El cuadro praxeológico

Las figuras humanas que estudiamos realizan acciones, es decir, tienen propósitos, luchan, por lo que ellos imitan la subjetividad humana. El cuadro praxeológico es útil para esquematizar su subjetividad o su habitus. Schäfer habla de análisis de habitus (HabitusAnalysis) para estudiar las prácticas de agentes sociales, pero en esta investigación no hay agentes, sino actantes, por lo que limitamos el modelo de Schäfer al estudio de las prácticas de los actantes. Los actantes son, por decirlo así, personas de papel, que están en los textos. Mientras que los agentes son actores de carne y hueso. Para esquematizar la subjetividad de los actantes, nos basamos en la información que provee el material escrito y no en la realidad social. Nos apoyamos teóricamente en la mimèsis II o configuración. Vemos que el modelo del cuadro praxeológico nos ayuda de igual manera para analizar actantes y agentes. La diferencia está en que la información que con él se organiza y esquematiza proviene de distintas fuentes, uno de la realidad social y el otro de un texto escrito. Que en nuestro caso es un texto teológico, un texto filosófico y uno literario.

El cuadro praxeológico es usado por el autor como una herramienta para el análisis de entrevistas, sermones y cultos religiosos. El modelo se elaboró para un trabajo de investigación empírico en Guatemala y Nicaragua (1983, 1985-1986), para estudiar a pentecostales de clase baja y a neo-pentecostales de clase alta y media, que compartían un espacio social común, pero que cada grupo interpretaba bajo signos distintos52 _{{cf. Schäfer 2009b; 1992}. Según Schäfer, los}

52 _{Un signo similar es usado ―dice Schäfer― de diferente modo según la posición que los agentes ocupan}

68 signos no solo representan, sino también, operan como percepción, juicio y acción (habitus)53_{. Se accede a las prácticas a través del lenguaje de los agentes. Ellos}

mismos le dan una interpretación que el científico social analiza.

A continuación, mostramos el esquema básico del “Cuadro Praxeológico” (o “Praxeological square: cognitive transformations”) según Schäfer54_:

Tabla 1: Esquema del cuadro praxeológico (H. Schäfer)

Schäfer da la siguiente explicación a este esquema:

Working with Bourdieu's theory of practical logic, the square can be transformed for sociological use. For this purpose, I distinguish terms for the description of experience (A and B) from other terms (A and B) for the interpretation (Deutung) of experience. Thus, the model has one term each for negative and positive experience as well as for negative and positive interpretation. Moreover the model will be read not so much like a static structure of meaning but like a structured process of transformation. The transformative process runs through all

judgement and action. As operators they organize the interpretation of experience in the sense that interpretation is already operative in the basic act of perception. At the same time, experienced objective circumstances (legal institutions, the police, the distribution of material goods, social recognition combined with the access to certain social places etc.) are not only social «hardware», but also function as signs relevant for human practices and not only as their objective conditions” {2009b: 9}. Para una discusión amplia sobre lenguaje y signos en relación a la teoría de Bourdieu ver capítulo 3 de la obra del autor: Schäfer 2015: 201-325.

53 _{“«Operators», according to my understanding (and close to the late Wittgenstein), are elements of}

social relations (including semantics) like statements, actions, signs, things etc. that exert effects upon those relations. However, an operator is nothing without in the which it operates (e.g. in the expression «y=(a)x» (y is a of x) a is the operator which relates y and x in a specific way). A statement such as «We are living in the end-times» is not simply a religious sign or symbol, and even less is it the signification of a factual condition. Above all it is a social operator that implies certain ways of perception, judgments, and actions and, therefore, social relations.” {Schäfer 2009a: 6, nota a pie Nro. 1}

54 _{Schäfer aclara que el método del “praxeological square” es solo superficialmente similar al “semiotic}

square” de J.-A. Greimas, pues en el primero se introduce la distinción entre experiencia e interpretación que ahora vamos a explicar.

69 the terms, generating sense by interpreting experience ―that is, ascribing meaning to practices (as Weber would say). In its sociological use, the model allows for two perspectives of analysis. Examining the mere cognitive operators, it helps us to understand the basic cognitive transformations that operate in the deep structure of practical logic. Drawing conclusions about dispositions of habitus, the model allows us (within the limit that «disposition» is not subject to observation [R. Carnap]) to understand central operations of identity― and strategy-formation among the actors observed. {Schäfer 2009a: 9-10}

Luego señala:

Accordingly the model allows us to capture two transformations: an epistemic and an action- oriented one. Both transformations operate under the axiomatic dichotomy between «positive» and «negative interpretation» (A and B), which is to say that clear cut ascriptions and explanations interpret complex contexts of experience and action. The epistemic

transformation accounts for the fact that experience is already being classified and assessed

during the very act of perception. In the model, this corresponds to the transformation between «negative experience» (A), «positive interpretation» (or: reasons for positive experience, A) and «positive experience» B). Perception, judgment and self-positioning, thus, can be understood as one, albeit differentiated, epistemic act. Correspondingly, the action-

oriented transformation (B to B and B to A) accounts for the fact that an actor's concepts of

actions not only are being molded by his opportunities and constraints, but also by perception and evaluation of experience. Moreover, the model implies that the processes of structuring experience by perception and of designing action can be understood as homological. {Schäfer 2009a: 10-11}55

