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Hopping as dispersive charge transport and approach to transient behavior

In document and C. H. Chen (página 115-122)

6. VRH beyond the static (DC) characteristics of OTFT

6.2. Hopping as dispersive charge transport and approach to transient behavior

2. Does the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage (to Ancajas)? Held: No

Ruling:

1. 1ST ISSUE

a. There was sufficient evidence to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes:

1. marriage contract,

2. Villareyes' letter to Ancajas saying that Villareyes and Tenebro were married 2. 2ND ISSUE

a. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.

b. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy

c. A plain reading of the law on bigamy would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage (regardless whether 2nd marriage was void or whatever).

d. Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.

e. there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned.

f. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity.

g. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is

not without legal effects.

SEPARATE OPINION: Vitug (I didn't dare leave some which I thought to still be relevant because Vitug's opinion was really good- better than the majority)

Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?

1. I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage, the answer must be in the affirmative. BECAUSE Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity.

2. in People vs. Aragon: this Court has underscored the fact that the RPC does not require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal

statutes.

3. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment) the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.

4. Vitug doesn't agree that by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage.

5. He says that It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

6. in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy, it was held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. (Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals, the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to amend the Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter)

7. (this is getting really long but Vitug's opinion is The Opinion) he goes on saying... A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself (remember Atty Kat saying this also?). Why? The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity.

8. The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or

disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like.

9. The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity.

10. Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy.

11. There are cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, under such, there's no crime of bigamy.

12. The Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be shown that the

subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. (so if 2nd marriage is VOID, there's no bigamy)

13. SO Since psychological incapacity does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be

inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy

14. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage.

96. Abunado vs. Republic 30 Mar 2004 – J. Ynares-Santiago

Facts:

1. On 18 Sep 1967, Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceno. In 1988, Narcisa left for Japan.

2. Narcisa returned to the country in 1992. She then found out that Salvador is cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato and has left the conjugal home. She also discovered that Salvador contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Biñas on 10 Jan 1989.

3. On 19 Jan 1995, Salvador filed an annulment case against Narcisa. He obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on 29 Oct 1999.

4. On 18 May 1995, Narcisa filed a case for bigamy against Salvador.

5. Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida in 1955 and was separated in 1966. Since there was no evidence of their marriage, they got re-married in 1989 upon the request of their son.

6. On 18 May 2001, the trial court convicted Salvador of bigamy. The CA affirmed with modification (on penalty) the decision.

Issue: Was the second marriage to Zenaida bigamous?

Held: Yes. The marriage with Narcisa was still subsisting when he married Zenaida.

Ruling:

1. A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if Salvador eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, both the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.

2. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. All that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

3. Pardon by the offended party does not extinguish the criminal action considering that a crime is committed against the state and the crime of bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the person affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same.

Carpio Concurring Opinion:

1. Under the Family Code, before one can contract a second marriage on the ground of nullity of the first marriage, one must secure a final judgment declaring the first marriage void.

2. Prior to the Family code, one could contract a subsequent marriage without first securing a judicial annulment of the previous marriage. The person remarrying assumed the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy should the court uphold the validity of the first marriage.

3. Article 40 of the Family Code considers the marital bond or vinculum of the previous marriage to subsist for purposes of remarriage, unless the previous marriage is judicially declared void by final judgment.

4. For purposes other than remarriage, marriages that are void ab initio are void even without a judicial declaration of nullity as held in Cariño vs. Cariño. Thus, the general rule is if the marriage is void ab initio, it is ipso facto void without need of any judicial declaration of nullity. The only exception is Article 40.

97. Victoria Jarillo vs. People September 29, 2009--- Del Castillo Facts:

1. Victoria Jarillo (accussed) was married to Rafael Alocillo (1st husband)

2. Rafael Alocillo however was already married to Loretta Tillman when Jarillo got married to him.

3. Victoria then married Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) on Nov 26, 1979 but it was only discovered on Jan 12, 1999.

4. Emmanuel (2nd husband) filed a case of bigamy against Victoriano.

5. Victoria then filed a case of nullity against Rafael Alocillo (1st husband) because he also committed bigamy.

6. Her main defense is that she cannot be charged for bigamy because her first marriage with Rafael (1st husband) was void to begin with because he committed bigamy.

7. Regardless of it all, the lower courts still found Victoria guilty of bigamy.

Issue: Is Victoria guilty of bigamy?

Held: Yes Ruling:

1. Judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner's assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the prejudicial question.

2. Both the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.

3. For humanitarian purposes, the court recognizes that the petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse from Alocillo, thus a deduction of jail time is in order.

Concept:

1. Landicho vs. Relova- He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes

the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. (cannot invoke the “prejudicial question.”

In document and C. H. Chen (página 115-122)