Germany went into war in August 1914 without any clearly defined aims.118 The German government’s initial objective was simply the military defeat of its enemies. Its primary purpose was to break through the perceived hostile ‘encirclement’ by the Entente powers. It associated with this breakthrough the hope of making Germany militarily secure within Europe and to consolidate or expand Germany’s global position of power. Very soon after the outbreak of war, then, the government confronted the task of translating this very general goal into concrete programmes for the post-war settlement. Importantly, it never committed itself to a fixed programme. Rather than setting specific targets which it wanted to achieve through the war, the government chose to mould its demands according to the eventual military outcome. In this way, it seemingly wavered between various annexationist schemes and the return to the status quo ante bellum throughout the war. Yet its deliberations resulted in a general plan which remained constant: the idea of surrounding Germany with small buffer states which would be at least militarily and economically dependent on Germany. This chapter will examine closely the place of Antwerp in this general scheme, using some salient works on German war aims, published source collections, as well as a number of important archival sources.
General
In the west, the prime object was Belgium. It was an outstanding feature of the government’s wartime diplomacy that until September 1918 it refused to commit itself to the unconditional and complete restoration of Belgium, even though a public declaration to this effect would have arguably given it much needed moral leverage.119 In fact, hardly anyone in power was in favour of such a declaration. The moderates, like Richard Kühlmann, Foreign Minister from August 1917 to July 1918, thought at the very least that Belgium should be used as a pawn – extracting concessions from the enemies at the future peace conference by threatening to annex the country. Others, like the second
118 See for example, David Stevenson, 'War Aims and Peace Negotiations,' in Hew Strachan (ed.)
The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War, Oxford 1998, pp. 205-7.
Governor-General in Belgium, Moritz von Bissing, thought that Belgium should indeed be incorporated into the German Reich, while probably the majority were in favour of a partial restoration, with German ‘guarantees and securities’ to be created in Belgium itself. The chief advocate of this formula was Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg.
Belgium’s natural resources, its heavy industry, its dense railway network, its military fortifications, its coastline, and the port of Antwerp provided the main pull factors. The most consistent and most radical German demands were perhaps about the area around Liège, adjacent to the German border. The supreme command of the army argued that it was necessary to annex this territory with its important fortress and railway junction in order to secure Germany’s industrial heartland in the Rhineland from a future military attack.120 This demand was accepted by most officials, even those in favour of the restoration of Belgian sovereignty.
Antwerp was an equally consistent target of the government’s war aims deliberations. Unlike the case of Liège, however, the Antwerp Question seemed to have conjured up much more controversy. This is illustrated by one of Wilhelm II’s notorious comments on the margins of newspapers. In this case it was an English article in February 1918 about strategic key positions of Antwerp and Constantinople. Wilhelm II wrote beside the accompanying map that it should be enlarged and displayed in the Foreign Ministry, so that ‘my diplomats will finally learn the value of Antwerp from the enemy, since they do not want to believe me. We have to hold on to these “keys”, and we have them now.’121 Indeed, during the first few months of the war, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg
120 See for example: Gerhard Granier (ed.) Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung im Ersten Weltkrieg.
Dokumentation, vol. 1: Koblenz 1999, doc. 149, n.1 (discussion Tirpitz, Ludendorff, 13 Aug. 1915), p. 409. Jacques Grunewald and André Scherer (eds), L'Allemagne et les problèmes de la paix pendant la première guerre mondiale. Documents extrait des archives de l'office allemand des affaires étrangères, vol. 1: Des origines a la déclaration de la guerre sous-marine a outrance (août 1914 - 31 janvier 1917), Paris 1962, doc. 365 (Hindenburg to Bethmann Hollweg, 5 November 1916), p. 548. Jacques Grunewald and André Scherer (eds), L'Allemagne et les problèmes de la paix pendant la première guerre mondiale. Documents extrait des archives de l'office allemand des affaires étrangères, vol. 2: De la guerre sous-marine a outrance à la révolution soviétique (1er février 1917 - 7 novembre 1917), Paris 1966, doc. 251 (Hindenburg to Michaelis, 15 Sept. 1917, and memo Ludendorff, 14 Sept. 1917), pp. 430, 434. Liège was also the first concrete territorial war aim voiced in the German press. See Thomas Raithel, Das "Wunder" der inneren Einheit. Studien zur deutschen und französischen Öffentlichkeit bei Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges, Bonn 1996, p. 390.