Por último dice:

In this regard, the model can be read as a process by which actors, in our case religious movements, position themselves within their perceived social context and, thus, develop identities and strategies56_{. (Collective) actors articulate grievances (A), imagine and formulate} solutions (A) for the causes of the grievances (B), and affirm their position (B), e.g. as a religious movement. This process of interpretation and self-ascription allows for a «cognitive elaboration of experience» in order to find a position in the field of action and an identity as a social actor (position B). Moving further from this position, the actors are modeled as developing strategies to cope with the «structural conditions» and «adversaries» (B) that cause their «grievances» (A). The model thus articulates dispositions of perception and

55 _{En otro trabajo explica sobre este modelo: “[...] se puede leer el modelo de la siguiente manera: los seres} humanos nos encontramos con experiencias de crisis (posición abajo, derecha). La religión responde a ellas con promesas adecuadas de salvación (arriba izquierda). De allí se deriva una actitud de fe y prácticas de acuerdo a la promesa de salvación, constituyéndose así una identidad religiosa elemental (abajo izquierda). Ésta, a su vez, forma la base para explicarse las causas del mal experimentado (arriba derecha) y así desarrollar estrategias contra el mal {Schäfer 2009b: 57}.

56 _{“The «actor» can be understood as an individual or a collective. That is to say, one can analyze a collective set} of interviews together or analyze individual interviews and compare or superpose them later, depending on one's research interest. According to the theory, in any case, habitus is to a certain extent always individual and collective” {Schäfer 2009a: 15}.

70 judgment as conditioning the design of strategies, which is to say that strategies are embedded in identity. Nevertheless, the model does not exclude the possibility of a strategic calculus in a principled way. {Schäfer 2009a: 11}

Como se ve en el cuadro, el modelo distingue el nivel (“axis”) de la experiencia del de la interpretación.

The distinction between these levels is important in understanding the transformation which takes place by ascribing meaning to expedience and action. Meaning ―ideas, «symbolic systems» etc.― is by no means a simple mirror of «reality» (Rorty 1999). Meaning is itself an

operator in human practice. It does not simply represent states of practice, but, by virtue of

being «used» by humans for ascription of attribution, it becomes «instrumental» (in a Wittgensteinian sense), that is to say, a practical operator. This is how meaning comes to terms with the process of interpretation of experience in our model. {2009a: 11}

En el nivel (axis) de la interpretación A – B se produce la contrariedad de un juicio: donde se afirma y se niega cosas universalmente. Y el nivel que Schäfer reconoce como el de la acción B – A, se asocia con la sub-contrariedad, donde se afirma y se niegan cosas pero de manera parcial. Schäfer para su modelo dice que los términos de la interpretación de la experiencia A – B representan un significado más claro en relación a la ambigüedad de la experiencia B – A. Es decir, la interpretación que dan los actores a sus acciones en el caso que él analiza de los movimientos religiosos en Centro América, son conocimientos más comprensibles (conceptualizados) que sus prácticas. Esas nociones les permiten a las personas orientar sus acciones.

Schäfer informa cómo usar el modelo en el trabajo de campo en entrevistas:

Ideally, such research rests upon slightly guided interviews that give interviewees the chance to describe and interpret their praxis (in a certain field). There are, basically, only four necessary narrative impulses. One focuses on negative experience such as problems and grievances; the second on positive experience, for instance, one's own position as a member of a religious movement or as a successful individual; the third on interpretation of negative experience, such as the reasons for a crisis, adversity etc.; and the fourth on interpretation positive experience, for example, ideas for positive future developments, divine or human helpers etc. Such texts will not only disclose the basic structures of the habitus in question, but will most probably also produce a huge surplus of signification, since the interviewees will associate many experiences and interpretations with each question. This points towards two tasks, one analytical and the other theoretical and methodical. As for the analysis of interviews, it is necessary to establish the logical connection between signs as well as the hierarchy of meaning within the texts. As for the latter, the analysis focuses on paradigmatic relations and can be carried out by Greimas' method of isotope construction (Greimas 1995). The former

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focuses on syntagmatic relations and can be carried out by an analysis of basic logical junctions underlying the semantic relations in sequences of text. [...] However, the analysis points to the theoretical and methodical task of reconstructing wider relations of meaning from the interviews. This corresponds to the theoretical notion of practical logic as a large network of incorporated and practically operating dispositions of a given habitus (Bourdieu 1980). {Schäfer 2009a: 12}

Puede compararse las entrevistas que se analizan con narraciones y afirmar que rige en ellas un principio parecido al de la literatura, guardando sus diferencias en el uso y la forma que tienen, pero que básicamente se trata de configuraciones con el lenguaje (como vimos en Ricœur). Se configura e imitan determinadas acciones. Esto nos refuerza la idea de usar el cuadro praxeológico para analizar textos y estudiar la lógica práctica de los actantes en nuestros textos teológico, filosófico y literario, que, como señalamos, para representar al ser humano, imitan sus acciones.