing priest and the wedding photos should have been considered by the lower courts.

Ruling: The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, (but respondent’s adoption has not been sufficiently established.) Concept:

There is a presumption in favor of marriage. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any evidence, to be in fact married.

WHY? If not, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.

Silverio vs. Republic 2007 – Corona, J.

Facts

1. Rommel Jacinto Dante Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate

2. Petitioner alleged his name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate).

His sex was registered as "male."

3. He further alleged that he is a male transsexual; underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. Ultimately, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok.

4. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.

5. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. RTC said that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. Court also believes that no harm or injury will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition.

6. OSG, filed a petition alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. CA ruled in favour of OSG.

7. On appeal to SC, Silverio’s petition hinges on under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

Issue: Can the entries in Silverio’s birth ceritificate be changed and thus alter his status and capacity to legally marry a person of same sex?

Held: No, simply because there’s no law.

Ruling :

1. A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

a. Court said that just because he acquired physical features of a female, doesn’t mean he’s entitled to the changes he seeks b. Petitions like this are controlled by laws. Because it’s a privilege and not a right, the State has an interest.

c. And there’s a governing law. It provides for grounds for which change of first name may be allowed- this includes: 1) name is ridiculous, 2) new name has been continuously used, or he has been publicly known by that first name, and 3) change will avoid confusion

d. Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name which was his sex reassignment is not contemplated by any of the governing laws. (**there’s just really no law for sex reassignment as a ground for change of entries in the birth

certificate) PLUS, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status (**he still can’t do same sex marriage even if his name be allowed to be changed-his name may be changed to MELY, but he’s still MALE!).

e. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.

f. As to the other law he invokes, RA 9048- same thing, it doesn’t cover sex reassignment.

2. No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

a. Under RA 9048, a correction involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

b. (this might be long... )Now, Rule 108 (in relation to other laws) provides for entries correctable—this includes acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name)

c. BUT Rule 108 doesn’t really cover the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

d. More crucially, these acts, events, decrees, produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person

e. (**now for its relevance to Marriage...)

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations... The comprehensive term status include such matters as as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, ....

f. A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status.

3. Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity a. The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.

b. The petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.

c. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).

People v De La Cruz 11 Feb 2010 – J. Nachura Facts:

1. Victoriano dela Cruz was convicted of the crime of parricide when he killed his wife, Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

2. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC but deleted the award of exemplary damages of 30,000 pesos.

Issue: Did the CA err in deleting the exemplary damages?

Held: Yes.

Ruling:

1. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest.

2. The CA erred when it deleted the award of exemplary damages. In line with current jurisprudence, it is but fitting that exemplary damages, in the sum of P30,000.00, be awarded, considering that the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present, this being a case of Parricide.

Panganiban v. Borromeo 9 Sep 1933 – J. Malcolm Facts:

1. Petitioners (husband and wife) went to respondent lawyer in order to create a contract that would allow the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in an adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of them.

2. The Respondent lawyer notarized this contract.

Issue: Is the attorney guilty of misconduct?

Held: Yes.

Ruling:

1. Although crimes of adultery and concubinage are private crimes which can only be prosecuted with the consent of the offended party, they are still crimes.

2. The act of attempting to legalize the crimes by making a valid contract goes against the reality that they are considered by law to be unlawful and immoral.

3. SC holds that the contract is contrary to law, morals, and public order and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.

4. Respondent is guilty of misconduct: “a member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held liable to account by the court even to the extent of disbarment.

In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent June 21, 1940- LAUREL

Facts:

1. Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second marriage, sought the legal advice of the Atty Santiago

2. The respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again, and asked him to bring his wife on the afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939.

3. There prepared the document in which it was stipulated, among other things, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying.

4. After the execution and acknowledgment of by the parties, the respondent asked the spouses to shake hands and assured them that they were single and as such could contract another and subsequent marriage.

5. Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio.

Issue: Is the contract between Baniquit and his wife valid?

Held: No.

Ruling:

1. There is no doubt that the contract executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family.

2. The advice given by the respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.

Selanova v. Mendoza

May 19, 1975 – Justice Aquino Facts:

1. Saturnino Selanova and Avelina Ceniza filed against each other a complaint for adultery/concubinage.

2. It is presumed that either spouse had withdrawn the complaint, and as a result, Judge Alejandro Mendoza liquidated the conjugal partnership of Saturnino and Avelina.

3. In that instrument, he allocated to the husband a 13-hectare Riceland and to the wife, the residential house and lot.

4. Selanova then charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law. The judge alleged that he relied on the provision that “the husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval.

5. On Feb. 27, 1975, having reached 70, Judge Mendoza retired and asked for a compassionate view on his case.

Issue: Is the agreement separating the conjugal property of the spouses void?

Held: Yes. The judicial sanction for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during marriage should be secured beforehand. The provisions of Art. 221 of the Civil Code supports this as it mandates that 1) any contract for personal separation between husband and wife shall be void and unenforceable, and this has the same effect on 2) every extrajudicial agreement during marriage for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

A contract legalizing the commission of adultery and concubinage, as manifested in the liquidation of the conjugal partnership in after such withdrawal of complaints, is contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a consequence, not judicially recognizable.