121 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA AA) Berlin, R 21570, fol. 8. The article in
was treating Antwerp separately from the rest of Belgium in his war aims considerations. He thought that Antwerp should be carved out of Belgium, and either offered to the Netherlands as part of a comprehensive re-ordering of the Dutch-German relationship, or annexed directly by Germany. His pre-war knowledge of Antwerp, and importantly his pre-war contacts with the German Colony, seemed to have inspired these ideas. In October 1914 he is reported to have remarked that Antwerp was already German-like and that the city could be easily Germanised within a short time.122 Thus it seems useful to look at the trajectory of Antwerp in the German war aims deliberations.
Campaigning for a ‘German Antwerp’ – The German Navy
The first documented call from within the government to permanently control Antwerp came from the German Navy. On 28 August 1914 Admiral Tirpitz, secretary of state of the Imperial Naval Office, impressed on Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg the importance of ‘acquiring’ Antwerp.123 In subsequent discussions the two men returned to the subject and agreed that Antwerp was an important factor for the future of Germany. When in January 1915 Bethmann asked Tirpitz for a written summary of his views on the Belgian situation, Tirpitz emphasised once more that the opportunity to gain possession of Antwerp was not to be missed. Similarly, the brother of Wilhelm II, Admiral Heinrich, Prince of Prussia, wrote in April 1915 that it was imperative that Germany was master of Antwerp in the future.124 Both Tirpitz and Heinrich give as primary reason the economic advantages that Antwerp had for Germany. In second place, they also asserted that Antwerp had a potentially significant military-naval value for Germany.
Indeed, the first discussion between Bethmann and Tirpitz was mainly about the future, but it seemed to have concerned the current strategic objectives as well. At this early date, the military conquest of the fortress of Antwerp had not
122 See points 2 and 6 of his ‘September programme’ (9 Sept. 1914). Reproduced in Werner
Basler, Deutschlands Annexionspolitik in Polen und im Baltikum 1914-1918, East-Berlin 1962, pp. 382-3. Undated notes Tirpitz on discussion with Bethmann Hollweg on 19 Oct. 1914, in Granier (ed.) Seekriegsleitung (1), doc. 146.
123 Granier (ed.) Seekriegsleitung (1), p. 399. Wende, Die belgische Frage, p. 26. See also:
Holger Herwig, 'Admirals versus Generals. The War Aims of the Imperial German Navy 1914- 1918,' Central European History, /5 (1972).
124 Granier (ed.) Seekriegsleitung (1), doc. 147 (Tirpitz to Bethmann Hollweg, 19 Jan. 1915), p.
even yet been decided.125 Tirpitz was probably a strong proponent of the extension of military operations to Antwerp. A few days before, he had created a naval division, which was to be deployed on the Belgian and French coast as soon as possible. In the last clause of his directive, he indicated the ‘top secret’ possibility that Antwerp, too, might be included in the division’s area of activity.126 Indeed, the naval division participated in the siege and conquest of Antwerp a month later and it was in charge of the city for a few days. It soon moved on to Bruges and the Belgian coast, however, and its area of command remained far removed from Antwerp. With the Scheldt estuary in neutral Dutch control, the direct value of Antwerp for the Navy was very limited in this war. As will be discussed later, the Navy used Antwerp as a tributary base for the war effort on the Flemish coast, but Antwerp never emerged as an important factor in the German naval campaigns.127 The question of whether a German-controlled Antwerp would always be as insignificant for the German Navy was investigated in several memoranda during the war.
Crucially, the active leadership of the German Navy were convinced that the Flemish coast, with the naval triangle of Ostende, Bruges and Zeebrugge, was of the utmost significance for Germany’s power on the world stage. The all- important point of reference was always Britain. The Navy’s argument was that a strong German naval base on the Flemish coast was such an acute threat to British military security that it would force Britain to make political and economic concessions to Germany. The Flemish coast, in this view, was the foundation on which Germany could become a true world power, the equal of the British Empire.128
The first who analysed in some detail the value that Antwerp could play in the future for Germany’s naval position in Flanders was a nephew of Tirpitz, Erich Edgar Schulze. Schulze was the second-in-command of the Naval Corps Flanders throughout the war, so he knew the local conditions from first-hand
125 On the decision to conquer Antwerp see ch. 1.
126 Granier (ed.) Seekriegsleitung (1), doc. 56 (Tirpitz to Zentralabteilung Reichsmarineamt, 23
Aug. 1914), p. 171.
