Pin, pan, clown (La guerra de los payasos)

The earlier sections positioned the contemporary institutional framework of school and dispensary committees in an historical context and provided insights in committees’ current responsibilities and actual activities. This next section presents analyses from the field research that relate to the question of how the institutional framework distributes control over the committees and the flow of resources around them. Most of the analyses are based on the group interviews with committee members.156

It starts with highlights of committees’ formal lines of accountability, before presenting findings on one key aspect: who actually controls the appointment process of members of management committees? Subsequently, it takes a closer look at the potential for control within a management committee; do the ex officio members – i.e. the nurse in-charge or the headteacher – dominate the committees? The last part of this section presents an analysis of the directionality of acts of accountability in management committees. Presuming that committees express their view about who is in ultimate control of the management committee in the directionality of their acts of accountability, a particular analysis of data asks how management committees balance upward accountability towards government with a downward accountability to people in the surrounding local polity? This last part also includes particular attention to aspects of financial accountability.

Formal accountabilities of management committees

Uganda’s School Management Committees formally are “the Statutory Organs at the school level and they represent Government”, managing schools “subject to any direction which may be given under the Ordinance by the Minister” (GoU, 1969: 4, 1998a: 17). And while school committee are expected to send copies of their minutes to the district education authorities, this does not necessarily imply subordination. The fact that since 1969 government formally controls the appointment of seven of the nine committee members leaves the school committee with a large degree of delegated autonomy in its operations. Importantly, the new education policy of Universal Primary Education in 1998 added a new reporting requirement for school committees: “Reporting regularly the

156

See Chapter 3 for methodological considerations regarding these group interviews and research tools such as Venn diagrams and pairwise ranking.

117 financial and operational status of the school programme to parents and community leaders” (GoU, 1998a: 18).157

Uganda’s Health Unit Management Committees manage the dispensary on behalf of the Sub-county Council, which appoints and removes committee members. The regulations do not contain instructions for the dispensary committee regarding its accountability – except for demanding the committee is responsible for ensuring that staff sends financial reports to the District Council. The regulations, for example, do detail that minutes have to be kept but not that they need to be sent to the Sub-county health authorities, nor does a committee have to present progress reports about, for example, its annual work plans. The fact that district authorities formally control the appointment of committee members suggests that, not unlike Uganda’s school committees, dispensary committees indeed act on behalf of government and are quite unencumbered by accountability obligations. The 1998 and 2003 regulations do, however, expect committees to “promote good public relations” and “to foster improved communication with the public thereby encouraging community participation in health activities” (GoU, 1998b: 9, 2003a: 3, 6, 7). Again, this is a hint at a line of accountability not unlike Uganda’s school committees.

Tanzania’s School Committees are formally “accountable to the Village Council” and must also forward their progress and financial reports to the education officials at the Ward and the District level. However, the regulations underline School Committees must also “effectively communicate educational information to all parents, pupils and community stakeholders” (GoT, 2001c: 16). Like Uganda school committees, Tanzania’s school committees must also make financial statements publicly available.158

Guidelines for Tanzania’s Health Facility Committees point out: “The Dispensary Committee shall be accountable to the Council” (GoT, 2001d: 33). Later regulations detail that the committees are expected to be submitting “quarterly, biannual and annual reports to the Council Health Board” – which is ultimately accountable to the District Council. Dispensary Committees can also be directed “to do any relevant activity as may be directed by the Ward Development Committee”. However, the regulations also stipulate that, “a

157

This issue will be taken up again in the later section on “Financial accountability”. 158

118 Dispensary Committee shall liaise with the community … to ensure that community needs are adequately addressed and facilitate a flow of information from both ways” (GoT, 2002a: 1334).

In general, the formal regulations for all management committees either present these committees as part of government – with government formally appointing all or most of the committee members and presuming an accountability to the appointing body– or as explicitly accountable to sectoral government bodies.

Selection and election of management committee members

Obviously, in a context where (tele) communication and direct supervision are limited, controlling the appointment process of members of local management committees is critical. It is probably for this reason that central government keeps a near-full control of the formal appointment process. For each of the four types of management committees, this section will juxtapose the formal appointment process against the findings from the field research to determine how the control over the appointment process unfolds in practice.

In Uganda, the regulations stipulate that School Management Committees are composed of nine members, of whom only two are directly elected by parents, four are appointed by the District Education Committee and three are appointed by the District Education Officer as the representative of central government’s Ministry of Education. Government formal influence over school committees is not only expressed in the fact it appoints seven of the nine members, but the District Education Officer is also the authority that formally approves of the appointment of all members (GoU, 1969: 1). However, the field research found that the actual practice of selecting school committee members deviates markedly.