Ruling: The respondent is severely censured.

Concept: Pre-nuptial Agreement – the dissolution of the conjugal partnership in marriage is secured beforehand

“I would not necessarily own what is yours.”

*Another example of judicial discretion – sympathy towards the respondent.

Lichauco-de Leon vs. CA 1990 - Medialdea, J.

Facts:

1. respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united in wedlock 2. they had a child named Susana (legitimate)

3. Later on, a de facto separation between the spouses occured due to irreconcilable marital differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home. Then Sylvia went to the United States where she obtained American citizenship.

4. Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California a petition for dissolution of marriage against Jose Vicente. She also filed claims for support and distribution of properties.

5. But since Jose was a Fil citizen and didn’t have properties in the US, Sylvia decided to suspend divorce proceedings and instead concentrated on obtaining property settlements with Jose

6. So she succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement (this letter agreement was one helluva demand! She demanded, among other things, that one Ortigas condo unit,Wack Wack condo unit, parcels of land in Ayala Alabang... plus financial support ) with her mother-in-law, private respondent Macaria De Leon

7. In that Letter-Agreement, there was that important phrase saying “it’s the stated objective of this agreement that said divorce proceedings will continue” (this later on was found by the Court to be one of the fatal points against Sylvia)

8. Macaria made cash payments to Sylvia in compliance with her obligations as stipulated in the Letter-Agreement

9. Then- Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership, which was granted by RTC.

10. Macaria filed with the trial court a motion for leave to intervene alleging that she is the owner of the properties involved in the case. The motion was granted.

11. She assailed the validity and legality of the Letter-Agreement which had for its purpose, according to her, the termination of marital relationship between Sylvia and Jose Vicente.

12. RTC ruled in favour of Macaria and declared the Letter-Agreement null and void; also declared conjugal partnership of the spouses and Sylvia DISSOLVED; and adjudicating to each of them his or her share of the properties and assets of said conjugal partnership in accordance with the agreement except the properties belonging to and owned by Intervenor Macaria.

13. Sylvia appealed raising that the cause or consideration of the Letter- Agreement is the termination of marital relations (here she was trying to make the Court believe that the Letter-Agreement was only about property relations and not marital relations);

Issue: Is the Letter-Agreement valid? (in so far as it deals with termination of either marital or property relations- which is another question that the Court must resolve)

Held: No.

Ruling:

1. The Court said  The third paragraph of the Letter-Agreement, reads: “In consideration for a peaceful and amicable

termination of relations between the Sylvia and Jose” It is readily apparent that the use of the word "relations" is ambiguous and thus subject to interpretation.

(Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the Letter-Agreement was the termination of property relations with her husband; On the other hand, Macaria and Jose Vicente assert that the consideration was the termination of marital relationship.

2. We (Court) sustain the observations and conclusion made by the trial court, that the parties contemplated not only to agree to a judicial separation of property of the spouses but likewise to continue with divorce proceedings

3. SC also agrees with the Trial Court in reasoning that:

- Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.; Also,

- Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulations...

4. So termination of marital relationship (Letter-Agreement) is not only contrary to law but contrary to Filipino morals and public Policy, thus NULL and VOID.

5. It’s all the more void because it contravenes Art 221, CC: The following shall be void and of no effect: (1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; (2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the

conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife; (

6. –discussion on vitiation of consent, it’s not relevant so won’t include it. but basically it’s an issue between Sylvia and Macaria that both acted in violation of laws so no party should be granted relief. Court simply said that this case is an exception to that

“in pari delicto” rule and that should there be any possibly relief, it should be granted to Macaria, not Sylvia.

7. So Court didn’t grant Sylvia’s petition.  Domalagan vs Bolifer

8 Feb 1916 – J. Johnson Facts:

1. In Nov 1909, Jorge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer entered into a contract where he was to pay Bolifer the sum of 500 pesos upon the marriage of his son Cipriano with the daughter of Carlos, Bonifacia Bolifer.

2. In Aug 1910, Domalagan has completed his obligation by paying 500 pesos plus 16 pesos as hansel or token of future marriage.

3. In the same month, Bonifacia Bolifer was married to Laureano Sisi.

4. Thus, he demanded the return of the 516 pesos with interest and damages. Damages resulting from the fact that he was obliged to sell a property in Bohol to meet the obligation.

5. After hearing, Judge Vicente Nepomuceno rendered judgment in favor of Domalagan and ordered the return of the 516 pesos plus interest of 6 percent.

Issue: Is the verbal contract valid?

Held: Yes.

Ruling:

1. Art. 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions does not render oral contracts invalid. Said section simply provides the method by which the contracts mentioned therein may be proved.

2. A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. A failure to except to evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law.

3. If the parties to an action, during trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.

Concept:

NCC, Art. 1403: The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by

In document and C. H. Chen (página 71-76)