127 See below, ch. 8.
128 See in particular Tirpitz’ memorandum ‘Die Bedeutung Belgiens und seiner Häfen für unsere
Seegeltung’ of 17 Oct. 1915, pp. 2, 4-7. A copy is in, for example: BAMA Freiburg, RM 3, 11718, fols. 110 ff. An incomplete copy is in: Granier (ed.) Seekriegsleitung (1), pp. 409-15.
experience.129 In early October 1915, he sent several drafts of a memorandum on the ‘military significance of the Belgian ports for the Navy’ to Tirpitz. It is likely that his uncle had asked for this exposé in order to use it for his own official memorandum, which he completed on 17 October. In his first draft, Schulze named both Antwerp and the Flemish coast as the Navy’s points of interest in Belgium, though he quickly established a clear hierarchy of the coast over Antwerp: even without Antwerp, the Flemish coast was of immense military value, whereas Antwerp without the coast was useless for the Navy. For even if the German Navy had full use of the Scheldt estuary – which was Dutch territory – Schulze argued that the Belgian coastline still controlled the decisive access route from the sea into the estuary. Yet this did not lead Schulze to dismiss the Navy’s interest in Antwerp altogether. He emphasised instead that a German naval station in Antwerp would enhance the value of the coast. If Germany controlled the Scheldt estuary, or if the waterway connection between Antwerp and the Belgian coast was enlarged, the Navy’s biggest warships would be able to use Antwerp. The current port installations along the coast catered for small cruisers, torpedo boats and submarines only. The relatively long and narrow route to the sea would probably still make Antwerp unsuitable as base for a full- scale sea battle against Britain. At the very least, however, Schulze noted that Antwerp would offer the quickest place of refuge and repair for ships that got damaged off the English coast.130 Alfred von Tirpitz, who took over much of the material presented by his nephew – sometimes verbatim – took equally great care to point out this potential military value of Antwerp.131
Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, chief of staff of the navy, by contrast was not as reluctant to dismiss the naval value of Antwerp in his memorandum of October 1915.132 On the positive side, Holtzendorff, too, noted that the great installations of Antwerp’s world port would facilitate the establishment of a naval base, and that its inland position secured the ships from enemy naval
129 Granier (ed.) Seekriegsleitung (1), doc. 56 (Tirpitz to Zentralabteilung Reichsmarineamt, 23
Aug. 1914), p. 170. See also correspondence by Schulze in: BAMA Freiburg: N 253 (Tirpitz), 170 and 209; N 523 (Schulze-Gaevernitz), 1f.
130 Erich Edgar Schulze, ‘Die militärische Bedeutung der belgischen Häfen für die Marine’ (first
draft, Oct. 1915), in BAMA Freiburg, N 253 (Tirpitz), 146, fols. 30-31.
131 BAMA Freiburg, RM 3, 11718, Tirpitz, ‘Bedeutung Belgiens’, p. 6.
132 Holtzendorff, ‘Die Bedeutung der belgischen Seehäfen für unsere Seegeltung, 29 Oct. 1915,
attack. On the downside, just like Schulze and Tirpitz, Holtzendorff recognised that this last feature was also a disadvantage, as it considerably delayed the fleet’s appearance on the open sea. Holtzendorff saw another problem with Antwerp, however, which the other two had not considered. He cautioned that the interests of the great commercial port would violently clash with an adjacent great naval port, especially as they would have to share the narrow access route of the Scheldt. Although Holtzendorff did not elaborate further on this objection, it was a most serious one. It touched on the very essence of Antwerp as a city married to world commerce – in fact, Antwerp citizens had a strong anti- militarist tradition, due to the constraints imposed on its expansion by the fortress of Antwerp.
In an original addition to the German Navy’s debate, Holtzendorff consequently argued that a much better suited naval base could be found in Terneuzen: the small Dutch port city located at the point where the canal from Ghent joined the maritime Scheldt, less than half the distance to the open sea than Antwerp (30 instead of 65 sea miles). In his conclusion, Holtzendorff emphasised once more that Antwerp was not suitable as naval base.133
Campaigning for a ‘German Antwerp’ – Bavaria
Another powerful voice that called for the inclusion of Belgium in the future German sphere of influence early on in the war, and one that focused particularly on the port of Antwerp, came from Bavaria. The Bavarian King Ludwig III was a vigorous lobbyist for the annexation of Belgium during the first year of the war.134 During the Christmas period 1914 he talked to Matthias Erzberger about his annexationist scheme, suggesting that Belgium would be best incorporated into Prussia, though Bavaria would be willing to take on the task as well. By way of justification, he referred specifically to Antwerp, arguing that it was the ‘natural port’ for the whole of western and southern Germany.135 The Bavarian insistence on the annexation of Belgium, particularly by Prussia, was also linked
133 Holtzendorff, ‘Bedeutung der belgischen Seehäfen’, points 11, 12, 27, in Granier (ed.)
Seekriegsleitung (1), doc. 150, pp. 418, 423.
134 Janßen, Macht und Verblendung, esp. pp. 21, 27, 29, 97.
135 PA AA Berlin, R 21427, fols. 40-41: notes on discussion Erzberger with Ludwig III, 31 Dec.
to the King’s scheme of enlarging Bavarian territory into Alsace-Lorraine, which he pursued for most of the war.136
In other words, the fascination of Ludwig III with the idea of annexing Belgium had two origins: one lay in diplomatic strategy – compensating Prussia in Belgium for Bavarian gains in the Reichsland –, the other lay in direct Bavarian economic interests. This second origin focused almost exclusively on Antwerp. Accordingly, when the Bavarian civil servant Adolf von Lutz was appointed representative of the Chief of the Civilian Administration in the Governmnent-General in occupied Belgium, he was instructed to duly report on any developments about the future of Belgium:
You know how much the King is interested in all that which is now known as the “war aim“ and which one is not supposed to talk about, and that specifically Belgium, or perhaps more accurately Antwerp, signifies the highest war aim for him.137
Apparently, the King avidly read all the information about Antwerp that Lutz subsequently sent home – including for example the technically detailed description of the port of Antwerp by the wartime commission from Hamburg and Bremen.138 Indeed, he had long been greatly interested in the problems of linking Bavaria to the world economy – Bavaria being one of the most landlocked states of Germany. In particular, he was enthusiastic about the ‘Rhine-Main-Danube’ project, and he patronised its main lobby group, the Bavarian Canal Society. This project involved the construction – or enlargement – of canals on Bavarian territory, with the aim of creating a continuous waterway system from the Black Sea to the North Sea.
On 6 June 1915, when he gave his annual address to the Canal Society, Ludwig III declared in thinly veiled terms that the Society was soon to profit from the annexation of Belgium, and the resulting ‘German estuary of the Rhine’.139 His speech was published verbatim by the Pan-German Münchner Neueste Nachrichten the next day, causing a stir in inner-German diplomacy. According to a Swabian diplomat in Munich, the King had actually intended to put further pressure on Berlin to make a pro-annexationist decision about
136 Janßen, Macht und Verblendung, pp. 21 ff.
137 Geheimes Hausarchiv der Wittelsbacher (GHA) Munich, Kabinettsakten Ludwig III, 59,
folder Baron Lutz: Dandl [Hertling?] to Lutz, 16 Mar. 1915.
138 GHA Munich, Kabinettsakten Ludwig III, 59, folder Baron Lutz: esp. Dandl [Hertling?] to
Lutz, 16 May 1915. See also ch. 4 for more on this book (Ehlers, et al., Verkehrswirtschaft.).
Belgium. The Bavarian government was quickly forced to distance itself from the King’s words, however, and the press censorship substituted a watered-down version of his speech of 6 June.140
This speech probably represented the peak of Ludwig III’s annexationist campaign. He was soon after influenced by his son Rupprecht, crown prince and commander of the sixth army on the western front, who had come to doubt that a full German military victory was possible.141 Nevertheless, he was extremely reluctant to let go of the idea of a ‘German estuary of the Rhine’. In January 1916, for example, he thought that if the whole of Belgium could not be annexed, then it might still be possible to annex just Antwerp, as well as perhaps the coastline.142
Parallel to the King’s interest, or possibly prompted by it, the Bavarian Ministry of Transport investigated in detail during the war the importance of Antwerp for the Bavarian economy. The key personality was Josef von Grassmann. A high-ranking civil servant (Ministerialrat) in the Ministry, Grassmann had been a specialist on inland waterways for over a decade.143 Furthermore, he had been involved in the commercial link between Bavaria and