Anecdotal Evidence Box 3 provides copies of a sequence of four letters between a school committee and local authorities – revealing that contrary to the formal appearances, the school committee is in actual control of the selection of members. The sequence starts with an authoritative letter by the District Education Officer stating all school committees “have with immediate effect been dissolved”; their statutory tenure had ended. The ensuing correspondence reveals how the outgoing school committee negotiates respectfully the

119 formal requirements with the central government representative and with the Sub-county Council authorities. However, it is the outgoing school committee that ends up fully determining the list of candidates proposed as the new committee members. The last letter in the sequence is from the same District Education Officer who dissolved the school committee three months earlier. This time she formally appoints all nine members proposed by the out-going school committee.

The above case study should not lead to the impression that the selection of the proposed candidates is fully controlled by the members of the outgoing school committee. Anecdotal Evidence Box 4 shows evidence of a competitive selection process of candidates in a meeting of parents to elect members of the next school committee. For each of the three executive functions, there are three candidates. A total of 61 parents voted to produce a list of nine candidates who were then proposed to the District Education Officer. Unlike the example in Box 3, this school committee did not even go through the motions to pretend some of the candidates were endorsed by the local Sub-county Council; all nine candidates resulted from an electoral process in the school. The District Education Officer also appointed these nine candidates.

The above two case studies are fairly typical and indicate that local actors – and not government representatives – ultimately control the selection of the members of Uganda’s school committees. The actual inter-play between formal rules and informal arrangements, as well as the electoral process in each school, however, varied. A few quotes from the committee interviews illustrate this and underline that central government’s regulations do not guide the processes.

“We were elected in 2003. How? Well, the PTA called a general meeting and dissolved the previous SMC after having served two years. Then the founding body appointed four members and the PTA five. (…) I think the head teacher asked the DEO to approve.” 159

“We were elected two years ago, for two year terms and the chairman has a three year term, but if the parents are not satisfied with us, they can elect other members every year.” 160

159

Group interview #16 (6 Oct 2004) 160

120 “The school committee made a list of the nine candidates after consulting the PTA. This list was sent to the Sub-county Council for approval. After that, the head teacher sent the list of names with the letter from the Council to the DEO for checking education and criminal records. The DEO then sent a confirmation letter. Took about three months.” 161

“All of us have just been re-elected in the general parents meeting earlier this year. There were three new candidates for the executive posts, but they did not get enough votes. This is our third term.” 162

Of special interest in the case of Uganda’s school committees is the role of the ‘foundation bodies’. Contrary to regulations and practice in Tanzania where foundation bodies have seat in school committees, Uganda’s central government does not allow a formal representation of foundation bodies on the school committee. In fact, when government suspects foundation bodies of having too much undue influence on the management of a school, it can and sometimes has, cut funding. Anecdotal Evidence Box 2 provides a reference to this. A local priest was also quite outspoken on the church’s relation with central government:

“The church built these schools, they’re on church land and we are still paying for books and maintenance … But government does not want us to help managing the schools. They only ask and take money and give nothing. Now they want more land.” 163

However, in line with the earlier finding that local actors ultimately determine the selection of committee members, it comes as no surprise that in spite of the uneasy relation between foundation bodies and central government, local actors find ample room to circumvent central government’s regulations and ensure the foundation body is represented in the school committee. Most school committees talked quite openly about this:

“At the annual meeting of parents, the PTA proposed two members and the Lutheran church 4. Then the parents elect three candidates among themselves. These were proposed to the DEO and he approved.” 164

“No, the church cannot propose a representative in the committee. But we invite the priest to all our meetings.” 165

161

Group interview #22 (14 Oct 2004) 162

Group interview #24 (15 Oct 2004). 163

Individual interview #7 (25 Sep 2004) 164

Group interview #20 (8 Oct 2004) 165

121 “We cannot have the priest in our committee, but we received the school from the Bishop so we appointed Mr X coordination person between the church and the SMC.”

Question: “What would happen if the Sub-county council or DEO would appoint a Lutheran or Muslim to your committee?”

Answer (confidently): “That would not happen.” 166

“The church cannot nominate SMC members. That is forbidden. The DEO takes a close interest. But those members elected from the parents make sure the church is represented. It is the foundation body.” 167

“The Bishop has his own Education Committee and when needed, they assist parents in coming up with candidates for elections in school committees.” 168

Some school committees, however, did not bother to ‘circumvent’ the regulations. Anecdotal Evidence Box 5 provides two examples of school committees that almost challenge government’s regulations. These two school committees not only openly list more than nine statutory members for their committees, but they also openly present the chaplain as a committee member or introduce two persons who sit on the committee on behalf of the “Foundation Body”. (Furthermore, one of these committees saw its “chairman elect” rejected in an earlier communication by the District Education Officer for failing to meet educational requirements, but the committee now re-introduces the man as an ordinary member.)

The formal regulations for Uganda’s Health Unit Management Committees stipulate that all members are appointed by local authorities – there are no elections. Formally, the Sub- county Council appoints “a prominent educated public figure of high integrity and not holding any political position” as chairperson. In addition, the Sub-county council selects one teacher from a school near the dispensary to be a member. Subsequently, each of the lower ranking Parish Councils being served by the dispensary – usually two to four Parish Councils – appoints a representative on the committee. The nurse in-charge of the dispensary acts as the ex officio secretary to the committee of five to seven persons (GoU, 2003b: 1). The interviews with committees in the field research confirmed the control by government of the selection process:

166

Group interview #24 (15 Oct 2004) 167

Group interview #26 (18 Oct 2004) 168

122 “We are the second HUMC. The first committee did not meet. So the nurse in charge talked with the health officials and she then selected nine new members. Us”. 169 “The Sub-county Council chairman was instructed there should be an HUMC for this clinic. So he selected us. I did not ask for this position, but I was appointed by the Council… it is an honour one cannot refuse.” 170

“Each Parish Council leader sent five or ten names to the Sub-County Council. These candidates did not know. The Sub-county then selected the members. It is an honour to be selected.” 171

One recurrent – and consistent – claim throughout the interviews is that candidates did not ask or compete for appointment to the dispensary committee but were ‘hand-picked’ for the “honour” by Village or Parish Councils, or by the nurse in-charge. Unfortunately, there was no opportunity in the field research to investigate what criteria would guide the local councils’ selection of candidates, or the criteria by the Sub-county Council for selecting from the proposed candidates. However, a remark by one of the district health officials seemed to confirm that village councils can feel they ‘appointed’ candidates, but then rely on central government representatives to intervene in case of problems, which suggests central government is indeed the leading appointing body.

“If the Village Council has a problem with their HUMC member then they come and see me. In fact, that has happened a few times and my deputy is currently

investigating such a complaint.” 172

The regulations for Tanzania’s school committees have changed significantly since the decentralisation policies of 2001. The current regulations stipulate there will be five members elected by parents and two members elected from the academic staff. In addition, the headteacher and the elected Ward Councillor are ex officio members and if applicable or desirable, a committee may have one representative of the “voluntary organisation if the school was originally established by that organisation” and a “patron” (mlezi) if the committee decides to have one. Tanzania’s regulations do not indicate the school committee members require government formal ‘appointment’ or elaborate details of the electoral process (GoT, 2002a: 1369). In all, the total number of school committee

169

Group interview #15 (5 Oct 2004). 170

Group interview 19 (7 Oct 2004). 171

Group interview #27 (18 Oct 2004). 172

123 members will vary from nine to 11. The interviews with school committees, however, reveal a rather different picture.

First, field research found elected Ward Councillors were involved in the meetings of only a few school committees on an occasional basis. In fact, most school committees mentioned Councillors as an external actor with whom they interacted.173 Second, most school committees had a mlezi, but with a few exceptions, these patrons did not live near the school and did not take part in meetings. (See section 4.5 for more details about the role of a mlezi.) Third, and most important, the interviews showed a wide diversity in the number of committee members (up to 16) but also in electoral processes: uniquely local agency and conditions were determinants, not government regulations, as these quotes demonstrate:174

“There was a general parents meeting where several candidates introduced

themselves. Voting was done by a show of hands and six were elected. Two of the old committee members got re-elected, two did not.” 175

“There are three churches, each appoints three representatives in the school

committee. Then the parents also met and they and they elected five members.” 176 The Village Council issued an election notice for the school committee and

candidates had three weeks to present themselves to the Council. At a public meeting seven members were elected by raising hands. But the chairman was chosen in a secret ballot. The teachers also elected two members.” 177

As in Uganda, the role of local churches – defined as ‘voluntary organisations’ in Tanzania – that have founded the school can play an important role in the selection of school committee members. And again, the selection processes appear to be different at almost every school:

“The meeting considered electing representatives for all religious organisations in the village: Catholics, Lutherans, Muslims and 7th Day Adventists. However, one of

173

Case studies into school committees in Tanzania prior to the decentralisation of 2001 suggests some school committees would invite Ward Councillors if and when need arises, rather than consider the Councillor as a permanent member of the school committee (PAMOJA, 2002b: 15).

174

A 2002 research among 95 school committees in the Kilimanjaro Region that found the number of committee members ranged from 10 to 17, “implying breaching the Act” (PAMOJA, 2002b: viii).

175

Group interview #38 (26 Nov 2004). 176

Group interview #46 (3 Dec 2004). 177

124 them was chosen because he had the trust of the other religious groups. So he

represents all.” 178

“We have one representative for the three, Lutherans, Catholics and Muslims. The parents chose the Catholic and the others trusted him and found him acceptable.” Question: “What would happen if he became unacceptable to some of the others?” Answer (puzzled): “Don’t know. We would probably have another election.” 179 “There are three churches around this school, each nominated a candidate for the school committee. In the elections only the Lutheran candidate got elected.” 180

The formal requirements for Dispensary Committees in Tanzania specify they are composed of five voting and three non-voting members. The five voting members comprise three members “from the community of dispensary users” who apply