VRH and the OTFT current

4. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the

“divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

5. But! We learned that a foreign judgment should be proved here in the Philippine courts; since Orbecido wasn’t able to show evidence that there was such divorce decree obtained by his wife abroad, Court is unable to declare that he’s capacitated to remarry; so his remedy is to give evidence. That simple. Once he does that, he’s free 

Concept:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

87. Dacasin vs. Dacasin 5 Feb 2010 – J. Carpio Facts:

1. Herald Dacasin and Sharon del Mundo were married in Apr 1994. They have a daughter, Stephanie, who was born on 21 Sep 1995.

2. In Jun 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree from the Illinois Court. In its ruling, the Court dissolved the marriage, granted to Sharon the sole custody of Stephanie, and retained jurisdiction of the case for enforcement purposes.

3. On 28 Jan 2002, both parties executed in Manila an Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie. Sharon then obtained an order from the Illinoi Court relinquishing jurisdiction to the Philippines.

4. In 2004, Herald sued Sharon for the enforcement of the Agreement. Sharon sought its dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

5. In 1 Mar 2005, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It noted the Illinois Court’s jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree including the order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to Sharon. It also said that the divorce decree is binding on Herald following the nationality rule.

6. Herald moved for reconsideration on the grounds that the divorce decree was void. The court denied reconsideration.

Issue:

1. Is the divorce decree valid?

2. Does the RTC have jurisdiction? Is the Agreement valid?

Held: Yes, the decree is valid and the RTC has jurisdiction. The Agreement is void for being contrary to Philippine law.

Ruling:

On the validity of the divorce

1. Herald cannot rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse. The decree is binding on him as an American citizen. He is bound by the decision of his own country’s Court pursuant to his national law.

2. A foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

On the validity of the Agreement

1. The RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Herald’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void. The Illinois Court only retained jurisdiction as to the enforcement of its Judgment of Dissolution.

2. The Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law. Under the law, the awarding of sole parental custody to the mother of children below 7 years is mandatory. Any agreement to the contrary is void.

3. Even supposing that Herald and Sharon are not barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, Sharon repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over Stephanie.

4. The imposed custodial regime lasts only until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the child’s emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt.

5. Since Stephanie is now 15 years old, the case is remanded to the RTC to settle the question of custody consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child’s best interest.

88. Lesaca vs. Lesaca 21 Apr 1952 – J. Reyes Facts:

The Family:

a. 3 Natural children from 3^rd wife b. 2 minor children from 2^nd wife

c. 2 kids that were made co-executrices (Juana and Consuelo) from the 1^st wife to their father’s will d. Baldomero is the father

These are three appeals:

Appeal 1:

a. The court ruled because of the widow that the 2 minor children should be granted each a monthly allowance of Php.100.00 for living expenses, plus an extra sum ofPhp.300 for their matriculation and uniforms.

b. the court ordered the co-executrices to deposit in court all the allowances.

c. co-executrices refused and claimed that the “same should be charged against their share of the inheritance.

d. they invoke Art 1041, which states that “allowances for support, education… are not subject to collation.”

Appeal2:

a. Appeal by the co-executrices declaring that the sum of 2,500 received by them as repurchase price of land bought by the deceased before the marriage is conjugal property and directing that one half of that sum be paid to the widow.

b. The widow and the deceased married in 1945 but the three parcels of land were bought in 1930.

Appeal3:

a. The deceased did not cultivate his own land.

b. Instead a person cultivated it for him for a certain percentage of the crop every year by way of rent.

c. The 1040 cavans of play in dispute was the rent or the decedent’s share of the harvest from Palay planted in June or July 1946.

d. This is after his marriage to Juana Felix.

Issue:

1. Whether the allowances for support granted by the court to the legitimate minor children of the deceased are subject to collation and deductible from their share of the inheritance. Held: Yes

2. Whether money received after marriage, as purchase price of land sold before such marriage to one of the consorts constitutes conjugal property. Held: No

3. Whether 1,040 cavans of palay of the value of 20,800 received as rent on decedent’s land for the years of 1946-1947 should be considered conjugal property so that one-half should go to the widow? Held: Yes

Ruling:

Appeal 1:

a. Article 1430 stated that “the surviving spouse and his or her children shall be given an allowance for their support out of the general estate… but it shall be deducted from their portion in so far as it exceeds what they may have been entitled to.”

b. Art 1041 does not float in this case because Art 1041 only refers to property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent.

Appeal2:

a. There is no showing that the sum paid to Garcia was earned by the joint efforts of the deceased and the widow.

b. In the absence of such proof the sum must be deemed to have been the property o the deceased to whom the land for which it was given in payment was sold.

c. Thus, ½ of the money should not be given to the widow.

Appeal3:

1. It should belong to the conjugal partnership.

2. It is immaterial that the rent was actually received after the dissolution of the marriage through the death of the spouses. It is the date of accrual that is important.

89. TERESITA C. YAPTINCHAY, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES June 9, 1969 - SANCHEZ

Facts:

1. On July 13, 1965, herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay sought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, her appointment first as Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965

2. Petitioner there alleged that the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for nineteen (19) years

3. The deceased who died without a will left an estate consisting of personal and real properties situated in the Philippines, Hongkong and other places with an estimated value of about P500,000

4. On July 17, 1965 an order appointing herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay special administratrix of the state of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay upon a P25,000-bond.

5. Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, - upon the ground that said Teresita C. Yaptinchay, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the latter's estate.

6. Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased, as special administratrix and of Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged surviving spouse, as regular administratrix.

Petitioner’s Defense:

- Petitioner's stance before us is this: As she was occupying the Forbes Park property at the time of the death of Isidro Yaptinchay - Petitioner avers "that the construction of said North Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by petitioner and the

deceased, petitioner even contributing her own exclusive funds therefor."

Respondent’s Argument

- private respondents maintain that the construction of that house was undertaken by the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay without her (petitioner's) intervention and the deceased paid with his own personal funds all expenses incurred in connection with the construction thereof.

Issue: Whether or not this Court issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the respondent judge's order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873 (Court of First Instance of Rizal) directing petitioner to deliver to Special Administratrix Virginia Y.

Yaptinchay of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the North Forbes Park property hereinafter described, and to refrain from disturbing or interfering in any manner whatsoever with the latter's possession

Held: Petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she prayed for.

Ruling:

1. It is quite true that, in support of the allegation that the house in North Forbes Park was her exclusive property, petitioner presented proof in the form of loans that she had contracted during the period when said house was under construction 2. On the contrary, there is much to the documentary proof presented by petitioner which would tend to indicate that the loans

she obtained from the Republic Bank were for purposes other than the construction of the North Forbes Park home.

3. Not one of the promissory notes mentioned reveals use of the proceeds for the construction of the North Forbes Park house.

4. Unsupported assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive property may not be permitted to override the prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage with respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix.